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ABSTRACT 
What happens in a writer’s head before the writing begins and while the writing is taking place? 
What are the internal processes involved in the thinking up and writing down of imaginative 
fiction? Cognitive research takes a positivist approach, offering explanations based on scientific 
observation and measurement that are imminently rational, logical and readily depicted in neatly 
ordered models. However, none adequately reflect the descriptions contained in writers’ 
accounts of their lived experience of the creative writing  process. These experiential and 
phenomenological accounts depict a complex, multi-layered process, that is often chaotic, 
uncertain and unpredictable; the descriptions peppered with references to non-cognitive factors 
such as intuition, inspiration, felt sense, incubation and the imagination. The two approaches, 
positivist and phenomenological, express themselves in different languages and thus seldom 
speak to each other.  
This thesis seeks to address this gap by facilitating a bridge between them. It proposes 
a neurophenomenological model of the creative writing process that allows lived experience to 
sit comfortably alongside contemporary neurobiological research findings, so that each enriches 
and informs the other.  The model, therefore, provides a clear, systemic account of the creative 
writing process that embraces both its cognitive and non-cognitive aspects within a single, 
coherent framework that combines third-hand objective research with first-hand subjective 
accounts of lived experience, thereby yielding deeper insights into, and fresh conceptualisations 
of, the creative writing process.  It thus constitutes an original contribution to the discourse on 
Creative Writing as a field of study that also has the potential to impact the discourse in a range 
of related disciplines, such as the visual and performing arts, cognitive science, cognitive 
psychology, philosophy, phenomenology and neuroscience. The greatest impact of this 
contribution, however, lies in the scope it provides for cross-disciplinary conversations, 
particularly those that bridge the long-standing gap between the science and the arts.  
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CHAPTER 1 
CREATIVE WRITING – UNSETTLED, UNCERTAIN, UNDECIDED 
If the discipline appears to be operating at cross purposes … this is because the discipline is 
self-divided. Behind the current disputes are the contradictory aims, the unreconciled 
conceptions, of the discipline itself. (Myers, 1996, p. 4) 
 
The rise of Creative Writing as a field of study at university level has been both rapid and 
remarkable (Holland, 2003; Munden, 2013; Cowan, 2018).1  Introduced to the United Kingdom 
as a single program at the University of East Anglia in 1963, it quickly expanded its footprint 
so that by 2003, it was being offered at 24 Higher Education institutions as an undergraduate 
elective and in 40 programs at postgraduate level (Holland, 2003). Ten years later, these figures 
showed a sharp and significant increase. A Higher Education Statistics Agency survey found 
that Creative Writing was a subject choice offered in 504 degree programs across 141 Higher 
Education institutions (Munden, 2013). So widespread has this expansion been that it is difficult 
indeed to name a single HE institution teaching literature that ‘does not house Creative Writing 
in some form’ (Rees-Jones, 2011, p. 161). This growth curve is not unique to the UK; similar 
trajectories have been mapped in the United States and Australia, suggesting that this rise could 
justifiably be regarded as a global phenomenon (Cowan, 2018).  
However, the aura surrounding this ‘impressive success story’ has masked the absence 
of ‘an equally strong attention to its pedagogy and theory’ (Healey, 2009, p. 4). In other words, 
Creative Writing still lacks a distinctive epistemological framework that can inform its discourse, 
practices, pedagogy and research (Harris, 2007; Wandor, 2008; Donnelly, 2009). The 
consequences of this absence of a body of disciplinary knowledge are manifold. It renders 
Creative Writing ‘an academic outsider, in a state of flux and indecision as to its own purpose’ 
(Bradway-Hesse, 1998, pp. 4, 10) because, instead of shared understanding, there is ongoing 
 
1Throughout this dissertation, the term ‘Creative Writing’ is the name given to the field of study, while ‘creative 
writing’ (without capitals) is used as a generic term to denote the specific kind of writing that is the focus of this 
field of study.  
8 
 
uncertainty as to what ‘constitutes effective research in creative writing, nationally and 
internationally’ (Green, 2012, p. 327); instead of a clear theoretical underpinning for its 
pedagogy, there is more of a ‘polyphonic babble of epistemologies’ that does little to inform its 
teaching in a meaningful way (McLoughlin, 2006, p. 17), and there is such ‘ambiguity in the 
terminology used when discussing just what’s happening with creative writing within the 
university right now, [that] there isn’t even a common language established to discuss it’ (James, 
2015, p. 12). This dearth of shared theoretical understanding in Creative Writing is highlighted 
by ‘the volumes of theoretically grounded work’ in composition and professional writing which 
strongly suggests that ‘different types of writing can be studied and theorized like any other 
academic discipline’; it just hasn’t happened in Creative Writing yet (Hergenrader, 2016, p. 1).  
This chapter begins by exploring these deficiencies in more detail to provide the 
necessary background for the discussion of the dissertation’s specific research focus, namely, 
the creative writing process. This discussion will demonstrate the extent to which Creative 
Writing as a field of study is based on the paradoxical tenet that, on the one hand, firmly asserts 
that creative writing cannot be taught yet, on the other hand, advocates the teaching of it 
anyway. Following an exploration of this ambiguous view, the chapter presents the dissertation’s 
aim, namely, to provide a systemic account of the creative writing process, and to depict this 
process in a representational model. The chapter concludes with an outline of the dissertation’s 
argument, scope and approach.  
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION 
Scholarship on Creative Writing as a field of study reflects that there have been many attempts 
to clarify conceptualisations, theorise practices and develop shared understandings. However, 
what this discourse also reflects is a conversation bedevilled with so much uncertainty, 
contradiction and ambiguity (Dawson, 2005; Mayers, 2005; Healey, 2009; Jordan-Baker, 2015) 
that Creative Writing  can justifiably be deemed ‘a field or discipline “in crisis” ’ (Mayers, 2005, 
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p. 30). This view is not without foundation. As the following discussion will now demonstrate, 
Creative Writing, despite its spectacular rise, is a still field of study marked by undecided 
definitions, unquestioned assumptions and unexamined practices. 
Unsettled Status 
There is perhaps no better point to begin this discussion than with the vexing question of 
whether Creative Writing is a discipline or a field of study. This may initially seem to be a matter 
of small consequence, very much along the lines of “Is it a bird? Is it a plane? Does it matter, 
so long as it flies?” However, this apparently straightforward question touches on a deeper, 
more problematic issue in Creative Writing scholarship, namely, the lack of a distinctive 
epistemology;  a systemic, research-based theoretical framework that could and should inform 
its practices and pedagogy (Dawson, 2005).  
There are those who regard Creative Writing as a rigorous, flourishing discipline 
(Holland, 2003; Swander, Leahy and Cantrell, 2007), pointing to the emergence of doctoral 
programs, subject associations, and professional  bodies which, they claim, give Creative Writing 
a disciplinary identity. They are, however, by far in the minority. A greater number of scholars 
hold the opposing view that Creative Writing’s ‘lack of recognisable academic research’ strongly 
suggests that it cannot, as yet, be viewed as a discipline (Hergenrader, 2016, p. 1). They assert 
that Creative Writing is woefully under-theorised (Haake, 2000) and that it has yet to ‘undergo 
necessary inquiries and research into its field in order to develop and be measured as an 
academic discipline’ (Donnelly, 2009, p. 1). In their view, it has ‘generated very little in the way 
of self-analysis or theoretical publication’ (Wandor, 2008, p. 148) and is therefore ‘inadequately 
equipped and built on shaky premises’ (Harper, 2007a, para 1). They thus argue that  Creative 
Writing is still best defined as a field of study (Mayers, 2016), or a site of knowledge,  i.e. a 
cluster or collection of ‘ideas and actions that have been perceived, discovered or learned and 
[are then] grouped together in a specific way to create an identifiable “site” or situation – in this 
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case, one we call “Creative Writing” ’ (Harper, 2007b, para 3).  This field  or site of knowledge 
has yet to achieve disciplinary status (Bizarro, 2004; Andrews, 2009; Donnelly, 2009; Berg, 
2010). It has yet to ‘occupy its own disciplinary and intellectual space’ (Berg, 2010, p. 14), by 
asserting its independence as a discipline through clearly establishing its ‘epistemological 
difference from other subjects’ (Bizarro, 2004, p. 307).  
To this end, there are strongly worded proposals for the establishment of a parallel field 
of study, namely, Creative Writing Studies (Dawson, 2005; Andrews, 2009;  Donnelly, 2009 & 
2012; Harper, 2015a; Mayers, 2016; Gupta, 2017). These proposals include calls for a doctoral 
program that will allow for ‘a dissertation in creative writing theory (rather than the current 
creative dissertation)’ (Bradway-Hesse, 1998, p. 10); for focussed post-graduate research into 
the pedagogy, research methods, and disciplinary practices of Creative Writing (Bizarro, 2004, 
p. 307), and for scholarship that will distinguish Creative Writing from other closely related 
disciplines, such as composition and literary studies (Donnelly, 2009). In other words, a field of 
study that ‘takes Creative Writing as its academic theme rather than its hands-on endeavour’ 
(Gupta, 2017, para 25), and in so doing, provides a site for the development of a meta-discourse 
that will establish ‘the conceptual parameters of the discipline’ (Cowan, 2018, para 31), thereby 
helping to develop, define and debate its epistemology (Harper, 2015a).   
Responses to these calls have been cautious (Mayers, 2016). More often than not, the 
notion has been strongly rejected. Anna Leahy (2016), for example, presents a robust case 
against the both the term and the concept in the newly launched publication, Journal of Creative 
Writing Studies. She argues that the field of Creative Writing already embraces ‘scholarship in or 
writing about creative writing pedagogy and the profession’ (p. 1). Any move to establish a 
separate line of enquiry would thus serve only to widen ‘the divide between the creative and the 
critical’ (p. 3). At best it could only offer ‘an academic home for scholarly work in creative 
writing’, which she asserts is unnecessary because ‘my critical work already has a home: creative 
writing’ (p. 6). She is particularly fierce in her assertion that the notion of Creative Writing 
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Studies is largely driven by the perceived need for Creative Writing to conform to the ‘rules of 
the academy’ and be made to fit into ‘traditional structures’ (p. 1).  
Leahy’s response is telling for two reasons: first, its stance reflects an underlying 
ambiguity, similar to that evident in the discussion on the status of Creative Writing. In this case 
the ambiguity lies in the view that, while Creative Writing should be in the academy, it must, 
nevertheless, strongly resist efforts to make it part of the academy. This effectively positions 
Creative Writing as ‘an “anti-academic field” within academic existing institutions’; as  
something different from an academic discipline rather than as a new kind of academic 
discipline (Mayers, 2005, p. 20). In the second instance, Leahy’s strong resistance illustrates the 
stance which has fostered the pervasive view that ‘academic inquiry into creative writing … is 
an evil to be avoided’ (Bizarro, 2004, p. 295). This stance is characterised by a marked reluctance 
to ‘move beyond our preoccupation with the writer or the text to the role of creative writing as 
an academic discipline’ (Haake, 2000, p. 188), with the result that Creative Writing has been 
perceived as being ‘a- or even anti-theoretical’ (Haake, 1994, p. 47).  
Opposition to this line of argument comes swiftly and vociferously. The counter-
argument is that Creative Writing draws on the wealth of literary theory and literary criticism in 
the research and production of the creative text. Furthermore, the exegesis that must 
accompany each creative text entails critical engagement with theories from a variety of 
disciplines as students contextualise both the text and their writing process (Leahy and Brady, 
2009). This counter-argument, however, overlooks the key distinction being made in these 
proposals for Creative Writing Studies, namely, that while the production of the creative text 
may well be theorised, Creative Writing as a field of study is not. In essence, Creative Writing 
itself lacks an exegesis, an epistemology that addresses questions such as, ‘What is Creative 
Writing? How is Creative Writing, Creative Writing?’ (Jordan-Baker, 2015, p. 239), and ‘What 
is the nature of the knowledge it contains, considers and advances?’ (Harper 2007a, p. 93). That 
these questions are still unanswered, strongly suggests that Creative Writing is not yet grounded 
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in a theoretical framework, such as that found in other fields of study concerned with writing.  
One of the reasons for this lack of a theoretical framework lies in the fact that Creative Writing 
has not even arrived at a shared understanding of its terminology, much less a shared 
understanding of practices and pedagogy.   
Undefined Terms 
Defining exactly what is meant by the term ‘creative writing’ is surprisingly problematical. It 
seems to be a term that means ‘radically different things to radically different people’ with 
‘different aims and purposes in mind’ (Myers, 1996, p. 4). It has, for example, been used by 
computer programmers (Péréz and Sharples, 2001) healthcare researchers (Clewlow, 2001; 
Nicholls, 2009) and teachers of accountancy (Krom and Williams, 2009) in contexts quite 
unrelated to the traditional practices of literary text production.  Examples such as these lend 
compelling support to the argument that ‘all writing is creative writing’ because any writing, 
from instructions for using a power drill to esoteric literary poetry, ‘uses the raw materials of 
language, experience, knowledge, textual sources and the author’s own ideas and imaginings to 
bring something into existence that did not exist before’ (McVey, 2008, p. 289). They also 
support the contention that the term is one of ‘essential emptiness’ (Green, 2012, p. 322). Yet 
even within the field of Creative Writing itself, the definition of the term is still ‘the site for an 
ongoing contest of possible meanings’ (Mayers, 2015, p. 85).  Some of these contested meanings 
are centred on what is meant by ‘writing’ and others, on what exactly is meant by ‘creative’. 
The word writing ‘harbours both static and dynamic dimensions; it is both product and 
process’ (Mayers, 2015, p. 57). This is a significant distinction because how the word is used 
shapes conceptualisations in this field of study. For example, when a scholar uses the word, is 
she/he speaking of writing as product, writing as process or a specific kind of writing 
differentiated from other kinds of writing because the end product arises from a specific process 
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unique to that kind of writing? Such clarification may seem to be little more than a fruitless nit-
picking exercise, but this lack of clarification has significant implications.   
 If its reference is predominantly writing as product then ‘creative writing’ is little more 
than ‘a makeshift, omnibus term for poems, novels, novellas, short stories, and (sometimes) 
plays; for the invented as opposed to the historical; for the imaginary in contradistinction to the 
actual; for the concrete and particular as distinguished from the thorny and abstract. In short, 
for non-non-fiction’ (Myers, 1989, p. 2). However, defining the term ‘creative writing’ purely in 
terms of the written product, raises another issue. How should this tentative but broad 
definition be adjusted to accommodate the newest addition to the writing stable, namely, 
creative non-fiction?  By its very nature, the content of this written text does not confirm to the 
suggested criteria: it is historical rather than invented, and based firmly on the actual rather than 
the imaginary. Does this then mean that every time a new form of writing is included, the 
definition of the term must be changed? Would it need to be altered, again, to encompass the 
more modern forms of creative writing that are digital, multi-modal and genre-hybrids which 
are currently influencing the way creative writing is conceived and taught (Donnelly, 2009; 
Goldsmith, 2011; Clark et al., 2015)? 
If the word ‘writing’ refers to process, then what exactly is the process being envisaged?  
Moreover, how can such a process even be identified when there are so many conflicting views? 
Graeme Harper (2010), for example, asks if ‘the activities constituted as Creative Writing can 
always be grouped under the term ‘process’? He argues that  
Process is not the best term. Certainly it is a term trying to grasp 
something; but what it misses out is as telling as what it includes. To 
better incorporate fortuitousness, irrationality and emotionality, as 
well as planned action and rationality, talking of the activities of 
Creative Writing is far better (p. 116). 
Even if this question could be settled, and a process or a range of activities be identified as 
constituting the writing process, there would be yet another obstacle to overcome , namely, the 
resistance to any attempt to describe or analyse this process. ‘Many creative writers simply do 
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not want to demystify the processes of imaginative writing ... or want to know much about 
them’ (Bizarro, 2004, p. 295). They are of the opinion that such analyses and descriptions would 
tamper with a process thought to be inherently ‘too mysterious to describe’, and attempts to 
demystify it, would thus prove ‘harmful or destructive’ to the process itself (Mayers 2015, p. 
79). However, there is increasing support for the notion that Creative Writing should be about 
process, or at least devote a significant level of attention to the writing process (Murray, 1972; 
Collins, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Berg, 2010; Parker, 2014; Mayers, 2015). Yet even this  agreement 
raises other, thornier questions, such as: How does one teach a process that is likely to include 
‘those chaotic and often mysterious places where texts first emerge in the form of inspiration, 
idea, image, or sound’ (Mayers, 2015, p. 58)? Who, if anyone,  is equipped to teach it (Berg, 
2010)? Should it be taught alongside craft techniques (Green, 2012)? How does one document 
and evaluate such a process (Parker, 2014)? What would the impact of this approach be on the 
nature of assessment in Creative Writing (Donnelly, 2015)? 
The word ‘creative’ as a designator for a specific kind of writing, is an equally contested 
site within the discourse. Robert Pope (2005), for example, points out that ‘novelists, poets, 
playwrights, scriptwriters and biographers will either refer to themselves by those terms or 
simply as ‘‘writers’’ – hardly ever as ‘‘creative writers’’ ’. This raises a number of questions 
around the need to describe this kind of writing as ‘creative’. Is it purely, ‘a creature of the 
academy’, serving to ‘distinguish it from other educational forms of writing, such as ‘academic 
writing’ or ‘criticism’ (p. 40)?  If so, then what, in fact, is it that ‘makes creative writing so different’ 
from these other kinds of writing’ (Bishop and Starkey, 2006, p. 71, original italics) and will 
investigations into whether or not “creative” is a useful adjective only serve to ‘demystify an 
entire domain’ (Ostrom, 1994, p. xvi)? Would these investigations show creative writing to be 
materially different from the kind of expressive writing that is ‘precious writing, useless writing, 
flowery writing, writing that is a luxury rather than a necessity’ (Murray, 1982, p. 135)? Or would 
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they support the view that the term is intended to refer specifically to the writing of fiction and 
verse (Tate, 1964)?   
 The conversation becomes more muddled by the fact that there are those who, while 
supporting the view that creative writing is primarily concerned with the production of literary 
text, prefer to use the term ‘imaginative writing’ instead of or in addition to ‘creative writing’  
(Bishop and Ostrom, 1994; Haake, 1994; Clewlow, 2001; Green, 2012; Wandor, 2012).  This 
tendency is problematic  because the terms are used interchangeably, as if they mean the same 
thing. A clear example of this is found in the recently published Subject Benchmark Statement: 
Creative Writing (QAA, 2016) which formalises Creative Writing as a field of study.  The 
document throughout uses the term Creative Writing, yet the newly formed Higher Education 
Statistics Agency retains the classification used by the Joint Academic Coding System (JACS) 
and designates this field of study as ‘Imaginative Writing’, defining it as ‘the study of the creation 
of fictional text’, and makes no mention of  creative writing at all. This inclination to use these 
terms interchangeably raises a set of new, as yet unasked, questions, such as: Are the terms as 
interchangeable as assumed? How does one define imaginative writing when, as this dissertation 
will show, the very concept of imagination has yet to be clearly and unambiguously defined? If 
they do in fact have different meanings, how do the terms connect and relate to one another? 
Graeme Harper does suggest a possible way of distinguishing them, asserting that ‘when we say 
“creative” we sometimes mean “imaginative” but nevertheless points out that ‘these are not the 
same thing’ because “imaginative” refers to ‘the projection of mental images, whereas “creative” 
refers to something new’ (Harper, 2012, p. 61). However, he provides neither a detailed 
argument nor research-based evidence to support this claim. His comment then merely serves 
as an example of the extent to which issues like this are uninformed by rigorous, critical enquiry, 
and how easily the discourse can be shaped by unquestioned assumptions.   
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Unquestioned Assumptions 
As stated earlier, the conversation as to whether or not Creative Writing is a discipline is the tip 
of a much larger iceberg. Underlying this conversation is a more troubling issue, namely, the 
lack of a distinctive epistemology. This was not a pressing issue in the early decades following 
the introduction of Creative Writing to the academy. Reflecting on those early years, Wendy 
Bishop (1994a) remarks that the climate at the time ‘did not encourage pedagogical and 
theoretical thinking about creative writing” (p. 291). Even in the 1980s and 1990s, explorations 
that did attempt to question and challenge received boundaries were ‘more the exception than 
the rule’ (Mayers, 2015, p. 77) and Creative Writing scholarship ‘tended to take the form of 
handbooks which formalized craft-based workshop techniques’ (Dawson, 2005, p. 158). One 
of the consequences of this lack of critical enquiry into its epistemology is that Creative Writing 
instructors ‘[came] to take certain things for granted’, assuming that everyone shared ‘pretty 
much the same assumptions about our discipline’ (Bishop and Starkey, 2006, p. xii).  
Modern scholarship, however, is taking a more critical view of this knowledge gap. It 
finds that instead of the critical enquiry that could lead to the development of a distinctive 
epistemology, this gap has been filled with unexamined tenets (Andrews, 2009), tacit 
conceptions (Jordan-Baker, 2015) and unarticulated, unquestioned assumptions (Mayers, 2015).  
The main problem with these unquestioned assumptions about what is being taught, and why 
and how, is that they too easily ‘begin to operate as a kind of theory’ (Ostrom 1994, p. xi) 
without any requirement, or motivation, to investigate them critically.  They become deeply 
entrenched, self-perpetuating beliefs (Harris, 2009) that remain ‘suppressed, disguised as craft, 
or common sense’ (Camoin, 1994, p. 5), giving rise to ‘the structures we can’t see that none-
theless contain us, and invisible ideologies that would be rendered visible through critical 
enquiry into Creative Writing’s theoretical underpinnings’  (Haake, 1994, p. 240). In the absence 
of such a critical enquiry, Creative Writing is at the mercy of ‘a queer bricolage of theory, 
metaphor, faction, and myth, everything we know about writing, as well as what we don’t’ (p. 
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117). Kelly Ritter and Stephanie Van der Slice (2005), in their incisive argument, thus assert that 
there has been an over-reliance on lore – that ‘accumulated body of traditions, practices, and 
beliefs . . . that influence how writing is done, learned and taught’. They argue that the 
perpetuation of this lore has, in turn, developed into an ‘influential mythology’ that has 
sustained an ‘unquestioned pattern of practice’ (p. 103). When combined with the perceived 
resistance to a scholarly dissection of the complicated minefield of unexamined theories and 
practices that characterise Creative Writing, this mythology has effectively put the discipline at 
risk of becoming a field ‘dominated by an ever more unwieldy body of knowledge and practices, 
some of which may have outgrown their usefulness or been misapplied’ (p. 107). There are, 
however, clear signs that these unquestioned assumptions are now being critically scrutinised. 
Scholars are rigorously exploring some of the key tenets that have significantly impacted the 
shaping of Creative Writing. Among these is the unquestioned assumption that literary theory 
adequately fills the epistemological gap.   
Literary theory and literary criticism have been closely linked with Creative Writing from 
the outset. This link is so well-established that, in her objection to the notion of a field study 
called Creative Writing Studies, Catherine Brady (2009)  firmly states that there is no need for 
such an enterprise because ‘every reputable creative writing program requires students to 
undertake comprehensive literary study’ and that the craft theory of Creative Writing ‘has always 
been intimately linked’ to literary theory and literary criticism (Leahy and Brady, 2009, p. 200). 
While one may not agree with her position on Creative Writing Studies, there can be no refuting 
of her assertion that there has always been a close link between Creative Writing and these 
theories.  Clear evidence in support of her assertion is found in the historical accounts of the 
emergence of Creative Writing in the academies of the United States (Myers, 1996), the UK 
(Wandor, 2008) and Australia (Dawson, 2005). 
According to Myers, when Creative Writing was formally introduced to the American 
academy in 1936, the aim of the course was ‘to restore the idea of literature as an integrated 
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discipline of thought and activity, of textual study and practical technique’ (p. 4). This would be 
achieved by the teaching of literature ‘from the inside’ or, in other words, by more closely 
aligning the teaching of literature with the ways in which ‘literature is genuinely created’ (p. 8). 
Creative Writing was thus positioned as a branch of the study of literature that would facilitate 
‘an effort of critical understanding conducted from within the conditions of literary practice’ (p. 
133). It is still widely regarded as being, primarily, a way of ‘thinking and engaging with literature’ 
(Rees-Jones, 2011, p. 161), and as a way of preparing ‘aspiring writers to produce fine literature’ 
(Ramley, 2007, p. 51). There is little to fault this linking of Creative Writing with the study of 
literature which exposes students to a wide variety of published literary works. Reading  is not 
only ‘the creative centre of a writer’s life’ (King, 2000, p. 167). The close reading of these texts 
can inform a student’s own writing, as demonstrated in the craft-based writing workshops that 
shaped the pedagogy of Creative Writing in the early decades (Dawson, 2005). 
The issue at stake, however, is that literary studies have so come to dominate the field 
of Creative Writing, that it has led to the unquestioned assumption that literary theories could 
fill Creative Writing’s epistemological gap (Donnelly, 2009). Michelle Wandor (2008), for 
example, states that Creative Writing is in dire need of a theory that will include ‘an account of 
its history, as well as ‘an analysis and explanation of why it has come to take its current form’ 
to enable an informed ‘critique of its principles and practices’(p. 4). She then specifies that what 
she is arguing for is the development of ‘theories about practice’ that are based on the theories 
that inform literary criticism and literary studies (p. 6). This clarification suggests that despite 
her assertion that Creative Writing needs to theorised and reconceived, her argument still holds 
to the entrenched view that this theorising and reconceiving should be shaped by literary 
theories.  
However, there are those who have begun to challenge this view. They take issue with 
those who claim that literary theory can be usefully, and appropriately, integrated into Creative 
Writing pedagogy; that it serves to enrich the pedagogy through the practice of critically 
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interrogating finished texts and their contexts (Harris, 2009). They argue that these advocates 
for the integration of literary theory into Creative Writing overlook a fundamental flaw in their 
thinking, namely, that creative writing practice is ‘epistemologically different’ from literary 
studies (Donnelly, 2009, p. 154); that the two are, in fact, very distinct activities (Harris, 2009; 
Mayers, 2015). Whereas literary studies is a product-oriented field, concerned with the reading 
and interpretation of finished texts, which are approached as ‘stable and static entities’, Creative 
Writing, is a ‘process-oriented’ field in which texts are approached as ‘dynamic, unstable, and 
usually unfinished entities’ (Mayers, 2015, p. 57). In other words, the focus of literary studies is 
on what has been written, i.e. the finished text, while the focus of Creative Writing is on what is 
being written, i.e. the process of producing that text (Donnelly, 2010; Cowan, 2018). For this 
reason, Creative Writing, concerned with the process of creating the text, is not well-served by 
the theories based on the reading of the finished text. Quite the opposite, in fact. The 
dominance of literary studies, with its focus on the ‘interpretive function of reading’ and ‘the 
deconstruction of the text’ has not only superseded the question of  ‘how a story is constructed’, 
but is one of the reasons Creative Writing has failed to develop a theory of its own (Donnelly, 
2009, p. 153, original italics). This  unquestioned assumption has become so entrenched that it 
has left very little space to ask the very questions to even begin the necessary critical enquiry. 
This is beautifully illustrated in a statement made, without apparent irony, that ‘the effort to 
“academicize” creative writing pushes to the periphery what should be at the core of classes in 
English and creative writing: reading and responding to literature’ (Leahy and Brady, 2009, p. 
201).  
Contemporary scholarship is beginning to question this assumption. Of particular 
relevance to this dissertation are those questions being asked about the writing process as 
experienced by the writer, and why these accounts have not been considered an influential 
element in the development of a Creative Writing epistemology (Harper 2007a; Jordan-Baker, 
2015; Bailey and Bizarro, 2017). Even as scholars argue that an examination of writers’ account 
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could and should inform this epistemology, none, curiously enough, reference the wealth of 
scholarship already available on the writing process, such as the writings of William 
Wordsworth, Samuel Coleridge, Henry James, E.M Forster, Virginia Woolf, to name just a few. 
This dissertation therefore extends this list of questions to include others, such as: Why have 
these existing works not been referenced in any of the conversations? Is it solely due to the 
unquestioned assumption that  literary theory with its focus on the finished text adequately fills 
the epistemological gap? Could there be other reasons for this exclusion of these writers’ 
accounts of their writing process? Questions like these reflect how the unquestioned 
assumption regarding literary theory has hindered critical enquiry. There is, however, another 
consequence – it has also helped perpetuate the unexamined – but deeply entrenched – practices 
that frames the teaching of creative writing, namely, the writing workshop led by the writer-
teacher. 
Unexamined Practices 
Most of the scholarship that has been generated in Creative Writing has focussed on its 
signature pedagogy, the writing workshop (Jordan-Baker, 2015).  The key issue has not been so 
much the notion of the workshop itself, but rather what happens within that space (Haake, 
2000). This is reflected in the kinds of questions now being asked in the discourse, such as: 
What are the guidelines? What assumptions underlie them? When are the conversations in the 
workshops most productive and why (Ostrom, 1994)? Is it an effective pedagogy, and does it 
still work? Does learning take place in this situation, and, if so, what is being learned (Donnelly, 
2009)? Who is privileged to speak, and to say what “good” writing is? Whose work gets 
validated, and how (Kearns, 2009)? These are significant questions because signature pedagogies 
‘define how knowledge is analysed, criticised, accepted, or discarded. They define the functions 
of expertise in a field, the locus of authority, and the privileges of rank and standing’ (Horn, 
2013, p. 350). To better understand why these questions only surfaced so long after the 
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workshop had become so deeply embedded as Creative Writing’s signature pedagogy, it is 
necessary to go back to the beginning, to when it was first introduced at the University of Iowa 
in 1936 as the most effective way to teach creative writing. Diane Donnelly (2009) provides an 
insightful overview of this birthing of the writing workshop.  
Launched under the direction of William Schramm, the Iowa Workshop model was 
shaped by three influential strands. The first of these were the loosely constituted, but well-
established writing clubs where writers gathered together, informally, to write, read or hear their 
work read and then to revise that work in the light of the critical responses they received. The 
second strand was the academic workshop, established as part of the Advanced Composition 
program offered at Harvard as early as 1897, incorporated into the Verse-Making course 
introduced at Iowa in the same year and given further impetus in the post-graduate drama 
workshop that flourished at Harvard from 1906-1925. These enterprises created the space in 
the academy for the creative writing workshop which was to follow years later. The third strand 
was drawn from the newspaper industry where cub reporters traditionally developed and honed 
their journalism skills under the harsh and unforgiving eye of an experienced editor. This 
contribution came from William Schramm, the first director of Iowa’s Creative Writing 
Program, himself an ex-journalist. Under his directorship, the early Iowa Workshops operated 
primarily as a boot camp for young writers where a master of the craft would thoroughly criticise 
their writing as a way of teaching them to write better. 
Each of these strands was incorporated into the Iowa Workshop model but with some 
adjustments.  The notion of the newspaper editor as the experienced “master of the craft” was 
retained in the person of the writer-teacher. However, instead of this master being the only 
critic, the students now fulfilled this role, critiquing each other’s work, as was the custom in the 
writing clubs, thereby establishing the workshop practice of peer-reviewing. More importantly, 
the Iowa workshop also established the practice of framing the critique largely in terms of the 
reader’s response to the text. (The effects of this approach  would only become evident much 
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later, as will be demonstrated in the discussion below). This model then became ‘the archetype 
for all creative writing courses’ (Donnelly, 2009, p. 112).  
It also became a model that remained unquestioned until the late 1980s.  This can be 
attributed to the fact that, certainly in the early years of Creative Writing’s history, most, if not 
all, of these writer-teachers had ‘either studied at Iowa or were graduates of those who had’ 
(Bizarro, 2004, p. 296). They therefore simply ‘perpetuated the model they had experienced as 
creative writing students’ (Berg 2010, p. 37) because that was the only model they knew (Starkey, 
1994). To be fair, these writer-teachers, the masters of the craft, rarely had a background in 
pedagogy and so were not really in a position to question this pedagogical technique (Berg, 
2010). Nevertheless, there is truth in the view that the writing workshop is based on 
unquestioned assumptions and driven by lore; that despite being a model of instruction over a 
hundred years old, it is a ‘basically unrevised’ model  
in which the lore of creative-writing instruction has it that writers 
should teach what they do when they write, employing the 
“workshop” approach to teaching, based on a longstanding notion 
that the teacher is a “master” who teaches “apprentices”. The 
workshop method survives not because rigorous inquiry offers 
testimony to its excellence …  but because only recently have some 
teachers of creative writing questioned its underlying assumptions 
(Bizarro, 2004, p. 296). 
Contemporary scholars are now vigorously challenging two key aspects of the writing 
workshop, namely, the elevation of product over process and the silencing of the author (Haake, 
2000, Dawson, 2005; Donnelly, 2009; Berg, 2010; Mayers, 2015). They  argue that the 
requirement that students submit a completed text for workshop discussion means that the 
workshop is essentially ‘a text-centered exercise’ (Haake, 1994, p. 80); one overly concerned 
with end product (Haake, 1994; Healey, 2009; Mayers, 2015). Paul Dawson, for example, avers 
that the writing workshop – with its focus strongly on the crafting of the text, its emphasis 
firmly on writing technique, and with criticism as ‘its main pedagogical device’ – is still 
predominantly ‘all about text and textual criticism’. For this reason he asserts that the workshop 
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has been extensively shaped by a ‘theory of reading’ rather than ‘a theory of writing’; in other 
words, ‘how a work is composed by the student is not as important as how it can be read’ (pp. 
74, 87. Original italics). What is overlooked in this text-centred model, is the need for ‘careful 
and formal attention to the conditions and modes of literary production, because ‘talking about 
craft is not the same as practicing a writing process’ (Healey, 2009, p. 122). To make matters 
worse, this practice of elevating product over process is exacerbated by the observance of the 
gag rule, a rule that  ‘traditionally, silences the author’ in the workshop dialogue that follows 
(Donnelly, 2009, p. 38). There is thus no opportunity for the author ‘to explain her intention, 
ask for suggestions to make the technique more effective, or discuss published works that may 
have used similar techniques’ (Kearns, 2009, p. 795). More importantly, within this traditional 
workshop model, very little attention is given to the process of creating the text itself (Bishop, 
1990; Berg, 2010; Mayers, 2015) and contemporary scholars are finding this omission a matter 
of increasing concern. 
The view that Creative Writing’s pedagogy should be concerned with the writing 
process rather than the written product has lingered on the outskirts of the discourse for a long 
time, but it has never quite made it into the mainstream. Despite the strongly worded arguments 
for a more process-oriented approach made, in the 1960s and 1970s by the likes of Janet Emig, 
Donald Murray, and Sondra Perl (Gebhardt, 2011), and, more recently, by Wendy Bishop (1990, 
1994), the Iowa model continues ‘to be defended by many teachers who continue to adopt it’ 
(Berg, 2010, p. 86). One has to wonder why there has been such resistance to changing a 
pedagogy that effectively discourages collaboration, hinders playful experimentation and stifles 
creativity (Berg, 2010; Kearns, 2009), thus giving rise to what has been derisively termed 
‘workshop writing’ (Bizarro, 2004, p. 304). This is not to say that individual Creative Writing 
teachers haven’t explored alternative approaches that are more process-oriented. Nigel 
McLoughlin (2006) provides a very helpful overview of these many and varied process-based 
initiatives before outlining his own approach. However, what his overview does make quite 
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clear is that each approach is shaped by a different epistemology; that the pedagogy of writing 
is informed by a variety of theoretical perspectives. His approach, he says, is, therefore, just as 
another addition ‘to the polyphonic babble of epistemologies that creative writing pedagogy is 
in the process of generating’ (p. 17).  
There is little evidence that this polyphonic babble is effectively addressing the many 
questions that had already been raised with regard to the writing workshop, for example,  what 
were the ideological assumptions that underpinned this enterprise? How could the emphasis be 
shifted away from written product to writing process as had been done in composition studies 
(Haake, 1994)? Answering such apparently straightforward questions has not proved easy, 
mainly because, as Gayle Elliot (1994) asserts,  creative writing is not about ‘the production of 
knowledge’, but rather ‘the creation of art’ (p. 113). It is this artistic dimension that makes 
‘articulating a pedagogy of the workshop’ so difficult and raises even more challenging questions 
such as ‘How does one put into theoretical terms the processes of art? How does one reduce 
to a science what is part craft and part (the very word seems fraught with risk in an age of 
scientific proof) inspiration?’ (p. 115). More importantly, ‘how, exactly, are we to account for 
the nuts-and-bolts of the workshop and at the same time admit aloud that there are aspects of 
the creative process that are difficult to quantify and convey?’ (p. 117). Questions like these 
continue to haunt the discourse because they revolve around the one of the most unsettled 
issues in the field, namely, the question of whether Creative Writing can even be taught at all 
(Berg, 2010; Green 2012; Mayers, 2015).  
In hindsight, it is apparent that the Iowa workshop model dealt with this issue in a rather 
simplistic way. The focus of the workshop would be on the stable, fixed entity of the finished 
text; the scrutiny of the text conforming to the rigours of literary criticism. The processes 
outside of this ‘single, frozen moment’ would not come under consideration (Mayers, 2015, p. 
75). This aspect would be taken care of by the appointment of a  master of the craft i.e. a 
published writer. The reasoning behind this move was that ‘the best teachers of the making of 
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the arts are those experienced in making them’ and that ‘if one’s art is good, one has earned the 
privilege to teach others that art’ (Fenza, 2000, p. 10, original italics).  
Contemporary scholarship is also questioning this underlying assumption, namely,  that 
‘the ability to publish literary writing’ equates to the ability ‘to relay knowledge or to work with 
students’ (Bradway-Hesse, 1998, p. 10).   Danita Berg (2010) for example, argues that simply 
assuming a writer is able to teach the writing process is erroneous. It is based on the misleading 
notion that ‘the creativity of the masters’ could simply be handed down to their students ‘by 
their authoritative presence in the classroom’ (p. 29), as though the creative writing process 
could be absorbed by osmosis because, essentially, it could not be taught. She is of the firm 
opinion that it can be taught, but only if ‘those who stand in front of the classroom understand 
their processes – and the several inventive processes available to writers – well enough to guide 
students to transform the processual strategies into their own’ (p. 41). This is all very well as an 
academic argument, but it does not effectively address the issue highlighted by McLoughlin, 
namely, that the writer-teacher can embody any number of different approaches, although, in 
some instances, may be completely unaware that they are adopting any approach at all. Nor 
does it address the strong resistance likely to come from those  writer-teachers who, harbouring 
‘a lingering suspicion’ that the Muse would be ‘frightened off by excess speculation’, would not 
embrace the teaching of the writing process ‘in any formal, theoretical way’ (Elliot, 1994, p. 
117). These two contrasting views rest upon a deeper debate, namely, can creative writing be 
taught, or is it merely a talent / gift that needs encouraging and nurturing under the guidance 
of the writer-teacher who can, at best, be regarded as a facilitator of the writing process (Sarbo 
and Moxley, 1994)? 
There are those who hold a more moderate view, arguing that is possible to  juxtapose 
the ‘teachable’ aspects of creative writing, i.e. the craft elements, alongside the ‘unteachable’ 
aspects, such as talent or inspiration (Green, 2012, p. 327).  They argue that the workshop can 
replicate the conditions in which creative writing happens (McLoughlin, 2006), by focusing on 
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different stages in the writing process. For example, the workshop could incorporate pre-writing 
activities (Murray 1972; Starkey, 1994; Berg, 2010; Peary, 2016), consider the early drafting of 
the text, where feedback is about questioning the text as work-in-progress rather than offering 
a critical assessment of the completed text (Johnson, 2006), and include time for thoughtful 
revision in a supportive environment (Neave, 2012). These suggestions show how the workshop 
could shift its focus from product to process. However, whether or not creative writing teachers 
choose to implement strategies like these seems to depend upon the individual writer-teacher, 
with the result that the workshop becomes a space primarily shaped by the idiosyncrasies and 
teaching skills of a particular writer-teacher rather than a theoretically informed pedagogical 
strategy with well-defined learning objectives (Sarbo and Moxley, 1994; Dawson, 2005; Ritter 
and Vanderslice, 2005; Donnelly, 2009). 
Berg (2010) provides a compelling interrogation of this unexamined practice of 
appointing writers to teach creative writing ‘simply because they have written well and/or 
successfully themselves’.  Arguing that, because these writers ‘rarely have a background in 
pedagogy’, she asserts that they are ‘ill-equipped to recognize writing as a teachable art’. 
Moreover, unless the writers have been able to conceptualise the writing process for themselves, 
they are likely to ‘shroud it in mystery’, describing the text as ‘something created from genius 
and inspiration’, and the writing process in ‘vague and confusing ways’. This only serves to 
mystify the process even further. Where writer-teachers do have a clear understanding of their 
own process, they may either ‘lack the pedagogical skills’ to communicate this to the students 
effectively, or to discern the ways in which their own process ‘may not necessarily work for the 
apprentice’. Berg thus finds that learning objectives, where they exist,  are ‘ill-defined’ to say the 
least (pp. 37-44). However, despite Berg’s eloquent argument, this state of affairs is not solely 
attributable to the writer-teacher. There is a paradoxical issue underlying this conversation: on 
the one hand, there is the strongly held view that ‘teachers of writing must have an adequate 
understanding of the writing process to teach writing effectively’  (Collins, 2003, p. 24), but, on 
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the other hand, there is an equally strong view that the effective teaching of creative writing is 
not possible because  ‘the work of the writer is not easily quantifiable … the process by which 
art is made, unlike the constructing of scientific or critical theory, is impossible to track 
empirically from inception to completion’ (Elliot, 1994, p. 115); the creative writing process 
itself, thus remains essentially enigmatic and inexplicable (Harper, 2012) and, as argued below, 
is thus largely an unmapped one, for most of the models currently available have not succeeded 
in fully capturing both the knowable and unknowable aspects of this process.  
Unmapped Process  
Despite the fact that the writing process has been explored from many different perspectives, 
there is as yet no shared understanding of what constitutes the creative writing process, nor are 
there any ‘universal methods or procedures’ in place to study it and develop this understanding 
(Collins, 2003, p. 16). This, as so much else in the discourse, is a site marked by a range of 
contradictory and conflicting responses. Harper, for example, asserts ‘that there has never been 
a better time to recognise the mistakes of the past in failing to acknowledge, and then to 
examine, the processes and artefacts of Creative Writing practice’ (Harper, 2007a, p. 95) and 
that what is urgently needed is ‘the creation of shared critical understanding, and models or 
theories that seek to explain the processes at hand’ (Harper, 2007b, para 4). Yet he later 
questions whether the term “process” adequately describes what occurs (Harper, 2010). Mayers 
(2015) argues, on the one hand, that process should be a ‘natural – perhaps even a central – 
concern’ of Creative Writing (p. 70), but on the other, asserts that not all writing processes ‘can 
be described and demystified down to the last detail’; nor can there be any certainty that such 
descriptions ‘will always yield useful theoretical or practical knowledge’. He does, however, 
concede that ‘new knowledge or practical benefits may emerge from inquiry into writers’ 
processes’ making the inquiry ‘well worth the time and effort required, especially for those 
whose jobs involve teaching creative writing’ (p. 79).  
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These uncertainties are thrown into stark relief by the Flower-Hayes model (1981) 
developed in the field of Composition Studies. This model describes a writing process marked 
by clearly defined and carefully demarcated stages that follow one another in a neat linear 
sequence. A writer, they assert, moves through the stages progressively, even if sometimes 
recursively, using a process of rational decision-making. Although supporters of this model 
argue that it depicts a writing process that is true for every kind of writing from scientific essay 
to lyrical poem (Elbow, 1981), detractors point to its limitations as a model of the creative 
writing process (Pemberton, 1993; Stewart, 1994; Russ, 2003; Botella, Zenasni, and Lubart, 
2011; Botella et al., 2013; St-Louis and Vallerand, 2015). The Flower-Hayes model, they assert, 
omits a key aspect of the writing process used to create poetry and produce imaginative fiction, 
namely, the affect – that aspect that embraces phenomena such as ‘emotions, attitudes, beliefs, 
moods, and conation’ and includes both conscious and unconscious thought processing 
(McLeod, 1991, p. 97). This model, therefore, cannot provide an adequate account of the 
creative writing process because the creative writing  process is not a purely cognitive one 
(Mcleod, 1991); it cannot be ‘reduced to an intellectualised rationality, [because it] is not solely 
based on reason’ (Harper, 2012, p. 61). What Creative Writing needs, they posit, is a framework 
or model that allows for the juxtaposition of the ‘immaterial and unconscious with the material 
and conscious elements’ within the creative writing process (Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010a, p. 
42). The problem for Creative Writing scholars, however,  is that these immaterial and 
unconscious elements have yet to be adequately described. Until that happens, until there is a 
body of empirical and theoretical knowledge about how creative writing happens,  
it will always be simpler to focus on the objects that emerge from 
creative writing; to focus rather on  ‘the surface of writerly 
instruction – the level of inscription’ rather than ‘a level of thinking, 
and feeling and acting that goes beyond the points of inscription, 
starts before and ends afterward …  where plains of reference both 
literal and metaphoric merge in memory and thought and … [in] 
something we have long come to refer to as the imagination’ 
(Harper, 2014, pp. 61-62). 
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While there is a growing consensus that Creative Writing needs a deeper understanding of its 
writing process (Harper, 2007b; Donnelly, 2009; Berg, 2010; Jordan-Baker, 2015;  Hergenrader, 
2016), explorations of this process face many challenges. In the first instance, how does one 
‘look behind the product and somehow organize the unseen process into a theoretical construct’ 
(Sarbo and Moxley, 1994, p. 133)? How does one even begin exploring a process widely 
regarded as inherently unknowable (Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010a), immeasurable (Harper, 
Kaufman and Kaufman, 2012) and thus, largely unquantifiable (Elliot, 1994)? In the second 
instance, what mechanism will enable an investigation of a process that is fundamentally artistic, 
emotional and solitary (Berg 2010)? What strategies can be used to probe an intrinsically inner 
process (Donnelly, 2009) which, for the most part, takes place in the writer’s mind and so 
remains ‘hidden from the lens of the researcher’  (Collins, 2003, p. vii)? In the third instance, is 
it even possible to describe the process of ‘turning inklings into thoughts and thoughts into 
words’ (Harper, 2010, p. 89) so that the Romantic notions of ‘inspiration’, ‘intuition’ and 
‘imagination’, so frequently used in discussions about this process (Berry, 1994; Bradway-Hesse, 
1998; Collins, 2003, Donnelly, 2009; Berg 2010), are used ‘in a critically specific, rather than 
generic or colloquial way’ (Harper, 2015a, para 34)? Ultimately, the challenge Creative Writing 
scholars face is to develop a framework for its writing process that embraces both the ‘critical 
thinking’ necessary for text production, as well as the ‘creative thinking’ necessary for text 
creation. It needs a model that encompasses the critical mode of the process in the form of 
objectivity, ‘clearly articulated explanation’ and ‘considered evaluation’, as well as the creative 
mode of the process which is characterized by ‘subjectivity and affect, … sensory data, 
ambiguity and contradiction, associative leaps and disruptions of conventional logic, doubt and 
uncertainty’ (Healey, 2009, p. 34).  
Despite these formidable challenges, there have been many attempts to describe the 
creative writing process. As mentioned earlier, a plethora of scholarship has already been 
generated by writers over the centuries on this very topic.  These accounts have, however, been 
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discounted by academics who regard these stories and observations as a ‘highly engaging, yet 
fallible, source of information about the creative writing process’ that offers little more than ‘a 
wealth of unsubstantiated yet intuitively accurate knowledge’ (Bishop, 1990, p. 16). Setting these 
‘unsubstantiated yet intuitively accurate accounts’ aside, scholars have adopted a more 
“objective” approach to studying this deeply subjective process. These various studies have 
offered a wide range of possible conceptualisations. For example, the creative writing process 
has been metaphorically likened to cooking, mining, hunting and gardening (Tomlinson, 1986), 
an intricate spiderweb (Cooper, 1986,) an iceberg (Monk, 2016) and the idea of rhizomatic 
growth as proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Smith, 2015;  Harper, 2015a; Piller, 
2016). While each metaphor yields a number of insights, no single metaphor either captures the 
process as a whole or adequately explains the process.  Other scholars have drawn instead on 
constructs developed in diverse disciplines, such as computer programming (Bloor, 1997), 
quantum theory (James, 2015), Jungian psychology (Stewart, 1994;  Sonik,  2006a) and 
Bakhtinian dialogues (Fu, 2001) but with similar outcomes – while each study offers insights on 
some aspects of the writing process, no single study is able to account satisfactorily for all 
aspects of that process. Nor have the different models that have been proposed been successful 
in this regard (see Bloor, 1997; Doyle, 1998; Verbruggen, 2017).  
This dissertation, however, argues that it is now possible to develop a model that reflects 
the creative writing process more accurately, and to do so in a way that substantiates the 
‘intuitively accurate accounts’ given by the writers themselves. Two factors in particular make 
this possible, namely, the paradigm shift in the research landscape occasioned by the rise of 
phenomenological-based research in the 1990s, and the rapid advances in neuroscience. The 
first factor legitimises the subjective accounts given by creative writers, past and present, while 
the second factor, the research into brain activity, substantiates these accounts in a compelling 
way. Neither of these avenues was open to researchers in past decades. 
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DISSERTATION DESCRIPTION 
Focus and Objectives  
The focus of this dissertation is that part of the creative writing process that is essentially 
interior, private and subjective.  More specifically, the dissertation aims to explore four specific 
research questions, namely,  
1. How does one explore a process widely regarded as inherently unknowable, 
immeasurable, and thus, largely unquantifiable?   
2. How best can one investigate a process that is fundamentally artistic, emotional and 
solitary?   
3. How can one describe a process closely associated with the Romantic notions of 
‘inspiration’, ‘intuition’ and ‘imagination’ so that these terms are used in a critically 
specific way?  
4. Is it, ultimately, possible to develop a model that embraces both the critical thinking 
necessary for text production, as well as the creative thinking necessary for text 
creation?  
The dissertation’s objective is to propose a model for the creative writing process that answers 
these four questions. In so doing, it aims to bring clarity to a conversation cluttered with 
ambiguous terminology, contradictory conceptualisations, and uncertain understandings. Its 
central premise is that a clear and unambiguous understanding of the creative writing process 
itself, will bring consistency to the discourse, enable a more theoretically informed pedagogy, 
and so facilitate a more widespread agreement as to the role, nature and terrain of Creative 
Writing as a field of study. 
Scope and Delimitations  
The specific scope of the dissertation will be on that part of the creative writing process which 
is intensely private, deeply subjective, and  primarily solitary – that interior space in the writer’s 
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mind where inklings are turned into thoughts; thoughts into words, and those words then used 
to create the artform often termed “imaginative literary text” (Elliot, 1994; Berg 2010; Harper, 
2015)2. The emphasis, therefore, will be placed on lived experience because phenomenological 
approaches allow for ‘a deeper understanding of the process of writing’ (Collins, 2003, p.102). 
The particular investigative approach adopted in the dissertation’s argument will be 
based on the concept of ‘transversal creativity’ as proposed by Erick Piller (2016). Piller defines 
this concept as ‘a realized meshing of discourses and identities, ways of speaking, writing, 
thinking, and being that cut across and run between established discourses and subject 
positions’. He posits that an approach based on this concept would facilitate a more effective 
conceptualisation of creative writing both as artistic process and as a field of study in that it 
allows for a conceptualisation that encompasses both ‘arborescent’ and ‘rhizomatic’ paradigms. 
In this context, ‘arborescent’ refers to paradigms that enhance unity, stability, and order, and 
thus enable ‘the progressive vertical movement of a single system’. ‘Rhizomatic’ paradigms, on 
the other hand, emphasise ‘conceptual movements and connections horizontally between 
systems’. Arborescent paradigms thus represent hierarchically structured discourses, that have, 
over time, become ‘fixed’, but, nevertheless, continue to develop, climbing upward, ‘like a tree, 
above a network of foundational “roots”’.  Conversely, rhizomatic modes move ‘transversally, 
taking from diverse, even seemingly distant systems of discourse’ to bring together materials 
that can create a meaningful assemblage  that allows avenues of enquiry and conceptualisations 
not possible in ‘other, established systems of discourse’.  Such an approach, he argues, could 
give rise to frameworks that enable ‘divergent, [and] potentially more subversive and powerful’ 
understandings than is the case at present (pp. 1-2). Within this frame of reference, the approach 
used in this dissertation can be termed ‘transversal’ in that it not only draws on established 
 
2 It should be noted that the term “imaginative literary text” tends to be used by Creative Writing scholars, while 
HESA speaks instead of the ‘creation of fictional text’. For purposes of continuity in the discussions that follow, 
the former will be used throughout the dissertation with the caveat that ‘literary’ here does not signify any form of 
evaluation of the text. It serves simply to denote written, fictional texts of prose and poetry.  
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bodies of knowledge and developed discourses across a wide range of disciplines, but also 
references discourses that are decades old as well as cutting-edge research findings published as 
recently as 2019.  
Given this extensive reservoir of scholarship, it is vital that the dissertation maintains a 
strict focus on its research topic, namely, the creative writing process that is primarily subjective 
and solitary.  This is not to say that its argument dismisses those valuable contributions which 
address the social, cultural and political contexts in which the writing takes place (Amabile, 
1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). These contexts certainly do exert an influence on both the writer 
and the final text. However, the focus of the dissertation is the creative writing process which 
occurs primarily in the private, internal space of the writer’s mind. That said, further clarification 
of the term ‘creative writing process’ is necessary, specifically with regard to how it is used in 
the dissertation argument. While the term is broadly defined as the process of literary text 
production (Bishop, 1990; Doyle, 1998; Collins, 2003; Mayers, 2015; QAA, 2016), this 
dissertation makes a finer distinction. The usage of the term here embraces two closely 
interwoven sub-processes, namely, the internal, subjective process of idea generation, and the 
externalising of the generated ideas in the production of the physical text. While the dissertation 
will explore both sub-processes, the emphasis will be on the process of idea generation as this 
is the least understood aspect, and therefore the most problematic element of the creative 
writing process. Furthermore, the dissertation distinguishes between writing practice and 
writing process in the following way: Writing practice is defined as those observable physical 
activities that a writer may engage in, sporadically or habitually, while producing the literary text 
(Harper, 2010). Writing process, however, refers to the mental processing that occurs within 
the mind of the writer and is therefore not observable in the same way (Collins, 2003).  These 
finer distinctions provide a more refined guideline for the dissertation’s argument.  
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Dissertation Outline 
This introductory chapter provides the context for the research questions to be explored in this 
dissertation. It reflects a current view of Creative Writing as a field of study lacking a distinctive 
epistemology that could and should shape its theories, pedagogy and practices. Instead of a 
sound epistemology based on the kind of critical enquiry found in other disciplines, the 
discourse in Creative Writing reflects a field of study in a state of flux and indecision, 
characterised by the many, often contradictory, perspectives that have given rise to its unsettled 
status, its reliance on unquestioned assumptions and its perpetuation of unexamined practices. 
More importantly, the chapter highlights a surprising lacunae in this discourse, namely, an 
enquiry into the creative writing process itself, and this is the topic to be addressed in this 
dissertation. While blame for this omission has been attributed to a reluctance on the part of 
Creative Writing academics to engage in critical enquiry, the next chapter shows that this is not 
entirely justified.  
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, the fault line can be traced back to the seminal address 
given by JP Guilford in 1950 which laid the foundation for the wave of creativity research that 
followed it. This address not only specifically excludes artists from the agenda, dismissing their 
accounts of their creative process as being too subjective, and anecdotal and unreliable for 
serious consideration; it also rejects the references to imagination, inspiration, intuition found 
in these accounts as being concepts too vague, subjective, and affective to be included in 
scientific investigation. These omissions become entrenched in the positivist-rationalist 
research paradigm that dominates the early decades of creativity. This, in turn, leads to a widely 
held belief among creativity researchers that the creative process is domain general. In other 
words, they argue that a single, uniform creative process is able to account for all creative 
endeavours, irrespective of the domain in which they occur. Therefore, according to this view, 
the scientist and the artist both use an essentially rational problem-solving approach to produce 
their respective, but domain-specific, creative products. 
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Chapter 3 presents a challenges to this proposition, drawing on the wealth of 
scholarship generated by the domain debate on whether creativity itself is domain-general or 
domain-specific. Following a discussion of the evidence that favours the notion of a single 
uniform creative process, the chapter revisits the Wallas model to show that while the creative 
process, very broadly speaking, may be regarded as domain-general, it is possible to distinguish 
between the process used in sciences and that used in the arts. This is demonstrated by a 
comparison between the processes underlying scientific and artistic creativity respectively in the 
light of the Wallas model, with specific reference to the role played by the imagination in each. 
The chapter finds that where the scientific process is focussed on discovering objective, physical 
realities, the artistic creative process is concerned with the meaning-making through metaphor 
and then communicating that meaning in an imaginative way.  Additional evidence supporting 
the hypothesis of two distinctive, domain-specific processes strengthens the possibility that it 
is the domain itself that shapes the process. i.e. that the creative process is domain-specific.   
Having established that it is possible to envisage a process unique to artistic creativity, 
Chapter 4 then explores what this process may encompass.  This exploration is based on six 
phenomenologically based research studies and four practice-led dissertations that provide 
extended accounts of the artistic process, as recorded by the artist concerned. The high level of 
consistency found in these accounts suggests a process that is far more complex, multi-layered 
and uncertain than that of the comparatively much simpler problem-solving approach used in 
the sciences. The detailed description arising from this exploration not only shows that the 
artistic creative process comprises both conscious and unconscious aspects; it also reflects the 
extent to which this process is significantly shaped by the dynamic interaction between these 
two aspects. The chapter thus posits that it is this dynamic interplay, present from first thought 
to finished product, that lies at the heart of the artistic creative process.  
Chapter 5 counters the potential argument that questions the validity of this description 
of the artistic creative process, given that it is based solely on accounts of the artist’s lived 
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experience of this process. It does so by presenting a significant body of evidence drawn from 
the findings emerging from neuroscientific research studies; evidence which provides both 
support for and validation of this lived experience. The chapter first introduces the salient 
findings emerging from contemporary neuroscientific research into the Default Mode Network 
(DMN) and the Dorsal Attention Network (DAN).  It then traces the parallels between these 
findings and the process described by the artists in the previous chapter, highlighting the close 
correlations between the two. More specifically, the chapter demonstrates the extent to which 
the generation of the ideas that give rise to the artistic content correlates to DMN processing; 
the task of giving expression to those ideas in an appropriate form is correlated to DAN 
processing and how closely what the artists call the workings of their imagination correlates to 
the dynamic interaction between these two key neural networks. These close correlations are 
then captured in a model which brings together the phenomenology of the artistic creative 
process and the neurobiology that mirrors this process. This combination of first-hand 
experience with third hand knowledge in a single model has its basis in neurophenomenology, 
an approach that advocates the combining of these two perspectives for a more rounded 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon being investigated. For this reason, the model proposed 
here is termed a neurophenomenological model of the artistic creative process, and it clearly 
demonstrates its capacity to provide both a description of and explanation for the process it is 
depicting. The chapter concludes that this model could fruitfully be applied to the creative 
writing process.   
Chapter 6, however, asks why another model of the creative writing process is even 
necessary given the proliferation of cognitive process models that purport to account for the 
writing process for all kinds of writing, whether scientific essay or lyric poem. A brief analysis 
of the kind of writing being investigated in cognitive studies suggests that these studies focus 
on DAN-dominated writing, i.e. writing that is predominantly task-related, requiring the use of 
deliberate, rational, logical, and reasoning processes to produce the finished text. The chapter 
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therefore argues that cognitive process models are not able to provide a meaningful account for 
the creative writing process, which is primarily a DMN-driven one. Evidence in support of this 
assertion is drawn from a new conversation emerging within the Creative Writing discourse 
which highlights the integral role played by non-cognitive aspects in the production of 
imaginative literary text, aspects such as the unconscious, intuition, felt sense, inspiration, 
incubation and imagination. The chapter thus hypothesises that the proposed 
neurophenomenological model may provide a more meaningful account of the creative writing 
process, offering both a coherent phenomenological description of this process as well as a 
systemic neurobiological explanation for it unfolding the way it does. 
Chapter 7 tests this hypothesis by exploring the accounts given by fiction writers in four 
anthologies and two research studies. It maps the high levels of consistency found in these 
accounts, which range from Samuel Richardson writing in the 18th century to contemporary 
authors. The chapter then demonstrates how closely and accurately these consistencies are 
reflected in the proposed model, and concludes that the proposed model does provide both a 
meaningful description and a systemic explanation of the fiction writing process. It thus 
concludes that this dissertation has been able to provide well-defined answers to its four 
research questions as the proposed model clearly shows that it is possible to 
• explore a process widely regarded as inherently unknowable, immeasurable, and 
unquantifiable by means of the new approach afforded by neurophenomenology;  
• investigate a process that is fundamentally artistic, emotional and solitary in a critical 
way, owing to a phenomenologically-based research approach that is well-supported 
by advances in neurobiology; 
• develop a systemic description of the writing process that incorporates the notions 
of ‘inspiration’, ‘intuition’ and ‘imagination’ which, because of the combinations of 
neurobiological research and phenomenology, can now be used a critically specific 
way, and 
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• ultimately, develop a model that embraces both the critical thinking necessary for 
text production, as well as the creative thinking necessary for text creation. 
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation’s argument with a discussion of the implications of this 
finding, its limitations and the possibilities for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CREATIVITY RESEARCH AND THE ARTISTIC PROCESS 
It is unwise to rely on one method in studying any complex phenomenon … unduly limiting 
the scope of creativity research while raising the spectre of method bias in both theory and 
findings. (Mumford, 2003, p.108) 
 
The previous chapter argued that despite its rapid rise in the academic arena, Creative Writing 
still lacks a clear definition of its terrain and a systemic theory that informs its practices. This 
has largely been attributed to academics and practitioners either avoiding or bluntly refusing to 
engage in critical enquiry regarding their epistemology, pedagogy and theoretical perspectives.  
The result is that Creative Writing is a field of study more shaped by a body of unquestioned 
assumptions and unexamined practices than rigorous research. 
 This chapter, however, demonstrates that the academics and practitioners of Creative 
Writing have been unjustly blamed because at the time when it was establishing itself as an 
academic field, creativity research was also in its infancy. It shows how the seminal address 
given by JP Guilford in 1950, which triggered the wave of creativity research that followed, laid 
out a very specific research agenda in the form of his proposed research plan. This plan 
privileged the sciences, emphasised behavioural research, and endorsed positivism as its 
preferred research approach. With its focus fixed firmly on only that which could be observed 
and measured, Guilford’s framework thus excluded the vast body of writing on creativity and 
the creative process produced by artists and writers, dating back to Aristotle. Their accounts 
were deemed to be too subjective, affective and unreliable for scientific investigation. An 
unforeseen consequence of Guilford’s address was the extent to which his research plan became 
the preferred research paradigm for investigating creativity, thereby entrenching the exclusion 
of the artist and the artist’s experience of the creative process in these investigations. 
The chapter, however, demonstrates the way this research paradigm began to be 
challenged by the new insights arising from investigations outside the domain of psychology; 
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new approaches emerging from a fundamental shift in the research landscape in the 1990s 
which the rise of phenomenologically-based approaches that embraced lived experience, and 
the new findings emerging from the burgeoning discipline of neuroscience.  These new 
developments present a strong challenge to the purely cognitive conceptualisation of creativity 
that dominated the early decades of creativity research. 
CREATIVITY AND ART-MAKING 
Although the term ‘creativity’ first makes its appearance in the nineteenth century, the notion 
of creativity has a long history of being associated with art-making. This history is meticulously 
traced by John Mason (2003) in his necessarily brief publication, The Value of Creativity: The 
Origins and Emergence of a Modern Belief. Of particular relevance to this dissertation is Mason’s 
argument that the act of creating, i.e. the ability to ‘bring something into the world which did 
not previously exist, thereby ‘generating a new entity’ (p. 8), was originally deemed to be divine 
in origin. The Ancient Greek philosophers argued that, since only the gods were able to bring 
something into the world that had not existed before, the art-maker could only accomplish this 
under divine inspiration. In other words, poetry was only possible ‘if a god spoke through a 
poet’ (p. 19), which meant that  the poet had to spend much time in solitude, listening for this 
divine voice.  
This view persists into the fifteenth century, but it undergoes further refinement. The 
creative act is still viewed as  the realisation of ‘the forms, the Ideas, already present in the divine 
mind’ but the artists are now said to access these ‘universal Ideas’ through intuition. It is through 
intuition that ‘the soul receives the echoes of that incomparable music of the celestial harmony’ 
which the artist then imitates ‘to bring forth a most solemn and glorious song’. (p. 46). Poets, 
in particular, are thought to be especially endowed  with this ‘divine ability to create’ and thus 
enjoy an exalted status (p. 48). The seventeenth century, however, sees a subtle shift in thinking. 
The ability to ‘fetch light out of the smoke, roses out of dunghills, and give a kind of life to the 
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inanimate’ is defined as true genius (p. 111) and this ability, while still divine in origin, is rather 
ascribed to a specific human attribute, namely, the imagination. By the nineteenth century, 
nature has replaced the divine as the source of inspiration, and the imagination is regarded not 
only as the primary vehicle for creative thought, but is considered to be the very heart of the 
creative process itself. According to the Romantic poets, it is the imagination that gives poets 
‘the power of insight and transformation’ (p. 191). They assert that while it is the intuition that 
allows for ‘a perception of truth, or the intimation of the ideal, it is the  imagination that is the 
shaping power which reveals ‘the ideal in the real’ (p. 193).  
 There are many of these elements present in the address given by Ralph Waldo Emerson 
(1837) in which the term ‘creative writing’ is first used.  Positing that creative writing arises from 
creative thinking, Emerson expands at some  length on what he regards as constituting this kind 
of thinking. In his view, the mind is nourished by being exposed to  nature, reading and life 
experience. The knowledge thus gained is then brooded upon, given a new arrangement by the 
mind and the result of this rearrangement is expressed as new insights.  It is this specific thinking 
process that transforms ‘dead fact into quickened thought’; that is responsible for the 
‘transmutation and transformation of thought’ into new thoughts (p. 5). Furthermore, Emerson 
asserts that creative writing is but the product of this creative, transformative thinking process; 
its quality ‘precisely in proportion to the depth of mind from which it issued … it depends on 
how far the process [has] gone, of transmuting life into truth. In proportion to the completeness 
of the distillation, so will the purity and imperishableness of the product be’ (p. 3).  He is thus 
firmly of the opinion that writing can only be deemed creative if it arises from such a creative 
thinking process; that it this particular thinking process that renders the writing creative. 
However, as will be demonstrated, this becomes a hotly contested issue in modern creativity 
research, much of it arising from yet another shift in the conceptualisation of creativity 
occasioned by the industrial revolution and the drive for modernisation that followed it.  
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 The move towards industrialisation that accelerates in the late 1880s fuels the drive to 
modernisation that characterises the first half of the twentieth century. This impetus, propelled 
by economic forces, sees the emergence of an intense focus on scientific innovation and 
technological invention. In this climate, ‘increased scientific understanding and developments 
in technology [make] invention possible’, while commerce, in turn, makes ‘invention and 
innovation necessary’ (Mason, 2003, p. 74, original italics).  By the mid-1900s, scientific 
innovation and technological invention are regarded as the ‘new forms of human making’ (p. 
228). This privileging of science and technology sees a commensurate shift in research 
perspective. The scientific method of observation, hypothesis, experimentation, and veri-
fication is positioned as the most reliable avenue for valid knowledge production, and its ambit 
is extended to include the investigation of societal issues (Kumar, 2016). Positivism and 
rationalism thus come to dominate the prevailing research paradigm.   
 Rationalism, in particular, represents a radical departure from the earlier Romantic view 
of creativity as being ‘divinely’ inspired, or as something that ‘bubbles up from an irrational 
unconscious’ in a process that is hindered by ‘rational deliberations’. Rationalism, instead, views 
creativity as a form of human-making that is generated purely by the ‘conscious, deliberating, 
intelligent, rational mind’ (Sawyer, 2006, p. 23). The creative product is therefore simply defined 
as ‘a new mental combination that is expressed in the world’ and the creative process as little 
more than the combining of existing thoughts and concepts in new ways through a mental 
process termed ‘associationism’ (p. 7). Furthermore, because creativity is now closely ‘associated 
with the human mind’, it becomes the purview of psychological research enquiry (p. 29). At the 
time this new conceptualisation is taking shape, psychology,  a recent addition to the academy, 
is seeking to establish itself firmly as a science. It therefore eagerly embraces both rationalism 
and positivism in the form of behavioural psychology, in which the human psyche is 
investigated primarily through behaviour which can be observed and measured. Within this 
framework, the ‘non-rational’ aspects of the creative process are explained by what Freudian 
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theory declares to be ‘subliminal activity arising from unexpressed wishes and unfulfilled desires’ 
and art-making is viewed as nothing more than an attempt to give expression to these 
unexpressed wishes and unfulfilled desires through the ‘creation  of a fantasy world’ (Sawyer, 
2006, p. 15). 
 It is against this background that JP Guilford (1950) gives his presidential address to the 
American Psychological Association. He uses the occasion to announce the realisation of a 
long-standing ambition, namely, ‘to undertake an investigation of creativity’ (p. 444) and his 
address provides a detailed outline of his proposed research plan. While this address is credited 
with launching the modern wave of creativity research that follows (Sawyer, 2006), it also has 
two unforeseen consequences that are particularly relevant to this dissertation. As the discussion 
will now argue, in the first instance, Guilford’s plan does more than shape modern 
conceptualisations of creativity; it also defines the paradigm that will be used to investigate it. 
In the second instance, his research plan explicitly excludes both the artist and the artistic 
creative process, and this exclusion becomes entrenched in early creativity research.  
GUILFORD’S WATERSHED ADDRESS  
A Research Plan Becomes A Research Paradigm 
Guilford couches his call for a renewed focus on the neglected area of creativity within an 
explicit agenda and a clearly defined research framework. He argues that, because ‘the enormous 
economic value of new ideas is generally recognised’ there is a pressing need to identify creative 
promise and then to cultivate this creative potential so as to meet the  need for future ‘leaders 
with imagination and vision’. The challenges of the approaching technological age will require 
leaders, that are ‘men (sic) of good judgment, planning ability, and inspiring vision’, capable of 
‘creative thinking of an unusual order and speed’ (p. 446). He has thus developed his research 
plan to meet this specific need, and so it is a plan designed ‘with certain types of creative people 
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in mind: the scientist and the technologist, including the inventor’  (p. 451). The artist is not 
among them.   
 He further limits the scope of his plan by basing it on, what he freely admits, is a narrow 
definition of creativity. His proposed research will be confined to investigating the creative 
personality, more specifically, ‘the abilities that are most characteristic of creative people … 
[and thus] determine whether the individual has the power to exhibit creative behavior to a 
noteworthy degree’ (p. 444). The aim behind this strategy is to identify the particular behavioural 
traits that are expressed as creative performance using the ‘factorial conception of personality’, 
in which ‘personality is conceived geometrically as a hypersphere of n dimensions, each 
dimension being a dependable, convenient reference variable or concept’ (p. 447). This 
approach allows for the mapping of direct correlations between observed behaviour and 
personality traits, otherwise known as psychometric testing. Guilford already had considerable 
experience in this regard, having spent many years’ service in the armed forces spear-heading 
the development of psychometric tests for the selection of military pilots (Barlow, 2000). 
Evidence that this approach is readily adopted, and favoured, in modern creativity research is 
reflected in the fact that researchers rapidly develop over a hundred tests designed to measure 
the level of creativity in individuals (Sawyer, 2006, p. 40), the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking becoming the best known and most widely used of them all.  
 Guilford further hypothesises that the kind of thinking that underlies creative behavior 
will show high levels of fluency, novelty, flexibility, and complexity, together with ‘a synthesizing 
ability’ and ‘an analyzing ability’ (p. 453).  He expands on this hypothesis in a later work, his 
‘Structure-of-Intellect Theory’ (1956), which argues that creative thinking hinges on a 
combination of divergent thinking and convergent thinking, with divergent thinking being the 
thinking most responsible for the creative component. What makes this view so appealing is 
Guilford’s rational explanation for the notion of divergent thinking – it can be attributed to the 
24 possible combinations of the 120 factors of intelligence that form the patterns expressed in 
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creative behaviour (Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2001).  The appeal of this rational approach was 
so great that this view became deeply embedded in the paradigm that framed the creativity 
research that followed Guilford’s address. As Arthur Cropley (2016) observes, 
It became standard practice to distinguish between branching out from 
the known to generate novel ideas (divergent thinking) and reapplying 
the already known in conventional ways (convergent thinking). 
Guilford himself labelled his topic creativity, and it was quickly 
accepted that divergent thinking = creativity, convergent thinking = 
intelligence (p. 242). 
The implications of this embedded premise are far-reaching and are discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapter. Not least among them is the way this view gives rise to a reductionist 
conceptualisation of the creative process as little more than a form of problem-solving 
(Weisberg, 1993; Lubart, 2001; Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2001). A more extreme version of 
this view is advocated by early creativity researchers such as Robert Stahl (1980) who argues 
that to arrive at a clear understanding of creativity it is necessary ‘to reject the current practice 
of assuming that creative behaviour is directly caused by some special kind of mental operations 
called creative thinking’. More pointedly, he asserts that,  
Such a cause-effect relationship between hypothesized distinct creative 
thinking processes and creative output produces an illusion of 
explanation … for us to continue to operate with the assumption that 
real, distinct creative thinking processes really do exist misdirects our 
attention from achieving any real understanding … Furthermore, 
researchers have not supplied any tangible evidence which verifies the 
existence of distinct creative thinking processes separate from the 
behaviours they produce … without the empirical evidence, continued 
support  for the existence of distinct creative thinking processes as 
causal operations is to accept a purely hypothetical construct as the 
cause, of observable, unique and novel  behaviours, event and products 
(p. 10). 
While Stahl’s view represents a particular, and perhaps singular, perspective, the distinguishing 
between divergent and convergent thinking becomes standard practice in the creativity research 
that follows Guilford’s address. However, it is not just this aspect of his research plan that is 
widely adopted. His entire research plan as a whole is espoused as the standard approach to 
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researching creativity and as such becomes the dominant research paradigm, with the tenets 
underlying the plan being incorporated into the paradigm as its guiding principles (Sternberg, 
and Grigorenko, 2001; Mumford, 2003).  
It is easy to see why researchers found the plan so alluring – it had a clear agenda, a 
well-defined framework, and a soundly structured strategy. More importantly, the plan closely 
conformed to the prevailing view of the day. According to this view, research was only valid if 
based on a scientific approach, adopted positivism as its preferred perspective and valued 
observed behaviour observation as the most reliable form of evidence (Kumar, 2016). The plan 
contained all these elements and so psychologists embraced it wholeheartedly because it not 
only offered them ‘a viable new method for studying creativity’; it also facilitated the kind of 
systemic studies needed if psychology was to be regarded as ‘an active area of scientific 
investigation’ (Mumford, 2003, p. 108).  However, in this heady rush to embrace Guilford’s 
scientific approach to investigating creativity, few paused to consider that they were adopting a 
very restricted framework with clearly delimited parameters (Sternberg, and Grigorenko, 2001). 
Even fewer were aware of the extent to which these limitations, which rendered Guilford’s plan 
so well considered, would have the effect, when adopted as a research paradigm, of ‘unduly 
limiting the scope of creativity research while raising the spectre of method bias in both theory 
and findings’ (Mumford, 2003, p. 108). This bias is nowhere more evident than Guilford’s 
exclusion of the explicit artist from his plan and his dismissal of the artistic creative process.   
The Artist Excluded, the Artistic Creative Process Dismissed  
As has already been mentioned, the creative individuals Guilford had in mind for his research 
did not include the artist. Guildford was quite clear on this point in his discussion of the kind 
of thinking he surmised led to creative behaviour. He stated that, 
The hypotheses mentioned, as was stated earlier, refer more specifically 
to a limited domain of creative thinking more characteristic of the 
scientist and technologist, including the inventor … other restricted 
47 
 
domains will need to be investigated to take care of the writer, the 
graphic artist, and the musical composer (p. 453). 
 
Had this been all Guilford had to say on the matter of the creative processes of writers, artists 
and musicians, it may have led to these processes being investigated in tandem with the research 
initiative he was proposing – but this is not the case, for he then went on to dismiss the very 
idea of a distinctive artistic creative process.  While he admitted that ‘we have only vague ideas 
as to the nature of thinking’ and acknowledged that there was literature that explores the creative 
process using a ‘critical-incident’ approach,  he nevertheless asserted that, 
it would be more correct to refer to these historical reports as 
anecdotes, however, rather than critical incidents, since they suffer 
from most of the weaknesses of anecdotes … They abound with 
vague concepts such as ‘genius,’ ‘intuition,’ imagination,’ ‘reflection,’ 
and ‘inspiration,’ none of which leads univocally to test ideas (p. 
451). 
He thus dismissed the attempts made by researchers to ‘interpret these reports psychologically’ 
as being ‘quite superficial’ in that, while the interpretations were certainly ‘dramatic’, they were 
not ‘suggestive of testable hypotheses’ (p. 451). He did concede that there was an apparent 
consensus that the creative act involved the four stages of preparation, incubation, inspiration 
and verification (Wallas, 1926), but he discounted this consensual view because it ‘tells us almost 
nothing about the mental operations that actually occur’. For instance, he argued, while the 
reports refer to ‘a period of incubation during which there seems to be little progress in the 
direction of fulfillment’, they yet assert that that ‘there is activity, only it is mostly unconscious’.  
Guilford challenged this claim, stating that, 
The belief that the process of incubation is carried on in a region of 
the mind called the unconscious is of no help … It is not incubation 
itself that we find of great interest. It is the nature of the processes that 
occur during the latent period of incubation, as well as before it and 
after it – and how would one go about testing for incubating ability? 
(p. 451). 
To be fair to Guilford, this was a very legitimate question. As is the case of any researcher, he 
was a product of his times and his scepticism regarding the artistic creative process is rooted in 
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the fact that, at the time, there was no way of measuring the artistic creative process other than 
the model used in behaviourist research. According to this model, the only evidence that could 
be considered reliable was evidence obtained by objective measurement (Sawyer, 2006). For this 
reason, behaviourists held that, while the mind and its mental processes could not be directly 
observed, the behaviours resulting from its mental constructs could, and these behaviours thus 
constituted reliable evidence of creative activity. Accordingly, they advocated that the  ‘ideal 
approach to the study of creativity’ therefore required, at its most basic level, ‘objective (valid 
and reliable) response data’ because, ‘essentially, a theory, hypothesis, or definition of creativity, 
is scientifically acceptable only if the behaviour to which the approach refers is publically 
repeatable, testable, and potentially falsifiable’ (Rowenton, 197, p. 15). The alleged stage of 
incubation did not meet these criteria and so was excluded from the research framework 
outlined by Guilford. More importantly, this scepticism regarding the validity of reports on the 
artistic creative process became deeply entrenched in the creativity research paradigm. 
Perpetuation of Guilford’s Approach and Views 
It has been argued that Guilford’s plan becomes the research paradigm for investigating 
creativity; it tenets mutating into the paradigm’s guiding principles. Clear evidence in support 
of this argument is presented in this part of the discussion will show how, even as behaviourism 
gives way to a new branch of psychological enquiry, namely, cognitive psychology, one still 
encounters elements of Guilford’s approach and views, particularly with regard to the exclusion 
of the artists’ accounts of their creative process and the artistic creative process itself.  
Guilford’s dismissal of artists’ accounts as being too subjective and anecdotal to be 
considered worthy of investigation was still being upheld by researchers in the 1990s. For 
example, Margaret Boden (1990) cautioned researchers against placing any reliance on writers’ 
accounts of their creative processes, asserting that they are too indicative of the dictum ‘you see 
what you want to see’. She argued that because memories of events are notoriously unreliable, 
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accounts written by the artist after the event will be shaped by the artist to match his/her 
preconceptions about the creative process, with the result that 
If you believe that ‘insights’ come suddenly, unheralded by previous 
consciousness, then in your own introspective experience they are 
likely to appear to do so. If you already believe they arise from some 
unconscious process of ‘intuition’ you will not look for other possible 
explanations (p. 259). 
 
She thus concludes that because these accounts are retrospective rather than introspective, they 
‘cannot be fully trusted’ (p. 260). A similar caution came from renowned compositionist, Wendy 
Bishop (1990), who declared that, while writers’ accounts of their writing process stories are 
‘highly engaging’, they nevertheless, need to be regarded as a ‘fallible source of information 
about the creative writing process’ (p. 16). Far better, she asserted, for the process of writing to 
be ‘more dependably examined through cognitive and context-based studies of writers at work’ 
(p.28). It’s not difficult to see the close parallels between the kind of research Bishop proposed 
here, and that outlined by Guilford. Both advocated a research approach that is focussed on 
what can be objectively examined and thus reliably verified (‘more dependably examined’) 
through independent observation (‘cognitive and context-based studies’) of a specific behaviour 
(writers at work). The most telling departure from Guilford’s plan is that Bishop’s proposal 
places the excluded creative writer in the spotlight, but it takes nearly another decade before 
this possibility is embraced (see Doyle, 1998).  
Until then, the rationalism of Guilford’s approach, which discounts the possibility of a 
distinctive artistic process, provides strong support for views held by researchers such as Robert 
Weisberg (1993). Using carefully selected  examples, Weisberg argues that ‘the development of 
creative works requires no elaborate construction, because creativity is firmly rooted in past 
experience and has its source in the same thought processes we all use every day’ (p. 3). Creative 
thinking is thus simply a form of ordinary thinking.  There are no leaps of insight, or moments 
of flashing inspiration. Where such events have been reported, he too cautions against them on 
the grounds that self-reports are given to unreliability, inaccuracy and fabrication.  
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According to Weisberg, what truly defines the creative product, what renders it extra-
ordinary, lies in the effect it produces not in the way it was produced. For this reason, ‘creative 
productions can be explained using relatively ordinary cognitive processes, such as analogical 
thinking’ (p. 11). Creativity thus amounts to little more than basic problem-solving in which 
analogical thinking is used to apply prior knowledge to new situations (p. 122). To strengthen 
his argument, Weisberg, like Stahl, points out that empirical research into the artistic creative 
process has produced very little in the way of evidence that any kind of unconscious processing 
occurs in the incubation period.  He asserts that just because artists think about their work 
occasionally during the incubation period, ‘there is no need to assume unconscious thought 
occurred’ (p. 47). His clinching argument in this regard is that since any work of art has traceable 
antecedents that provide clear evidence of reworking and redrafting, there is clearly no such 
thing as unconscious processing.   
Given this climate of scepticism, the dismissal of their accounts of their creative 
experiences, and the discounting of the very processes they describe, it is not surprising that 
Creative Writing scholars choose not to engage in this discourse. Even had they wished to 
contribute, it would have proved almost impossible to enter the conversation because ‘what 
had originated out of a legitimate concern for providing psychology with a scientific basis … 
quickly developed into a program of ontological reduction, eventually denying the existence of 
any mental reality besides behavior or dispositions to behave’ (Klausen, 2010, p. 348). There 
simply is no space in this reductive view of creativity for the kind of conversation that would 
embrace the contributions arts practitioners, and creative writers, could make. The discourse 
thus remains closed to them despite the contributions from those researchers who are prepared 
to entertain the possibility that incubation and intuition may well have a role to play in the 
creative process. However, while these researchers are prepared to entertain these new 
possibilities, their research paradigm is still firmly rooted in model outlined in Guilford’s plan. 
First-hand accounts are still regarded as anecdotal and unreliable and the emphasis still rests on 
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the rigid paradigm of the scientific approach. This paradigm continues to exert a powerful 
influence (Mumford, 2003). 
For example, Stephen Southern and Suzanne Domzalski (1984) are of the opinion that 
‘the incubation stage is the most enigmatic of the four components of the model’ and, as such, 
provides ‘much material for psychological speculation and investigation’ (p. 37). While clearly 
not sceptical, they are nevertheless cautious in their exploration of the role played by intuition 
which they posit is the mediator in a possible dynamic exchange between conscious and 
unconscious thinking processes. In exploring the nature of breakthrough in scientific 
investigation, they argue that, 
fundamentally, a creative breakthrough is not simply the end result of 
a cumulative growth process, or a chance discovery. The creative 
breakthrough results from a dynamic struggle within the person 
between what is consciously thought on the one hand, and on the 
other, an insight that is trying to be born on the other. When the 
patterns that are consciously known from training and experience no 
longer serve the individual in explanation, prediction, and problem-
solving, the unconscious can provide a rich source for new ideas and 
patterns (p. 18). 
Artists would not have been surprised at this finding – it closely mirrors their experiences of 
the artistic creative processes – but they would have been dismayed that this discourse is so 
clearly confined, once again, to the domain of the hard sciences. Like Guilford, Southern and 
Domzaski are only concerned with creativity in the scientific community, stating clearly that 
their focus is exploring how ‘the rational, systematic procedures of conventional science and 
the intuitive, ‘discontinuous’, contributions of highly creative researchers [can] complement 
each other’ (p. 3). As is the case in Guilford’s plan, their research also adheres to the tenets of 
privileging the scientist, excluding the artist, and preferring the rationalist perspective.  
Similar instances of adherence are even more evident in studies specifically concerned 
with investigating incubation. The studies conducted by Andrew Patrick (1986), Eliaz Segal 
(2004) and Sophie Ellwood, Gerry Pallier, Allan Snyder and Jason Gallate (2009) are highly 
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illustrative in this regard. Collectively, their studies involve 326 participants, all of them being 
undergraduates drawn from the social sciences. None of these participants are included because 
they are artists, nor is there any attempt to ensure artists are included the sample. Furthermore, 
all these studies focus on observed behaviour as researchers investigate how the participants 
respond to task interruption. In each instance, participants are given a problem-solving task, are 
interrupted after an interval to begin another task, after which they return to working on the 
initial task. Their behaviour before, after and during the various tasks is observed and measured. 
The studies reflect varied findings and very different views, but there are echoes of Guilford’s 
voice in all of them.  
Patrick, for example, observes that while ‘many anecdotal reports suggest that 
incubation is an important part of creative production … experimental support for the 
phenomena has been difficult to gather (p. 169). He thus sets up an experiment that attempts 
to mirror the conditions ‘thought to be most conducive to witnessing incubation effects’. The 
findings are disappointing, leading Patrick to conclude that ‘while incubation effects may be 
very elusive in the laboratory, the faults in the research reported to date make a conclusion that 
incubation does not exist premature’. He posits that ‘the particular factors that might be 
necessary for incubation still need to be examined’ (p. 173). Segal takes the same point of 
departure as Patrick, but conducts his study nearly 20 years’ later. The similarities thus reflect 
how deeply entrenched Guilford’s dismissal of the first-hand reports of the creative process has 
become. Segal also begins by stating that ‘despite widespread anecdotal reports of 
breakthroughs attributed to incubation, which now belong to the scientific lore, rigorous 
experimental verification of the incubation phenomenon is far from trivial’ (p. 143). His study 
therefore aims to test the hypothesis that incubation involves some form of internal processing. 
He uses the same methodological strategy as Patrick i.e. task interruption, but comes to a very 
different conclusion. The results of his study lead him to conclude that ‘nothing happens during 
the break’ and that ‘ the unconscious hypothesis was not supported by this research’. However, 
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while Patrick suggests that failure to find conclusive evidence for incubation might rest in the 
design of his experiment, Segal is more ‘inclined to believe that the popularity of unconscious 
explanations of incubation among scientists and laymen stems from the incorrect interpretation 
of the phenomena’.  These incorrect interpretations arise from the notions that ‘a great deal of 
cognitive work’ takes place during incubation of which the solver is ‘unaware’.  Segal avers that 
‘these notions are probably wrong’ (p. 147).  
The study conducted by Ellwood et al. three years’ later makes for interesting reading. 
They begin by acknowledging the limitations of the research undertaken to date, stating that 
‘creativity is often conceived of as a form of problem solving, with problems being broadly 
deﬁned as goals to be reached’. Furthermore, they argue that  this approach, with its ‘limited 
view of creative endeavour’ has been favoured because ‘it is more amenable to empirical 
investigation’. The incubation phase, however, remains ‘somewhat more mysterious’, proving 
‘less amenable to scientiﬁc investigation’ (p. 6) as it continues to be located in ‘anecdotal 
accounts of creative ideas or solutions ‘‘springing to mind’’ after a period of incubation’ (p. 7). 
These early remarks seem to suggest that the researchers will be adopting a very different 
approach in their investigation. However, the only way they differ from previous studies is that 
instead of focussing on tasks that call for convergent thinking, their study focuses on tasks that 
call for divergent thinking. The study is thus informed by the possibility that ‘the incubation 
effect might be the result of nonconscious idea generation’ and its methodology is carefully 
designed  ‘to maximize the possibility that the participants were not consciously working on the 
experimental task during the incubation period’ (p. 8). Yet, the study still adopts a strongly 
behavioural approach. The researchers use the Idea Generation Test to measure the effects of 
a distracting break, a test that has been ‘validated against established measures of cognitive 
ability and personality’ (p. 6). As in the case of the two previous studies, the results are neither 
definitive nor conclusive. Ellwood et al. suggest that some the reason for this might lie in the 
‘conundrum in the behavioural manifestation of a cause that is, by deﬁnition, not discoverable 
54 
 
by the individual and not presently objectively observable’  (p. 8). Almost wistfully, they observe 
that it is unfortunately difﬁcult to test alternative theories  ‘differentially using a behavioural 
approach’, and that more meaningful explorations of incubation may be ‘a matter for 
neurophysiological investigation’ (p. 13). 
These studies clearly illustrate the shortcomings of the research paradigm that emerges 
from Guilford’s plan. However, as the study by Ellwood et al. indicates, some researchers are 
sensitised to these limitations. Others who question Guilford’s approach and hypotheses argue 
that Guilford’s Structure-of-Intellect theory is ‘deficient in several respects’ and offers ‘only 
limited value’ (Undheim and Horn, 1977, p. 79); that there is little evidence of a close correlation 
between intelligence and creativity because tests haven’t ‘proved successful at measuring general 
creativity or creative potential in any specific field of endeavour’ (Sternberg and Grigorenko, 
2001, p. 314), and that ‘divergent thinking of the type measured by Guilford just does not seem 
to correspond well to the kind of thinking required for serious creativity’ (Sawyer, 2006, p. 58).  
Against this background, Mark Runco (2008) confidently asserts that 
creativity will never be fully understood using the traditional scientific 
approach. This is in part because creativity requires originality, and the 
novelty that signifies originality is typically unpredictable, or at least not 
predictable with much precision … creativity depends on affect, 
intuition, and other processes which cannot be accurately described 
using only objective terms (p. 93). 
 
What is significant about Runco’s comment is that it not only embraces the very ‘vague 
concepts’ that Guilford found so problematic, but also suggests that a more in-depth 
understanding of creativity has to include these very concepts in its conceptualisation. This view 
is shared by Larry Briskman (2009) who argues that Guilford’s approach, which is based on 
studying the creative personality as a way of investigating creativity, is misleading. Moreover, he 
asserts that ‘a ‘purely’ scientific study of creativity’, or even a purely psychological or sociological 
one ‘is impossible’ (p. 27).  
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This shift in perspective that begins to challenge the purely cognitive conceptualisation 
of creativity is enabled by the confluence of three factors that change the playing field: creativity 
research is embraced by a  range of diverse disciplines, some of which are not constrained by 
the tenets of Guilford’s address; the rising interest in qualitative research that results in the 
adoption of a more phenomenologically-based research approach, and the rapid developments 
in brain research that provide early evidence for the notions of inspiration, incubation and 
intuition. The impact of this shift is that creativity is conceptualised in different ways, the terms 
used by artists are given substance through brain research and the phenomenological approach 
validates first-hand accounts of lived experience.  
CHANGES IN THE RESEARCH LANDSCAPE  
New Research Investigations 
It is not just psychologists who are drawn to creativity research following Guilford’s address.  
Mark Runco and Robert Albert (2010) note that in the period from the late 1960s to 1991 
‘almost 9,000 creativity references have been added to the literature’ (p. 5). This keen interest in 
creativity continues unabated. Policy-makers, professional bodies, businessmen and industry 
leaders, faced with the challenges of unprecedented and rapid development in all areas are 
looking to creativity research to assist in finding the innovative strategies they need. Creativity 
research, once the domain of the behavioural psychologists, becomes densely populated with 
research from across a wide range of diverse disciplines; from medicine and health care to 
business management, education, and neuroscience (see, for example, Gajdamaschko, 2005; 
Aldous, 2005;  Fink et al.,  2007; Harnad, 2007; Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012;  Dörfler and 
Ackermann, 2012; Ellamil et al., 2012). This new wave of research, together with significant 
advances in the study of consciousness, cognition and neuroscience, yields a wealth of new 
insights that impact the understanding of creativity that had been so shaped by behaviourism 
(Mumford, 2003; Kaufman et al., 2010). However, it is the rise of interest in qualitative research 
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that fundamentally alters the narrow framework within which creativity had been explored by 
the behavioural psychologists. 
New Research Approaches 
During the 1990s the research landscape undergoes a significant change. David Rennie, 
Kimberley Watson, and Althea Monteiro (2002) note a marked rise in the incidence of 
qualitative research. Their examination of the PsycINFO and Dissertation Abstracts International 
databases shows that the number of records yielded by the search terms ‘qualitative research’, 
‘grounded theory’ and ‘discourse analysis’ were ‘basically non-existent until the 1980s, when 
there was a sharp rise that intensified in the 1990s’ (p. 179). Pertti Alasuutari (2010) maps a 
similar rise in the field of sociology, stating that ‘the last decades have witnessed the forward 
march of qualitative research … A recent study shows that only about one in 20 published 
papers in the mainstream British journals use quantitative analysis – a trend also observed in 
Finland, Canada and the United States’ (p. 14). While Rennie, Watson and Monteiro are unsure 
whether their finding indicates ‘a significant shift in the conduct of psychological research’ (p. 
187), Patrick O’ Neill (2002) is convinced there has been a fundamental change, describing it as 
a tectonic shift.  He argues that qualitative research is not simply ‘an add-on to quantitative, 
hypothesis-testing research’; it is a fundamentally different research paradigm because it has a 
different starting point: ‘rather than starting with a hypothesis to be confirmed or falsified, the 
[qualitative] researcher may start with some loosely theoretical questions’, and rather than using 
reasoning, the research would explore the topic using contemplative, descriptive thinking – ‘a 
narrative mode of thinking’.  A shift, like this, he argues, has become necessary because the 
prevailing quantitative paradigm is too confining and ‘its methods and assumptions put too 
many interesting questions beyond the scope of its enquiry’. As in the case of behaviourism, the 
purely quantitative paradigm ‘only permitted a narrow range of phenomena to be studied’, 
whereas qualitative research asks different questions and answered them in different ways (pp. 
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191-193). An oft-cited example of the impact of asking different questions is the work of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996). By changing the research question from ‘what is creativity?’ to ‘where 
is creativity found?’, he develops his systems theory of creativity which conceptualises creativity 
as a confluence of social, cultural, and personal factors. In this way qualitative research opens 
the research space and enables research options that include new kinds of research contribution.  
 The social sciences embrace this new development in the form of grounded theory (see 
Byrne, 2001; Corley, 2015) and the arts find a research home in practice-led research.  Both 
approaches take a fundamentally different view of research, namely, that instead of being strictly 
confined to analytical, objective and theoretically based investigations, research can be more 
open-ended, fluid and tolerant of the subjective view. In the case of practice-led research, this 
view allows for ‘the active exploration of critical concepts in practice: a process that draws on 
phenomenological  experience as well as conceptual understanding, a process continually open 
to re-negotiation, re-interpretation and re-presentation’ (Adams, 2014, p. 218). Suze Adams 
(2014) here highlights the key aspects that distinguish practice-led research from previous 
research paradigms. The focus shifts from objective analysis of a product or object to 
considering critical concepts in practice whereby phenomenological experience is regarded as 
valid research data and what is being researched is clearly an open-ended process, not a final 
product.  The impact of this change in research perspective is highly relevant to this dissertation. 
The rise in interest in qualitative research, and the phenomenologically based investigations it 
enables, legitimises first-hand accounts as valid data. This, therefore, means that the artist’s 
accounts of their creative process, dismissed by Guilford as nothing more than fanciful 
anecdotes, can now be included in explorations of the creative process.  What further facilitates 
this shift in perspective are the findings emerging from the rapidly developing arena of brain 
research  which, as the discussion will now show, provides a scientific basis for the very 
concepts Guilford found too vague for consideration.  
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New Research Findings  
The new wave of research that results from creativity being examined from a wide variety of 
disciplinary perspectives, means that creativity is no longer viewed as a concrete and 
immediately identifiable phenomenon. The contemporary conceptualisation of creativity sees it 
rather as a complex syndrome of factors in dynamic relationship with each other which, at best, 
can only suggest a potential for creative thought rather than a firm prediction of it (Klausen, 
2010; Runco, 2008). Moreover, creativity is now understood to be less of a personality trait as 
posited by Guilford and more as a conceptual construct shaped by the socio-cultural conditions 
of its environment (Mason, 2003; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Amabile, 1996) For this reason, 
defining creativity has proved problematic but there is a consensus that the creativity syndrome 
comprises four elements: person, product, process and place (socio-cultural context) (Sawyer, 
2006).  
 While each of these elements has been the focus of creativity researchers, the one 
element that has not easily yielded itself to scientific scrutiny is that of creative process, 
particularly the notion of unconscious processing. The evolving discourse on creativity has thus 
found itself caught between one of two conceptualisations – either the Romantic view which 
holds that the creative process is ineffably mysterious or the more pared-to-the-bones view of 
the rationalists (Sawyer, 2006) who regard creativity as little more than a problem–solving 
process ‘generated by the conscious, deliberating, intelligent, rational mind’ (Park, 2014, p. 356). 
  However, the new insights into cognition and consciousness made possible by 
significant advances in brain research have opened up the relatively hidden world of mental 
processing at the very time the notion of creativity is being reframed. Sowon Park (2014), for 
example, states: 
In a curious twist, the hard sciences are charting new ground that 
restores to the centre areas previously considered the realm of the 
humanities: consciousness, experience and affect, due to the rise of 
cognitivism (p. 356). 
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Interestingly, she prefaces this comment with the observation that ‘the expansion of cognitive 
studies, the field that produced the most sustained forms of thinking about consciousness was 
literature. In particular, capturing consciousness was the spur to a great modernist ambition, as 
the development of the “stream of consciousness” method in the early twentieth century 
attests’. She attributes the ignoring of this literature by early cognitive scientists to ‘the simple 
fact that the majority of cognitive scientists are unwilling or unable to find ways to incorporate 
literary knowledge about consciousness into materialist scientific epistemology, because the 
kind of knowledge that humanists accumulate is not so much problematic as untestable’ (p. 
348). Yet recent research studies are providing increasing evidence of the creative process as 
described by arts practitioners, with particular reference to the very concepts Guilford found 
too vague for scientific investigation, namely, the unconscious and the processes thought to 
originate there – inspiration, incubation, and intuition.  
 Basing his Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) on convincing empirical evidence, Ap 
Dijksterhuis (2006) argues that ‘attention is the key to distinguish between unconscious thought 
and conscious thought. Conscious thought is thought with attention; unconscious thought is 
thought without attention (or with attention directed elsewhere)’. He likens this to speech,  in 
that, while speaking is a conscious act, this act arises from various unconscious processes, such 
as those responsible for choice of words or syntax, which have to be active to make speech 
possible.  He thus posits that in like manner, ‘conscious thought cannot take place without 
unconscious processes being active at the same time’ (p. 96). 
 These unconscious processes, he asserts, differ from conscious thinking in a number of 
significant ways. While conscious thought is constrained by low working memory capacity 
because it can only temporarily store approximately seven items at any one time, unconscious 
thought is not limited in this way. Furthermore, the unconscious works bottom-up, or a-
schematically, whereas consciousness works top-down, or schematically, and where conscious 
thought is precise, following strict rules,  unconscious thought tends to work in rough estimates.  
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These differences, he concludes, seem to indicate that consciousness generates thoughts or 
ideas in a very focused and convergent way, whereas the unconscious is more divergent, thereby 
increasing the probability of generating creative and unusual ideas: ‘conscious thought stays 
firmly under the searchlight, [whereas] unconscious thought ventures out to the dark and dusty 
nooks and crannies of the mind’ (p. 102). He asserts therefore that unconscious processing is 
‘an active, generative, and creative mode of thought’ (p. 104).  
 This active and generative aspect of the unconscious process was the focus of a 
subsequent study by Chen-Bo Zhong, Ap Dijksterhuis, and Adam Galinsky (2008). Their 
findings support the UTT principle that conscious thought is primarily analytic and derivative 
processing, while the unconscious excels at integrating and associating information. However, 
these findings also provide evidence to suggest that, because the unconscious is capable of 
carrying out associative searches across a broad range of background knowledge, unconscious 
thought ‘appeared to change the very nature of the search process’ (p. 913). They argue that the 
direct evidence provided by this study for a causal relationship between unconscious thought 
and increased solution-related activation, suggests, that ‘unconscious activation may provide 
inspirational sparks underlying the “Aha!” moment that eventually leads to important 
discoveries’ (p. 915).  In their view, the unconscious thought processes are more powerful than 
conscious thought processes and so provide a vital ‘power boost’ in the associative search for 
creative solutions  and this power-boosting occurs in the stage of incubation. They conclude 
that ‘previous research may have underestimated both the importance and the complexity of 
incubation in creative processes and therefore may have looked for the incubation effect in the 
wrong place’ (p. 916). 
  Both these studies thus provide a way of reconciling the gap between anecdotal 
evidence regarding unconscious processes in creative discoveries and the lack of empirical 
support for the effect of incubation.  ‘It seems that creative insight results from a process in 
which some initial conscious thought is followed by a period during which the problem is put 
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to rest, consciously at least. After this period without conscious thought, a solution or idea 
presents itself. Although the anecdotal evidence for incubation is abundant, not much is known 
about the process’ (Dijksterhuis and Meurs, 2006, p. 102). 
 However, the findings of three recent studies do provide empirical support for the stage 
of incubation in the creative process. A study conducted by Jason Gallate et al. (2012) found 
that productivity was significantly increased as a result of participants activating non-conscious 
processes in off-task or incubation periods. They concluded the incubation stage was of great 
benefit to creative individuals and that their research supported the notion, first mooted by 
George Wallas in 1926, that ‘the incubation phase is a key component of the creative process’ 
(p. 150). The results of a study conducted by Ken Gilhooly, George Georgiou and  Ultan 
Devery, (2013) not only support the role of unconscious work during incubation but refute the 
suggestion that the creative effects of incubation effects can be attributed to beneficial 
forgetting or attention shifting. Beneficial forgetting proposes that setting the task aside allows 
for misleading strategies, mistaken assumptions and inhibiting mindsets to ‘weaken’ thereby 
allowing for a fresh perspective when the task is resumed. Attention shifting is similar in that it 
shifts attention away from a misleading assumption and on returning to the task, the adoption 
of more useful ideas. Both are based on the assumption that nothing happens in the period 
when there is no conscious engagement with the task. The hypothesis that was tested and 
supported was that incubation effects arise from active unconscious processing. The researchers  
find  that, overall, the results ‘support a role for unconscious work in delayed incubation’. They 
are ‘consistent with the findings of Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) and of Gilhooly et al. 
(2012), which supported the involvement of unconscious work in the immediate incubation 
paradigm’ (p. 147). They attribute the role of incubation to ‘implicit, associative, spreading-
activation processes’ in which the unconscious develops ‘a useful foundation of novel 
associations’ which would be highly accessible to the conscious when the task was resumed 
after incubation.  Moreover, test results showed ‘that unconscious activation spreads more 
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effectively when the conscious distracting task involves a different type of knowledge’ (p. 148). 
Similar results were obtained in a later study conducted by Ning Hao et al. (2014) to determine 
if fatigue recovery or intermittent conscious work could account for improved thinking after 
taking a break from the target task. Their findings support the unconscious work theory of the 
incubation effect but also suggest that the interpolated task stimulates the unconscious to access 
remote and relevant nodes and so generate the remote associations that positively impact 
creative problem-solving (p. 35). However, despite the strong evidence provided by these 
studies, simply observing the effect of incubation does not explain ‘how unconscious thought 
works and when and how the unconscious transfers its information to consciousness’. It seems 
‘there is much more about the processes involved that remains to be discovered’ (Dijksterhuis, 
2006, p. 107).  
  This is exactly what has been and is being addressed by neuroscience, a field that has  
seen significant advances in its ability to identify and map brain functions.  Its research findings 
are providing clear scientific evidence of the processes operating during incubation or mind-
wandering. This substantial body of  neuroscientific research offers compelling support for the 
hypothesis that there is a ‘positive association between mind-wandering and the incubation 
effect in insight problem solving’ (Tengteng Tan et al.,  2015, p. 380). Furthermore, recent 
research has shown that the brain’s default mode network, especially the medial temporal lobe, 
is involved in mind-wandering and that mind-wandering shares a similar neural network with 
offline memory reprocessing, which allows a broad search of long-term memory and an 
automatic reorganization of memory representations (p. 376). In other words, neuroscience is 
providing hard evidence for what the other studies have observed, namely, that the unconscious 
is ‘an active, generative, and creative mode of thought’ (Dijksterhuis, 2006, p. 104) which uses 
‘implicit, associative, spreading-activation processes’ to generate ‘a useful foundation of novel 
of associations’ (Gilhooly et al., 2013, p. 148). 
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 In addition, ‘recent neuroimaging studies have been increasingly capable of 
demonstrating frontal activation during the performance of tasks that require creativity’ 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010, p. 178). A clear example of this is the neuroscientific exploration 
of the “Aha!” moment of insight that often occurs during or immediately following the 
incubation stage. Defined as a form of cognition that results in a new interpretation of a 
situation or a potential solution, insight is regarded as the moment the work of the unconscious 
spills over into conscious thinking. In a review of their research studies, John Kounios and 
Mark Beeman (2009) provide a neuroscientific explanation for this moment.  They base their 
research on previous findings that insight is a form of cognition that occurs in a number of 
domains; is significantly different from deliberate, conscious thinking, and occurs when an 
unconscious solution suddenly emerges into awareness. They then use electroencephalography 
(EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine processes ‘that would be 
difficult to detect using behavioural measurements alone’ (p. 210). 
 They found that immediately before an insight solution was reported, there was a burst 
of high-frequency gamma-band activity in the right anterior temporal lobe. However, an 
unexpected finding was that this high-frequency burst was preceded by a burst of slower, alpha-
band activity. Since alpha-band waves are the brain’s dominant rhythm and are understood to 
reflect idling or inhibition of brain areas, they suggested that this slower wave pattern represents 
‘the brain’s covert alternative to closing the eyes or looking away’ as a way of reducing the flow 
of processing.  This, they argue, suggests that ‘when a weakly activated problem solution is 
present in the right temporal lobe, a temporary reduction in interfering visual inputs facilitates 
the retrieval of this solution, allowing the solution to pop into awareness’ (p. 212). 
 They also found that the patterns of brain activity were distinctly different depending 
on whether the problems were being solved with insight or conscious analytical thinking.  In 
the case of insight solutions they found greater neural activity over the temporal lobes of both 
cerebral hemispheres and over the mid frontal cortex which suggested the ‘priming of brain 
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areas that process lexical and semantic information’.  In addition, activity detected in the anterior 
cingulate suggested a ‘readiness to detect weakly activated, subconscious solutions and to switch 
attention to them when they are detected’ (p. 212). Similar and related findings reflect the extent 
to which neuroscientific research is providing clear support for anecdotal reports of moments 
of insight and intuitive understanding (Kaufman et al., 2010; Richards, 2010). This distinction 
between insight and intuition is a significant one. The terms insight and intuition have often 
been used interchangeably, mainly because both enter consciousness as new, fairly fully formed 
ideas. However, they differ in two key respects and several studies using fMRI have identified 
them as ‘distinctive constructs’ (Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012, p. 32).  
In the first instance, insight, which features prominently in problem-solving, provides, 
as it were, the missing piece of the jigsaw that enables a new picture or solution to fall into place 
whereas intuition brings a sense of a whole new picture.  While both originate in unconscious 
processes, i.e. processes that are not analytical, rational or conscious, ‘intuition entails vague and 
tacit knowledge, whereas insight involves sudden and clear awareness’ (Richards, 2010, p. 200). 
It is in this sense of broader knowing that intuition is differs from insight; it is the ‘suddenness 
and completeness of the products of intuitive operations when they first enter consciousness’ 
that mark intuitions as distinct from insights: ‘intuitions commonly appear as a whole, whether 
or not the processes that produced the results involve synthesis or analysis, or whether they 
have occurred serially or as parallel processes’ (Laughlin, 1997, p. 25). They arrive as a coherently 
organised gestalt rather than just an isolated idea.   
 The second key difference between insight and intuition is that where insight enters 
consciousness as a blinding flash, termed in the literature as the “Eureka!” or “Aha!” moment, 
the intuitive product tends more often to seep into conscious awareness (Boucouvalas, 1997) 
as though the intuited idea was being processed ‘at the bottom of a murky river, and the results 
written on a blackboard that is then released to float upward to the surface’ (Laughlin, 1997, p. 
25). That the right hemisphere of the brain forms a key component of this ‘murky river’ is 
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supported by extensive data which indicate that it ‘specialises in global, parallel, holistic 
processes’ aimed at integrating parts into a whole. (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 220). In fact, 
Charles Laughlin (1997) argues that, since the processes of the nervous system form ‘a complex, 
multi-layered and distributed network of untold millions of cells interacting in trillions of ways’ 
and ‘most of the knowing that goes on in this welter of processing is unconscious … 
comparatively little knowledge is derived initially from rational thought. The brain’s mode of 
producing knowledge is inherently intuitive’ (p. 32). 
 It is this idea of intuition as a mode of knowing that has been the focus of a significant 
volume of research in the field of business studies. In their literature review, Cinla Akinci and 
Eugene Sadler-Smith (2012) provide an informative trajectory of the development of intuition 
research in management from the 1930s, in which they demonstrate how ‘parallel insights in 
related fields of scientific inquiry … have availed management scholars of conceptual, 
theoretical, and  methodological resources’ which have ‘facilitated the study of intuition in 
management’ (p. 3). More importantly, they demonstrate how recent research has provided 
substantial evidence for more ‘systematically derived and conceptually robust definitions of 
intuition’ (p. 35). Viktor Dörfler and Fran Ackermann (2012), for example, define intuition as 
a phenomenon comprising six key characteristics, and describe intuiting as being 
rapid (often labelled instantaneous), spontaneous (does not require effort 
and cannot be deliberately controlled) and alogical (meaning that it does 
not necessarily contradict the rules of logic but does not follow them 
either). The outcome of the intuitive process is tacit (in that the 
intuitives cannot give account of how they arrived at the results), holistic 
(also often called gestalt, as it is concerned with the totality of a 
situation rather than parts of it), and the intuitor feels confident about 
their intuition (with no apparent reason in terms of evidence) (p. 547).  
Furthermore, they argue, there is a growing recognition among researchers that deliberative 
conscious reasoning is not the only way of arriving at valid knowledge; that in fact ‘when one 
achieves a high level of expertise, intuition naturally emerges and at the highest level it becomes 
the dominant form of knowledge’ (p. 550). 
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 These findings are significant because they demonstrate that intuition can no longer be 
viewed as a vague concept; nor can it be regarded as belonging solely to those artists’ accounts 
that were dismissed as being too subjective, affective and anecdotal to offer anything meaningful 
to the enquiry into creativity and the creative process. On the contrary, intuition is increasingly 
being seen as a mode of knowing as valid as that of rational thought, and the two as being in a 
complimentary rather than an oppositional relationship with one another.   
 The research of Arne Dietrich (2004) has proved seminal in this regard in the way it 
embraces both types of cognition.  His model is based on neurological findings that the brain 
has two different types of neural system – an affective system and an analytical system, each 
with its own record of activity so that emotional memory is part of the emotional or affective 
circuitry, and perceptual and conceptual memory are part of the cognitive or analytical circuitry. 
In addition, the brain has two distinct processing modes, namely deliberate or conscious and 
spontaneous or unconscious (p. 1012).  
  Combining these structures and modes of processing yields a matrix of four possible 
categories of cognition: deliberate-analytical; deliberate-emotional; spontaneous-deliberate, and 
spontaneous-emotional. The first combination relates to logical, methodical analytical work; the 
second to emotional insights as experienced during psychotherapy for example; the third 
combination refers to the breakthrough insights that occur after reaching an impasse in 
problem-solving, while the last combination comprises intensely emotional experiences of 
insight. In his argument for this model, Dietrich asserts that ‘the spontaneous processing mode 
is the underlying mechanism for intuition’ (p. 1118), and that this spontaneous processing is 
available to artist and scientist alike. He does, however, make the observation that in the arts 
the expression of the creative insight requires exceptional skill while the sciences depend heavily 
on formal knowledge (p. 1020). He concludes that ‘creativity results from the factorial 
combination of four kinds of mechanisms. Neural computation that generates novelty can 
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occur during two modes of thought (deliberate and spontaneous) and for two types of 
information (emotional and cognitive)’ (p. 1023).  
 Dietrich’s research supports the emerging notion of creativity as ‘both the art and the 
science of thinking and behaving with both subjectivity and objectivity. It is a combination of 
feeling and knowing: of alternating back and forth between what we sense and what we already 
know’ (Aldous, 2005, p. 44). This view forms the basis of the argument made by Carol Aldous 
(2005) that ‘there is a need to value both subjective and objective elements in the creative 
process’ (p. 44).  Citing a number of protocols, she argues that the formation of a new idea has 
three aspects:  pre-verbal and non-verbal processes; pre-conscious or non-conscious activity, 
and intuition. She asserts that this suggests that ‘the production of a new idea would appear to 
entail moving between thinking and feeling, and between focused and defocused states of 
attention’ (p. 52). She captures this notion in a conceptual framework comprising the three 
elements identified by researchers as critical to creativity, namely, visual-spatial and linguistic 
circuits in the brain; conscious and non-conscious mental activity, and reflection or listening to 
the ‘self’. She argues that, 
central to the framework, however, is the intuitive function. The 
generation of feeling within and between non–conscious and 
conscious activity … and between and within the visual–spatial and 
linguistic circuits serves to evaluate, monitor and filter a particular 
solution path. Feeling, as is revealed in the exploratory protocols, plays 
a significant role in crystallising possible solutions generated in the 
visual spatial circuit of the brain and is likely to be one of the body’s 
internal communication mechanisms particularly in instances of non-
verbal reasoning (p. 53). 
 
Both Dietrich and Aldous thus view intuition as a bridge crossing the traditional divide between 
scientific and artistic modes of knowing and producing knowledge, a view that is finding 
increasing support. For example, Park (2014) argues that intuition research has overturned the 
historical view that ‘the natural sciences and the humanities are two distinct forms of intellectual 
enquiry, yielding two different kinds of knowledge’ in which the two forms were not seen as 
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‘essentially different but equal realms of knowledge’ (p. 356), but rather ranked according to 
their perceived worth.  This worth was defined by the reigning logical positivist stance in which 
analytical and logically rigorous scientific methods were the standard for intellectual 
investigation.  However, she contends that 
the neuroscientific evidence in Damasio and LeDoux’s experiments 
indicates that cognitive decision making is disabled when the affective 
structures of the orbito–frontal cortex are impaired, demonstrating 
that rationality and feeling are indivisible, effectively breaking the 
dualist and hierarchical model of knowledge (p. 356). 
 
Park attributes the breaking of this dualistic, hierarchical model of knowledge to neuroscientific 
research, yet it is apparent from Southern and Domalski (1984) that this divide was already 
being ‘intuitively’ bridged in the 1980s. In a paper entitled, ‘Developing Intuition: The Key to 
Creative Futures Research’ they argue that there is some overlap between the framework for 
problem-solving and the models for creativity in that ‘one group of investigators prefers active, 
intentional techniques for problem-exploration, while another group favors passive, receptive 
approaches to innovation via self-exploration … In the final analysis, we find that the rational, 
systematic procedures of conventional science and the intuitive, “discontinuous”, contributions 
of highly creative researchers complement each other’ (p. 3). They are careful, however, to point 
out that this ‘descriptive approach to futures research is clearly speculative’ (p. 6); a speculation 
that has since been confirmed by empirical neuroscientific research. 
Yet, the contribution of this scholarship has even more far-reaching implications: it not 
only bridges the traditional divide between the sciences and the humanities but, in so doing, 
also contributes to the validation of artists’ accounts of their creative process. Where recent 
research has made the inclusion of these accounts possible and necessary, neuroscience has 
supported these accounts as legitimate modes of knowing. The need to embrace this essentially 
equal but different form of knowledge production and intellectual enquiry has been addressed 
in the model proposed by Dean Simonton (2009a). 
69 
 
 Arguing that it is possible to distinguish between scientific and artistic creativity, and 
that creativity is domain-specific, Simonton proposes a hierarchy of creativity in which these 
domains are placed on a continuum ranging from predominantly logical, objective, formal, and 
conventional forms of creativity to forms of creativity that are ‘predominantly intuitive, 
subjective, emotional, and individualistic’ (2009a, p. 449). Claiming that ‘the hierarchical model 
captures the most crucial dimension in delineating varieties of creativity, scientific, or otherwise’ 
(2009b, p. 466)  he proposes the domains be ordered as follows: the abstract sciences (logic and 
mathematics), the physical sciences, the biological sciences, the psychological sciences, the 
social sciences, the humanities, and the arts. Objections to his model focus mainly on his 
decision to arrange the domains hierarchically, thereby reinforcing the traditional view that hard 
sciences are ‘higher’ than the soft sciences. In his reply, Simonton points out that this hierarchy 
is not intended in any way to reflect respective values of the domains: ‘we can just as well turn 
the hierarchy upside down. At the top will be those domains that impose the fewest constraints 
on creativity, whereas those domains that require creators to satisfy quite rigorous criteria will 
reside at the bottom’ (2009b, p. 466). 
 While Simonton’s arrangement of the domains may have been better expressed as a left-
right continuum rather than a top-down hierarchy, his model does indicate a fundamental shift 
in thinking as to what constitutes data for critical enquiry, how knowledge is produced and the 
nature of different modes of knowing. By acknowledging the contributions of the more artistic 
domains to developing a more rounded understanding of creativity, Simonton’s model 
effectively legitimises art practitioner’s accounts and formalises their place in the realm of 
knowledge production. From being categorically excluded from the creativity research that 
followed Guilford’s address, artists’ contributions can now be welcomed, and their insights 
added to the emerging discourse on what it means to be creative and what the creative process 
entails.  
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This chapter has argued that when Guilford’s research plan became the preferred 
research paradigm in the decades following his address in 1950, it had a number of unforeseen 
consequences. It offered a very restrictive research paradigm that was based on behaviourism, 
rationalism and positivism. This in turn lead to a purely cognitive conceptualisation of creativity 
that excluded the lived experience of the artistic creative process and emphasised the human-
making activities of scientific innovation and technological invention above those historically 
associated with imaginative art-making. However, the impact of the paradigm shift in the 
research landscape of the 1990s which opened up new avenues, offered new approaches and 
generated new research, particularly in the field of brain science. Together, these changes 
created an environment that enabled the inclusion of lived experience as valid research data, 
and validated the concepts used by artists to describe their creative process.  
This chapter has served to introduce the three main themes of this dissertation’s 
argument, namely, the limitations of a purely cognitive view of the creative process, the validity 
of the artist’s lived experience of this process, and the extent to which neuroscience provides 
hard evidence that supports artists’ accounts of this experience. All these themes inform the 
model of the artistic creative process proposed in Chapter 5 and so are repeatedly addressed in 
the chapters that follow. However, it is first necessary to address two questions: Is there a 
creative process that is unique to art-making that differs significantly from the process used for 
the human-making activities of innovation and invention? If, so what can be learned from 
artists’ accounts about the artistic creative process? The first of these two questions is the focus 
of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DOMAINS AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS 
Does the creative process vary according to the nature of the task? Is there a creative 
process for work in the visual arts that differs from the creative process involved in literary 
or scientific work? (Lubart, 2001, p. 304) 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how the wealth of literature on the artistic creative process was 
effectively excluded from early creativity research that favoured a purely  behavioural, rationalist 
and positivist research approach. However, the 1990s saw a paradigm shift in the research 
landscape that made it possible to include the subjective, personal accounts of the artistic 
creative experience in the conversations on the nature of creativity. There is thus evidence of 
an emerging acknowledgement within the creativity discourse that artistic creativity is a different 
but equal mode of knowing and knowledge production, as reflected in Simonton’s hierarchy of 
domains (2009a).  
 This chapter explores the question of whether artistic and scientific creativity employ 
two distinctly different processes i.e. the possibility that art-making may involve a distinctive 
process that can be readily identified as an artistic creative process.  It focuses on the dilemma 
raised by one body of research that supports the notion that there is only one uniform creative 
process, while another body of research strongly supports the idea of separate processes. The 
chapter then argues that the answer to this quandary can be found in the model proposed by 
Graham Wallas (1926). Basing its rationale on Wallas’s contention that the imagination is the 
preserve of the arts, the chapter demonstrates that, while the imagination plays a key role in 
both artistic and scientific creativity, the roles are so markedly different that there is convincing 
support for the view that the creative process is domain specific. For this reason, the chapter 
avers that it is the domain itself which constrains the creative process used to develop its creative 
products, and thus concludes that it is  possible to identify and describe a creative process that 
is unique to artistic creativity.   
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THE DOMAIN DEBATE 
Domain Specific vs Domain General Creativity  
The notion of domains can be traced back to the ancient Greeks who attributed creative 
inspiration to nine different muses (Kaufman, 2012), each responsible for creative endeavour 
within its particular preserve. Modern scholarship, however, uses the term more broadly to 
designate ‘areas of organised human activity’ (Li, 1997, p. 108) or as a way of discriminating 
between different types of intelligence (Hass, 2014). There is little consensus on what these 
domains might be or where their boundaries might lie (Silvia, Kaufman, and Pretz, 2009; Julmi 
and Scherm, 2015; Baer, 2016). There is, however, a wide consensus that a domain comprises a 
distinct realm of skill and knowledge (Jeon, 2008; Sawyer, 2006; Baer, 2015; Julmi and Scherm, 
2015) and that ‘it generally takes many years to acquire the kinds of domain-specific skills and 
knowledge needed’ before a truly original contribution to a field can be made; ‘something 
creativity researchers call the ten-year rule’ (Baer, 2016, p. 52).   
This is the only point of consensus in what is widely regarded as one the most 
controversial questions in creativity research, namely, whether creativity is domain-general or 
domain-specific (Plucker and Beghetto, 2004; Jeon, 2008; Simonton, 2009a & 2014; Baer, 2016). 
What this means in layman’s terms is that, if creativity is domain general, then Stephen 
Hawkings could just as easily been a world-renowned poet, and Madonna an internationally 
acclaimed mathematician. If creativity is domain specific, then Hawkings and Madonna would 
only ever have been able to make creative contributions within their respective fields (Kaufman 
and Baer, 2004). The issue has become the site of a heated debate, with views quickly polarising 
into two distinct camps and advocates for each assembling empirical studies, compelling 
evidence and robust argument to support their stance (Plucker and Beghetto, 2004).  
 The roots of this controversy lie in the contrary, and conflicting, results arising from 
the waves of psychometric testing that followed Guilford’s address. All follow his person-
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centred approach, but the test results provide support for both domain general and domain 
specific views of creativity.  It is only recently, that researchers have begun interrogating the 
research approach itself, pointing out that the results are significantly influenced by the kind of 
questions being asked (Kaufman and Baer, 2004) and the specific kind of tests being used (Baer, 
2016). In essence, their critique of the positivist approach advocated by Guilford argues that 
this approach relies on ‘statistical models that won’t settle the issue’ (Silvia, Kaufman, and Pretz 
2009, p. 139). The current view is that, while, broadly speaking, creativity embraces both domain 
general and domain specific aspects (Kaufman, 2012), it is better conceptualised as being 
domain specific, particularly with regard to the creative task that gives rise to the creative 
product (Silvia, Kaufman, and Pretz, 2009; Plucker and Zabelin, 2009).  There is thus a growing 
view that domain specificity matters more than previously thought (Dow and Mayer, 2004; 
Ivcevic, 2009; Silvia, Kaufman, and Pretz, 2009; Hong and Milgram, 2010; Baer 2016). 
Proponents thus argue that because creative performance occurs in domains, it must be 
investigated within those domains; that if we are to truly understand creativity we must discover 
‘how it functions in domains, not how it might work at a highly abstract or purely theoretical 
level’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 237).  This view is supported by compelling neuroscientific 
evidence that shows that different modes of thinking are associated with ‘functionally different 
activity patterns of the brain’ (Fink et al., 2007, p. 76, original italics) and that while creativity 
‘relies on multi-componential neural networks … different creativity domains depend on 
different brain regions’ (Boccia et al., 2015, p. 1). 
 This domain debate has generated a body of rigorous research, as reflected in the range 
of comprehensive literature reviews that accompany the views on this debate (Plucker and 
Beghetto, 2004; Simonton, 2009 & 2014; Baer, 2016). However, what is conspicuous by its 
absence in this wealth of research is any in-depth exploration of the possible intersections 
between domain and creative process. There has been an overwhelming focus on the creative 
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person and the creative product, but scant attention has been paid to exploring the question as 
to whether the creative process is domain general or domain specific.   
Dean Simonton (2009a), a strong advocate for domain specificity, observes that, while 
research has successfully discerned ‘dispositional contrasts in the scientist and the artist’, there 
is not a commensurate level of understanding of how the creative process ‘might systematically 
vary across different domains of creativity’. Instead, he says, ‘what we currently possess is a 
chaos of miscellaneous puzzle pieces that we hope can be eventually placed together to form a 
single coherent picture’ (p. 448) He is not the first to remark on this gap.  As early as 1997, Jin 
Li  challenges the rationalist position that ‘the process of creativity is the same across all the 
knowledge domains, irrespective of how different knowledge domains are organized’ (p. 108). 
Based on the findings of her study of the difference between Eastern and Western art, she 
asserts that, 
Regardless of the predispositions and personalities they possess, 
individual practitioners encounter a different process of creativity in 
different knowledge domains, depending on how the specific domains 
are organized … Domains differ in the kinds of opportunities they 
provide and the processes that their practitioners go through to achieve 
creativity (p. 107). 
That Li’s research predates Simonton’s observation by more than a decade is a reflection of 
how little attention is being given to the intersection between domain and the creative process 
in the domain debate.  When the creative process is mentioned in the discussion, it is often 
merely sketched in very broad terms, almost as an aside to the main argument. For example, 
Baer (2016), in presenting his case for domain specificity, briefly notes that   
It isn’t simply that the content is different; the analytical skills 
employed in different domains are themselves also quite different. The 
critical and analytical thinking skills that help one dissect a sonnet are 
of little use when dissecting a logical argument, or a polygon, or a frog. 
They aren’t even that much use in analyzing a haiku, although there is 
probably some overlap in that case. Skills that might seem the same 
when viewed from the outside – from an observer’s perspective – may 
be totally different when viewed from the inside, at the level of actual 
cognitive operations (p. 61). 
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Although he raises the possibility that there may well be different ‘thinking skills’ and ‘cognitive 
operations’ at work in different domains, Baer does not pursue this possible link in any great 
depth, which  suggests that the investigation into the intersection between domain and creative 
process is still an unexplored line of enquiry. Part of the reason for this can, once again, can be 
attributed to the pervasive impact of the rationalist-positivist paradigm favoured by creativity 
researchers.  
Creative Process is Domain General 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the research paradigm adopted in the early decades 
of creativity research is based on a very narrow, almost simplistic, definition of creativity that 
views the creative process in reductionist terms. The creative process is described as being little 
more than a rational, logical form of problem-solving in which divergent thinking provides a 
satisfactory account of its key creative component (Lubart, 2001; Plucker and Beghetto, 2004; 
Silvia, Kaufman and Pretz, 2009; Baer, 2016). Furthermore, the underlying premise is that the 
creative process is common to all creative persons across all domains (Plucker and Zabelin, 
2009) and is encountered wherever rational thought is ‘directed to the goal of solving intellectual 
or artistic problems’, with an attitude of ‘critical open-mindedness’ and ‘a willingness to persist 
with a process of trial and error’ until the creative solution is discovered (Jarvie, 2009, p. 52). 
These creative solutions are defined as the products of a mental process that involves ‘many 
complex cognitive processes, such as conceptual combination, the use of analogies and 
schemas, associations, and divergent thinking’ (Kohn, Paulus and Korde, 2011, p. 203). 
Creativity is thus solely attributed to the creative person’s cognitive ability to combine categories 
and connect elements in different ways ‘to produce original, high-quality products’ (p. 204). As 
this purely rational, cognitive approach is thought to provide a full account of what is believed 
to be a uniform creative process, there is little impetus to make any distinction between scientific 
or artistic creativity – both are regarded as forms of rational problem-solving (Lubart, 2001; 
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Jarvie, 2009). Many models are developed to depict this process, most little more than more 
elaborate versions of the alternative model proposed by Guilford, which dispenses with the 
‘vague concepts’ he found so objectionable , namely, inspiration, incubation, and imagination 
(Lubart, 2001). These models thus reflect ‘a predominantly cognitive perspective on the 
phenomenon’, excelling at ‘depicting a rather orderly and simplified succession of stages’ for 
what is primarily regarded as a uniform creative process. Variations in the models  are supported 
by ‘sustained arguments about the exact number and characteristics of each stage’ (Glaveanu et 
al.,  2013, p. 2). So, for example, one model, that clearly illustrates this predominantly cognitive 
perspective, posits that the creative process comprises the stages of ‘problem construction, 
information encoding, category search, specification of best-fitting categories, combination and 
reorganization of best-fitting categories, idea evaluation, implementation, monitoring’, all linked 
though feedback loops (p. 1). 
 These cognitive models are a far cry from the thoughtful and considered speculations 
on the creative process offered by the Romantic poets that make repeated reference to the 
imagination, the unconscious process of generating new ideas, and the strong emotional 
undertow of the process itself.  However, because the cognitive approach to the creative process 
suits the sciences so well, the view that the creative process is a uniform process, readily 
accounted for in purely rational terms, becomes deeply entrenched. It continues to be used as 
grist in the mill to bolster the argument supporting domain generality as reflected in the views 
of Plucker and Beghetto (2004) who assert that  
the interrelated nature of creative ability and creative process can 
certainly be conceptualized as having strong domain-specific 
components, but a large body of research provides evidence that 
cognitive abilities and processes, both in general and those devoted to 
creativity and problem-solving apply across domains (p. 159). 
Yet this simplistic and reductionist view of the creative process is being challenged by 
contemporary researchers who are now highlighting the misconceptions embedded in the very 
tests developed by Guilford and Torrance to predict creative ability and performance. For 
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example, in his overview of these tests, Baer (2016) finds that since ‘all that most standard 
divergent-thinking tests report are domain-general scores’, the tests only serve to reinforce the 
prevailing notion that creativity is domain general.  In addition, although the tests measure only 
one component of Guilford’s model, namely, divergent thinking, ‘they nevertheless, without 
any corroborating evidence, claim to predict creative performance generally’, because the tests 
are underpinned by ‘an implicit assumption of content generality’ ( p. 18). He notes that, while 
Torrance did expand the tests to include domain-specific divergent thinking components, this 
did little to change the view that what was being measured was ‘a single domain-general skill 
that happened to be deployed in different domains’ (p. 27); a position Torrance maintained 
despite the lack of almost any correlation between the scores on the tests and findings that 
suggested the basic assumption was incorrect (Shaughnessy, 1998). Baer concludes, therefore, 
that ‘much of what we think we know, from decades of creativity research using what we now 
know to be invalid tests, may simply not be true’ (Baer, 2015, p. 172). 
 Other studies find that conceptual combination is not necessarily correlated to divergent 
thinking, and that the standard measure of divergent thinking, namely, the ability to generate a 
great number of ideas, does not necessarily correlate with creativity; that ‘quantity does not 
necessarily equal quality’ (Kohn, Paulus and Korde, 2011, p. 204). They find little evidence to 
support the view  that divergent thinking is synonymous with creative problem-solving. They 
thus argue that, while divergent thinking may ‘often lead to highly original ideas’, originality 
alone is not sufficient for something to be deemed creative: ‘Creative things of all sorts, be they 
ideas, solutions, products, inventions, whatever, are both original and effective’. Divergent tests, 
therefore, ‘are best viewed as estimates of the potential for creative thought’ and tests of 
ideation, rather than indicators of creativity itself (Runco, 2008, pp. 94-95). 
 Even more compelling evidence that the creative process may not be the uniform, 
domain general process it is thought to be, lies in the consistent findings arising from studies 
investigating the link between task performance and creativity. Contrary to expectation, the 
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findings indicate that creative ability in one domain does not, in fact, transfer to a different 
domain; nor does training in one domain result in improved performance in another domain 
(Dow and Mayer, 2004; Baer, 2015).  This is clearly illustrated in the study undertaken by Todd 
Lubart and Jacques-Henri Guignard (2004). This study specifically explores the possible link 
between a domain-specific task and the creative process; the ‘kind of task analysis [that] is 
essentially missing in the literature and limits our ability to predict creativity in a given task as 
well as to understand why creativity scores correlate for certain tasks and not for others’ (p. 48). 
The hypothesis they test is that two tasks within the same domain will have nearly identical 
profiles of required abilities and traits for creativity and that creativity scores for these tasks will 
correlate strongly. In contrast, two tasks that require very different sets of creative skills will 
result in a weak correlation. Their investigation suggests there is a strong degree of task 
specificity in the requirements for creative performance across fields and even across tasks 
within a given field. So, for example, they find that, while designing an advertisement for a 
magazine page and designing an advertisement for a billboard, may require the same abilities 
and traits, the tasks themselves will require significantly different processes. This suggests that 
even within the broad domain of graphic design, specific tasks will reflect as somewhat 
differentiated processes.  
  This study provides support for the hypothesis proposed earlier by Lubart (2001) that 
‘the creative process may differ according to the domain of work’ and even ‘the sub-process of 
problem finding may be quite different depending on the kind of task’ (p. 299). He suggests 
that ‘other differences between tasks may also lead to differences in the creative process’; that, 
for example, there may even be  differences between the creative process involved in online 
productions, such as acting or playing improvisational jazz, and offline productions, such as 
writing a script for a play or composing a symphony; ‘there may also be different creative 
processes for tasks in the same domain of work, such as writing a novel and writing a short 
story or writing a haiku and writing a sonnet’. These possibilities, he asserts, then raise 
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provocative questions such as ‘Does the creative process vary according to the nature of the 
task? Is there a creative process for work in the visual arts that differs from the creative process 
involved in literary or scientific work?’ ( p. 304).  
That questions such as these are only being posed some fifty years after Guilford’s 
address reveals the extent to which the rationalist view of the creative process has obscured 
other conceptualisations. That they are being asked, however, indicates a readiness to consider 
alternative possibilities and to investigate other options. The discussion now turns to an 
exploration of the possibility that the creative process may, in fact, be very domain-specific. 
More specifically, is considers the prospect that the domain of artistic creativity involves a very 
different creative process to that depicted in cognitive models that suits the domain of the 
sciences so well. 
DIFFERENT DOMAINS, DIFFERENT PROCESSES? 
The Artist and the Scientist  
Despite the uncertainty regarding the nature and number of domains, and the seemingly 
irreconcilable divisions reflected in the domain debate, there is consensus that it is possible to 
distinguish between the domains of the Arts and the Sciences (Root-Bernstein and Root-
Bernstein, 2004; Kaufman, 2012; Simonton, 2014; Julmi and Scherm, 2015; Agnoli, Corazza, 
and Runco, 2016). However, the notion that creativity in each domain may require a distinctive 
process has only recently begun attracting more focussed attention.  Christian Julmi and Ewald 
Scherm (2015), for example, in their argument that the phenomenological method is a more 
appropriate way to explore the creative process as ‘a significant and unique human experience’, 
contrast the creative experience of the artist with that of the scientist. Their comparison shows 
that while artistic creativity results in products ‘that are clearly expressions of the creator’s inner 
states … scientific creativity results in a creative product that is unrelated to the creator as a 
person, who in his creative work acts largely as a mediator between externally defined needs 
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and goals’. They correlate this claim with the earlier findings that reflect a clear distinction 
between the ‘personal, subjective and meaningfulness’ focus of the artist and the impersonal, 
objective, and fact-oriented focus of scientists’ (p. 151). 
 Vlad Glaveanu et al. (2013) contrast what they see as two different creative processes. 
In the case of the sciences, they argue, the process conventionally begins when a problem is 
identified. The scientist responds by undertaking substantial research, seeking to pose ‘good 
questions’ to be researched. These questions are used to frame a hypothesis which is then tested, 
and discarded/replaced, reframed, revised and reframed, before the findings are reported. Key 
to this process is the Eureka moment, when the idea of a possible solution arises, seemingly 
instantaneously, in a moment of blinding insight (p. 8). The entire process, from beginning to 
end, is predominantly impersonal, objective, and fact-oriented. 
 Turning their attention to the process of artistic creativity, they describe quite a different 
process. They note that where scientific discovery begins with a problem, artistic creativity 
begins rather with a vision or an idea which the artist then feels impelled to express. The initial 
idea, however, is ‘schematic, necessarily incomplete’ and needs a time of reflection and  
incubation, before these first stages of ‘conception’ give way to the stages of ‘fabrication’, that 
encompass first sketches, intermediate drafts and the final object (p. 5). 
 An important part of this creative process is what they term ‘material undergoing’, 
defined as ‘the physical, sensorial, sensible presence of the work and the artist’s ‘confrontation’ 
with it. In this part of the process,  
Objects ‘guide’ the work, they ‘speak’ to the creator … resist the 
intentions of the artist. All of the sudden, they ‘ask a question’ and very 
often ‘change the original plan,’ being ‘stronger’ than the creator, 
‘imposing their rules’. This is exactly what artists love about their work, 
this resistance, this reaction, this dialogue (p. 5) 
This, they say, attests to the dynamic and cyclical nature of artistic activity, ‘a process filled with 
feedback loops, for working and reworking the work of art’ and is experienced  as a ‘dynamic 
between doing and undergoing … between an initial imperfect and incomplete idea and [the 
81 
 
developing work]’ (original italics).  These cycles of ‘action, reflection, action, non-action, plenty 
of action’ reflect the essential dichotomy inherent in the creation of art ‘during which the artist 
controls the process and at the same time lets it control the outcome’ (p. 5). 
 There are clear parallels between this account of the artistic creative process and the 
creative process identified by Brewster Ghiselin (1952) years earlier. Ghiselin describes the 
process as typically beginning ‘with a vague, even confused excitement, some sort of yearning, 
hunch, or other preverbal intimation of approaching or potential resolution’. This is followed 
by a stage of inner chaos and disorder that is nevertheless ‘organic, dynamic, full of tension and 
tendency’. What is absent is in these early stages is any apparent fixity, or commitment to only 
one resolution; instead, there is a sense of being cast into ‘a working sea of indecision’ and ‘the 
surging chaos of the unexpressed’. What maintains the creative momentum through these 
unsettling stages is the sense of the whole, the complete, which initiated the process to begin 
with, even though this sense may be little more than ‘a fragment of the whole’, with ‘a mere 
glimpse serving as a clue’ of something that needs to be developed, worked into a shape, 
completed (pp. 4-5). Much of the creative tension, therefore, lies in the process of giving 
expression to this initial preverbal intimation. Intuition or ‘felt sense’ plays a key role in guiding 
this process towards an implicit end: ‘a sense of the inherent goal embedded in the nature of 
the creative idea itself … some specific order urged upon the mind by something inherent’ as 
not yet realized’ (p. 10). The process Ghiselin describes is inherently organic and he cautions 
that ‘it is essential to remember that the creative end is never fully in sight at the beginning and 
that it is brought wholly into view only when the process of creation is completed’ (p. 11). It is 
therefore fruitless to seek it through a ‘scrutiny of the conscious scene, because it is never there’, 
nor can its unfolding be rationally or logically managed because, as he states quite unequivocally, 
‘[creative] production by a process of purely conscious calculation seems never to occur’ (p. 5). 
 This is a very different perspective on the creative process when compared with the 
neatly structured, tidily linear cognitive models proposed by the positivists and suggests quite 
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strongly that the process of artistic creativity is significantly different to that of scientific 
creativity. Whereas scientific creativity begins with a question or the need to find an answer to 
a problem, artistic creativity more often than not seems to begin with a felt sense of something 
that needs to be explored and then expressed (see for example Dillard, 1990; Fogelberg, 2002; 
Maxwell, 2007; Woolfe, 2007; Newman, 2008; Bye, 2014). 
 Shaun McNiff (2011) agrees that the scientific process as a largely methodical one that 
emphasises cause and effect, whereas the artistic process is less linear and structured. In artistic 
creativity, there is far less emphasis on  causal connections. Instead, there is a focus on the 
relationships that lie between the metaphors used to express what is sensed or intuited. 
Furthermore, he argues, while the scientific process is structured to ‘test and validate a pre-
existing premise’, the artistic process begins with ‘uncertain outcomes and even an absence of 
pre-arranged methods’ (p. 387) and moves, cyclically, to an end product which can only be 
clearly defined at the completion of the process.  
 Carl Hausman (2009) adds an additional dimension to these descriptions of the artistic 
creative process, arguing that unlike scientific creativity, the artistic creative act is, 
fundamentally, ‘a transforming act’ in which the act itself develops structure and meaning as it 
unfolds:  
The requirements of the developing structure are themselves 
developed. The creator does not set out with a pre-envisaged target. 
The creative artist does not know til he has said it what he wants to say 
or how to say it. He constitutes his target as he discovers how to aim 
at it. Thus the creative act is discontinuous … [but it] is not wholly 
uncontrolled. The artist exercises critical judgement, refines 
possibilities and integrates them, even though not yet sure of what the 
final integration might be (p. 12). 
However, despite such clear indications that distinctions are being made between these two 
processes, there are equally compelling arguments that these are but different forms of the same 
uniform process. For example, Ghiselin’s account of the creative process – an account liberally 
sprinkled with terms cognitive scientists generally regard as belonging to the field of artistic 
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creativity, namely, incubation, inspiration, imagination, intuition – is, in fact, based on extracts 
from the personal records of artists and scientists alike, strongly suggesting that the creative 
process is in fact a uniform one, common to all domains. Adding weight to this view, are the 
examples of scientists who are leaning towards more artistic expressions of their creative 
process, as well as exploring more artistic ways of engaging with their research data, and artists 
who describe their creative process in essentially cognitive, rational terms.  
Creative Scientist and Rational Poet 
Michael Polanyi (1981), an internationally acclaimed chemist, rejects the purely cognitive 
approach to scientific enquiry, lamenting the exclusion of imagination and intuition from the 
logic of scientific discovery because they are not deemed rational ways of making discoveries 
(p. 91). He asserts instead, that ‘both the dynamic and static phases of a scientific vision are due 
to the strength of the imagination guided by intuition’ (p. 93) and demonstrates his point by 
citing examples from the works of Copernicus, Albert Einstein and Johannes Kepler. He  likens 
the process of scientific discovery to that of the heroic quest in which the scientist, in pursuit 
of a hidden reality, is guided by ‘a dynamic intuition’ to pursue a particular avenue. In his view, 
the process of scientific discovery begins with the formation of a vision after which ‘the 
imagination sallies forth, and intuition integrates what the imagination has lit upon’ until ‘our 
intuition recognises the final result to be valid and our imagination points to the inexhaustible 
future manifestations of it’ (p. 106). There is much here that echoes the thoughts of the 
Romantic poets.  
Other instances of the process of scientific enquiry being couched in artistic terms, can 
be found in the work of Stephen Southern and Suzanne Domzalski (1984) who distinguish 
between ‘the rational, systematic procedures of conventional science and the intuitive, 
“discontinuous” contributions of highly creative researchers’, thus giving rise to the term 
‘creative scientist’ (p.3). This idea is explored in greater depth in a contemporary study that 
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contrasts the methods of traditional data analysis with more creative methods such as 
metaphors, poetry, plays, pastiche, and quilt design to show how some researchers find that a 
more artistic approach to analysis yields more holistic results (Hunter et al., 2002). This latter 
study not only frames the scientific process in more artistic terms, but suggests that traditionally 
artistic processes are being used effectively by scientists to interpret and communicate their 
research. 
 In an interesting reversal of position, there are also examples of the artistic process being 
described in the purely rational, logical, conscious terms usually associated with the sciences.  
Francis Sparshott (1981), a poet, gives a very logical, prosaic account of his creative process, 
beginning with the somewhat caustic comment that ‘people persist in asking about ‘the creative 
process’ as though that were something ‘above and beyond writing poems or painting pictures’. 
(p. 48). He describes his own style of working simply as ‘a steady application to the writing of 
poetry’. Other accounts of the creative process are merely ‘products of selecting and editing in 
order to present a certain image of creative procedure’. These accounts, he avers ‘may therefore 
omit material that could have been used to tell a different story – one, perhaps, in which the 
striking incidents would not figure at all, or would not appear striking’ (p. 52). 
 While instances of artists couching their creative process in essentially rational terms are 
rare, many researchers have sought to explain artistic creativity in this way. Weisberg (1993), for 
example, argues that evidence of earlier drafts and sketches shows a very logical progression 
from initial idea to final work, while John Hayes and Linda Flower (1981) propose a writing 
model that describes the writing process as a conscious cognitive activity, involving constant 
revising and rewriting until the end result is achieved. In similar vein, Jude Leclerc and Frédéric 
Gosselin (2004) adopt a strictly rationalist approach in their detailed analysis of the creative 
process used by Isabelle Hayeur (a successful Canadian visual artist) to illustrate the argument 
that artistic creativity is simply another form of ‘situated problem-solving’ (p. 801). 
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 Even more convincing evidence substantiating the view that the creative process could 
be the same for both scientist and artist comes from the extensive empirical research of Robert 
Root-Bernstein and Michelle Root-Bernstein (2004). After carefully mapping the 
accomplishments of over 400 polymaths (individuals displaying creativity at genius level across 
multiple domains), they confidently conclude that ‘without denying that the products of the arts 
and sciences are different in both aspect and purpose, we nonetheless find that the processes used 
by artists and scientists to forge innovations are extremely similar’ (p. 127, original italics). 
However, while there can be little argument against such well-researched findings, the fact of 
the matter is that these studies have been limited to recognised geniuses, suggesting that these 
findings may not apply to all of creativity. A greater number of studies based on less highly 
gifted individuals indicate that creativity at lower levels can be distinguished by distinctive 
creative processes, thus leading to the general consensus that creative expertise in one domain 
is not easily transferred to another (Dow and Mayer, 2004; Jeon, 2008; Ivcevic, 2009; Hong and 
Milgram, 2010; Baer, 2016). Yet these findings are not are not conclusive enough to challenge 
the robust arguments in favour of a single creative process. Cognitive models continue to 
dominate the discourse, more so when new variations emerge that provide rational accounts 
for both the conscious and unconscious components of the process. Based on Freudian 
psychology, these models view the creative act as ‘a special form of interaction between primary 
and secondary process thinking in which a novel idea or insight is generated by the loose, 
illogical, and highly subjective ideation of primary process and is then molded by secondary 
process into a context that is socially appropriate and meaningful to others’ (Suler, 1980, p. 144).  
 The Geneplore model is perhaps the best example of this predominantly two-stage 
creative process. It proposes an initial generative phase in which unconscious processes, such 
as insight, intuition and incubation, generate creative ideas that are revealed in the form of 
analogues, metaphors and other varieties of mental transformation. This phase is followed by 
an exploration phase in which these ideas are consciously explored, manipulated and 
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restructured, until a creative solution or product results. However, ‘the foundation of creative 
cognition is the reflexive activity that takes place between its processing components: the 
generative phase and the explorative phase of pre-inventive structures’ (Korba, 1993, p. 6). 
What is of significant relevance to this discussion is that, while the Geneplore model does 
accommodate the notions of intuition and incubation, it nevertheless makes no distinction 
between scientific or artistic creative processes. The underlying assumption is still that a uniform 
process is used by both. Contemporary support for this view is seen in the work of scholars 
such as Paul Sowden, Andrew Pringle and Liane Gabora (2015) who recast this two-stage 
process as Type 1 and Type 2 thinking. Interestingly, in their exposition of their model they 
note that ‘Allen and Thomas (2011) illustrated that both Type 1 and Type 2 processes are 
implicated at each of a five-stage model of creative thinking, the origins of which can be seen 
in Wallas’ (1926) four-stage description of the creative process’ (p. 42). Their reference to the 
Wallas’ model is serendipitous for, in his explanation of his model, Wallas himself suggests a 
possible resolution to this apparent dilemma as to whether there is one uniform creative process 
or a range of distinctive processes unique to each domain. 
Revisiting the Wallas Model 
The model proposed by Graham Wallas (1926), in his seminal publication The Art of Thought, 
has become the foundational reference point in the entire discourse on the creative process, as 
demonstrated by Lubart (2001). Lubart traces its influence over a 50-year period showing how, 
whether it is being summarily dismissed, or extended to include additional stages, the Wallas 
model has played an integral role in shaping the discourse on the creative process. That it 
continues to be the cornerstone in this discourse is reflected in the work of Eugene Sadler-
Smith (2015) who re-examines the model in the light of more recent research, arguing that 
‘although Wallas’ model is not a theory of creativity, it affords creativity researchers a unifying 
framework and general conceptual architecture within which relevant concepts and theories 
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from creativity research may be positioned’ (p. 348). He concludes his exposition with the 
expressed hope this revisiting of the model ‘will enable creativity researchers to better 
understand the subtleties and nuances of the interplay of consciousness, fringe consciousness, 
and non-consciousness in the creative process, the dynamics of which constitute a modern 
interpretation of the “art of thought” ’ (p. 350). 
 Wallas based his model on the reflections of the mathematician, Henri Poincaré, and so 
developed a four-stage model comprising the stages of Preparation, Incubation, Illumination 
and Verification. As well as explaining what is meant by each of stages, Wallas also includes 
many illustrative examples to demonstrate the model’s validity as an account of both scientific 
and artistic creativity, confidently claiming that ‘this four stage process is true of science and 
art’ (p. 82). Yet for Wallas there is a clear distinction between process used for scientific enquiry 
and that used for artistic expression. In a short paragraph, easily overlooked, he briefly discusses 
the ‘sharp distinction between Imagination and Reason’, in which he assigns the predominantly 
unconscious stages of Illumination and Intimation to that of Imagination, and the largely 
conscious stages of Preparation and Verification to Reason. He then argues that, while the 
thinking process in the sciences places a greater emphasis on the stages of Reason, the thinking 
process used in the arts places a greater emphasis on the stages of Imagination. He is therefore 
able to state quite assertively that, although ‘the words Imagination and Reason came to mean 
an opposition between two mutually exclusive processes’ (p. 125), this does not hold true for 
his model, which reflects a creative process in which both Reason and Imagination have key 
roles to play.  
 According to Wallas, the sciences and the arts use the same four-stage process. 
However, the components or stages of the process are weighted differently, resulting in a mix 
better suited to the respective modes of enquiry and knowledge production. Thus, in the 
sciences, a greater emphasis is placed on the stages of Reason, with Imagination playing only a 
very minor role, while in the arts, Imagination is the main player, with Reason playing a more 
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supportive role. In other words, while the process behind both artistic and scientific creativity 
comprises the same four stages, it is the domain in which the creative work takes place that 
defines the specific shape of that process. Framed in more modern terms, this proposition 
suggests that the distinctive creative processes that give rise to the creative products associated 
with a specific field of study are determined by the domain, which in turn means the creative 
process is, in fact, domain specific because it is the domain that determines the preferred shape, 
or mix of the creative process used in its modes of enquiry and knowledge production.  
 This possibility has not attracted much attention or research, even within the very robust 
domain-general/domain-specific debate. It is only fairly recently that the creativity discourse 
has begun to explore the idea that ‘the cognitive skills underlying creative thinking must be 
specific to rather narrowly defined content domains’ (Baer, 1998, p. 173). Further research is 
needed to investigate if domains, by their very nature, require very different modes of enquiry, 
different definitions of what constitutes knowledge within the domain, and how that knowledge 
is both produced and communicated.  
 Within the discourse, however, there is an emerging discussion as to what exactly 
constitutes a domain, and how to map domains accurately. While there is widespread consensus 
that a domain comprises a specific set of skills, or expertise, and a specific realm of knowledge 
(Sawyer, 2006), the notion that a domain may also constrain its mode of enquiry, and by 
implication its creative process, is a very new one, and, as such, opens up a host of unexplored 
research avenues by raising some interesting questions. For example, would it not be more 
fruitful first to research each domain thoroughly before attempting to develop over-arching 
theories of creativity (Baer, 2011; Pelaprat  and Cole, 2011)? While this would certainly entail 
an extensive and committed research effort, it could well lead to ‘a much more robust and 
complex conceptualization of creativity’ (Plucker and Beghetto, 2004, p. 156). 
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THE CREATIVE PROCESS IS DOMAIN SPECIFIC  
Investigations into the links between creativity and domains surface in the 1990s as researchers 
cautiously begin mapping the differences between creativity in the scientific and artistic 
domains. While maintaining the position that the creative process is simply a form of problem-
solving, these studies nevertheless begin to differentiate between the problem-solving process 
used in the sciences and the process used in the arts. In the case of the sciences the process is 
focused on ‘discovering gaps or discrepancies in existing knowledge, sensing difficulties when 
one’s expectations are not met, when observations do not match with an existing mental model 
of a phenomenon’, while in the arts the process reflects ‘an internally oriented effort to come 
to terms with a topic, express one’s emotions, point to a new social reality, or externalize an 
inner state’ (Lubart 2001, p. 299). 
 These proposed distinctions are currently being explored in greater depth with findings 
that strongly suggest there are different types of creativity (Glück, Ernst and Unger, 2002); that 
different domains require very different sets of skills (Kaufman, 2012), and that improved 
creative performance in one domain does not enhance performance in another (Baer, 2016). 
Neuroscience research provides convincing support for these views. Fink et al. (2007) find clear 
differences between the brain activation patterns occurring during free-associative thinking and 
the patterns observed during the performance of conventional cognitive tasks, such as 
intelligence test tasks (p. 71). The findings of Botella et al. (2013) contribute even further 
refinements to the domain specificity of creativity. In addition to substantiating the claim that 
the creative process involves more than cognitive components alone (p. 162), their analyses also 
revealed significant differences within the artistic domain. Their comparison of digital artists 
with painters showed that for digital artists, technology was essential for creative work and the 
cognitive component of the creative process was far more important than the emotional 
component. The cluster analysis for the painters reflected exactly the reverse – that while an 
understanding of the materials and tools was key to their creative process, the emotional 
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components were of even greater importance. The ability to feel their way into and through 
their work was what characterised the creative process for them.  Botella et al. therefore 
conclude that ‘the differences observed between digital artists and painters suggested two ways 
of creating, two different creative processes: a creative process based on cognitive components 
and a creative process based on action and gesture’ (p. 168). 
 While findings such as these strongly suggest that skills from one domain are not readily 
transferred to another, there is as yet no research that explores how this could inform a possible 
intersection between the creative process used to perform the task and the domain in which it 
takes place. Part of the reason for this gap is due to the lack of clarity regarding the nature and 
structure of domains themselves (Jeon, 2008; Qian, 2014). As noted earlier, this area has not 
received much attention, resulting in little more than a broad consensus that a domain 
comprises a specific set of skills and a specific realm of knowledge. Some attempts to build on 
this consensus are reflected in the work of Csikszentmihalyi (1996), who sees each domain as 
having ‘its own symbolic elements, its own rules, and generally, its own system of notation’ (p. 
37); yet there are few studies that examine with greater precision what these elements and rules 
might be.  What research there is suggests that  
• domains are cultural constructs, each with its own structure that can be measured on 
five fundamental parameters, namely, aim, methods, symbol system and uses, rules, and 
standards (Li, 1997);   
• they can be categorised as horizontal or vertical where horizontal domains ‘are the 
domains that allow novelty to occur in all dimensions of the domain, resulting in the 
divergent development of the domain. In contrast, vertical domains possess certain 
stable elements that are existentially fundamental to the domain, thus permitting 
alteration only around certain dimensions’ (Jeon, 2008, p. 29);  
• they also be classified as being well-structured or  ill-structured (sic). Well-structured 
domains are defined as those that are based on algorithmic and rule-based information, 
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such as Mathematics. They are thus domains that are heavily dependent on well-
established algorithms rather than heuristic approaches. In contrast, ill-structured 
domains are less dependent on algorithmic information, and more reliant on heuristics. 
Creative writing is an example of such a domain (Lawless and Kulikowich, 2006) 
In an investigation regarding the differences in divergent thinking in art and mathematics, 
Kyung Jeon (2008) draws on this research, as well as the componential model developed by 
Teresa Amabile (1996) which proposes that there are three key components to creative 
performance, namely, domain-relevant skills, creativity-relevant skills, and task motivation.  
Jeon finds that the classifications, proposed by Li as well as Lawless and Kulikowich, are 
reflected in the test results of his research. The study shows that creative performance in the 
art domain relies more on heuristic approaches, while performance in the domain of 
mathematics depends on more on algorithmic information (p. 65). In the light of the clear 
support this study lends to the notion that ‘creative performance may differ across domains 
according to the nature of those domains’, Jeon concludes that,  
The implication is clear – we need to pay more attention to the nature 
of a specific domain when we examine the domain specific nature of 
creativity. It would be paradoxical if we did not consider the nature of 
a specific domain when we discuss the domain specificity of creativity 
(p. 74). 
However, while in-depth research into how a domain impacts creative performance is still in 
its infancy (Qian, 2014), there are speculations on the possible differences between the artistic 
and scientific domains, and how these differences would impact the creative acts in the 
respective domains (Glück,  Ernst and Unger, 2002; Simonton, 2004; Fink et al., 2007; 
Kaufman, 2012). These differences are becoming more clearly defined.  
 To begin with, scientific creativity is conducted in the world of external realities with 
research focussing on the discovery of unknowns that already exist (Polanyi, 1981). The aim of 
these research initiatives is thus to develop theories with ‘high degrees of confirmation’ and 
truthfulness so as to bridge the gap between the known and the unknown (Currie, 2014, p. 49). 
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These theories need to be highly testable as the veracity of a theory is only proved when there 
is an ‘exact replication of results in experiments using the same conditions’ (McNiff, 2011, p. 
387). Further constraints determine the methods used to develop these theories – ‘in physics, 
for example, there are laws, absolute laws … and observable quantities that defy all creative 
calculations. Physics in this respect “guides the physicist” and defines a precise space of 
possibilities’ (Glaveanu et al., 2013, p. 8). 
 In contrast the world that is explored by the artist is the inner world of imagination, 
emotion, intuition and fantasy. Instead of the constraint of truthfulness, there is a requirement 
for the artistic work to display coherence, however fantastical and imaginary it may be, and, at 
the same time, to be arresting, emotionally engaging, and challenging (Currie, 2014). As to 
methods and outcomes, the arts, unlike the sciences, do not require exact replication to validate 
previous work; it is rather ‘variation and even uniqueness’ that is highly sought after (McNiff, 
2011, p. 387). For this reason, domain differences can explain why two or more scientists are 
able to make the same discoveries independently of each other, but two musicians never 
compose the same symphony: ‘Scientists work in more or less the same network of 
constellations and thus, in principle, can also deduce in the same way in this network. In 
contrast, a musician always expresses his own unique corporeal impulses’ (Julmi and Scherm, 
2015, p. 156). 
 In an elaboration on his hierarchy of domains, Simonton (2014) provides a tidy 
summary of these essential differences, stating that while the sciences are ‘highly constrained by 
logic, data, objectivity, conceptual and methodological precision, formal presentation, and a 
strong collective consensus’, the arts are less constrained than the sciences, giving 
‘considerable rein to subjectivity, emotion, and individualistic expression’ (p. 259). In other 
words, where the sciences aim at discovering, uncovering and revealing the realities of the 
external world that is itself constrained by immutable natural laws, the focus of the arts is on 
the experiencing, exploring and expressing of an inner, subjective world where the constraints 
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are more fluid, being determined to a large extent by the inherent nature of the work being 
created. Essentially these differences can be encapsulated as ‘the difference between turning 
inward to write fiction and turning outward to write about reality’ (Julmi and Scherm, 2015, p. 
156); a distinction that echoes Wallas’ claim that the arts are more reliant on the inner, intuitive 
processes of incubation and illumination than the sciences, which place a greater emphasis on 
the more conscious, rational and logical processes of preparation and verification.  
 While these speculations still need to be verified by substantial research, they are 
providing a sorely needed vocabulary for discussing domain differences within the broader 
creativity discourse (Julmi and Scherm, 2015). However, if, as Lawless and Kulikowich (2006) 
suggest, domains are constructs that comprise ‘declarative (i.e., knowing what), procedural (i.e., 
knowing how), and conditional (i.e., knowing when and why) forms’, (p. 30), then the idea that 
each domain may also require a distinctive process is not an implausible one (Lunke and Beat, 
2016). 
  This in turn creates the possibility of the following hypothesis, namely, that the four-
stage model proposed by Wallas does provide a broad account of a creative process common 
to all domains, but each domain will, nevertheless, determine its distinctive creative process by 
laying a different emphasis on the various stages, constraining the nature of the activity 
undertaken in each stage and shaping the way that activity impacts the final creative outcome.  
Making a case for  this hypothesis has proved challenging because ‘the literature comparing 
artistic and scientific creativity is sparse’ (Root-Bernstein and Root Bernstein, 2004, p. 127). 
Equally challenging is an exploration of Wallas’ suggestion that it is the role played by the 
imagination that distinguishes between the processes of artistic and scientific creativity. There 
is a similar paucity of research for on this issue, although ‘psychologists have researched both 
imagination and creativity, studies which attempt identification or testing of a link between the 
two phenomena have been sparse’ (Stokes, 2014, p. 2) 
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This dissertation, however, explores this link in some detail and in so doing, makes its 
first meaningful contribution to the discourse on creativity as a whole, the discourse on the 
creative process in particular, and an even more specific contribution to  conceptualisations of 
the phenomenon of the artistic creative process. The following section provides a very brief 
overview of contemporary perspectives on the imagination, highlighting three aspects that are 
integral to the dissertation’s developing argument, namely, that the imagination is a productive 
agency; that it is driven by the need to make meaning, and that it uses metaphor as its preferred 
language to convey this meaning.    
ART-MAKING AND THE IMAGINATION  
As already stated, Wallas posited that it is the role played by the imagination that differentiates 
between artistic and scientific creativity; that where the imagination only plays a minor role in 
scientific creative process, it plays a major role in the artistic creative process. Indications that 
his suggestion may prove to be a fruitful line of enquiry are found in contemporary research 
that is reviving interest in an area long ignored by creativity researchers.  
 There are three main reasons why the imagination has not attracted research attention 
until fairly recently. One, of course, is Guilford’s dismissal of the imagination as a concept too 
vague to be considered a valid area for research (see Chap 2, p. 43). This dismissal goes 
unchallenged for the second reason imagination is not deemed worthy of investigation – it had 
already fallen into disfavour. Once a reigning concept in conceptualisations of what it means to 
be creative, it underwent a ‘precipitous drop into disrepute’ (Richardson, 2013, p. 385), 
occasioned by the rise of experimental science in the last century. ‘Viewed as a confounding 
variable that could only inhibit the detachment and clarity of scientiﬁc objectivity’, imagination 
was deemed the very hallmark of ‘subjective judgment’ and so ‘cast even further into the outer 
darkness of intellectual irrelevance’. It became synonymous with ‘illusion, falsehood, and 
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mistaken perception’ (Morley, 2005, pp. 117-118) and was described as ‘a repository’ of  
falsehoods and ‘false consciousness’ (Gunn, 2003, p. 44).  
 None of this was helped by the rise of the rationalist approach of cognitive psychology 
and its positivist perspective. The dominance of this paradigm ensured that the imagination 
remained outside of its circle of concern and this is the third reason the imagination did not 
receive research attention. However, uneasy with this rigidly scientific approach, researchers 
have begun to question whether it is appropriate to reduce human experience to a single 
epistemological framework (Mumford, 2003), and if imagination can indeed be fully explored 
‘through scientific methodology alone’ (Aldworth, 2018, p. 181)? The new avenues opened up 
by the rise of phenomenology creates a different  research climate and so contemporary 
researchers begin turning their attention to this much-maligned area of the human experience 
(Neisser, 2003; Beaney, 2005; Gajdamaschko, 2005; Morley, 2005; Kneller, 2007; Liu and 
Noppe-Brandon, 2009; Pelaprat and Cole, 2011; Gallese, 2011;  Lin, and Tsau, 2012; Zittoun 
and Cerchia, 2013; Abraham, 2016; Jung, Flores and Hunter, 2016;  Brogaard and Dimitria, 
2017; Nir, 2017; Aldworth, 2018). This research will be discussed in greater contextual detail in 
the following two chapters as it provides the underpinning for the model proposed in Chapter 
5.  However, three strands in this research provide useful entry points into this very complex 
field of understanding: the Kantian notion that the imagination has a productive agency; the 
Vygotskian view that the imagination is primarily concerned with meaning-making, and the 
assertion that the imagination communicates its material primarily through metaphor (Neisser, 
2003). 
Imagination as Productive Agency  
Unlike creativity, which is now regarded as a socio-cultural construct (Amabile, 1996; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Mason, 2003), the imagination is a specific cognitive ability that enables 
the contemplation of new realities and possibilities and ‘the capacity to conceive of what is not 
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– something that, as far as we know, does not exist; or something that may exist but we simply 
cannot perceive’ (Liu and Noppe-Brandon, 2009, p. 19).  
 For centuries, speculations as to what constituted the imagination and how it worked 
was located almost exclusively within the field of philosophy, beginning with Aristotle who 
posited that the imagination acted a bridge between sensation and thought by supplying the 
images or ‘phantasms’ without which thought was simply not possible. Philosophers, such as 
Descartes, Hume, and Wittgenstein have developed and expanded this basic tenet, thereby 
providing modern researchers in psychology and neuroscience with a rich conceptual 
framework to guide their investigations, but it is the work of Immanuel Kant that is still regarded 
as the most influential of all these early philosophers (Beaney, 2005). 
 Michael Beaney (2005), provides a useful distillation of Kant’s thinking, in his 
publication  Imagination and Creativity. He highlights key Kantian propositions, three of which 
are of particular relevance to this thesis, namely that: 
• the building blocks of the imagination are the intuitions arising from sensory experience, 
• the reproductive imagination refers to the ability simply to reproduce ideas or mental 
images, 
• the productive imagination, on the other hand, refers to the ability to synthesise the 
intuitions and thereby generate new ideas or mental images. 
Kant’s first proposition marks a departure from David Hume’s premise which states that it is 
the knowledge acquired through sensory experience that provides the building blocks for the 
imagination, and that new ideas are created simply by dividing and recombining these existing 
ideas, or blocks of knowledge, to form new concepts. Kant argues instead that sensory 
experience provides intuitions rather than knowledge and that these sensation-based intuitions 
are subsequently synthesised by the imagination to form meaningful, coherent units. It is then 
the work of the understanding to provide the concepts that make it possible to both 
comprehend and grasp the substance of what has been intuited – and to transform these 
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intuitions into new knowledge. In Kant’s linking of intuition, imagination and understanding 
into one integrated process, one can see the foreshadowing of the Wallas model of the creative 
process – one that begins with what is already consciously known (sensory experience), then 
moves into the unconscious processes of incubation (the forming of sensation-based intuitions) 
and illumination (the synthesis of the intuitions into meaningful, coherent units), and finally 
concludes in the conscious process of understanding, examining and verifying that which has 
been intuited (transforming the intuitions into new concepts/new knowledge).  
 Kant’s second proposition regarding reproductive imagination refers to the mental 
ability to recall, reconstruct or represent what is already known i.e. what has already been 
experienced. In his view the reproductive imagination is essentially passive in nature, in that it 
merely receives sensory impressions and then makes sense of that input through the process of 
association with previous experience and knowledge. For this reason he terms it alternatively 
‘the empirical imagination’ (p. 224), an aspect of the imagination that can be closely correlated 
to the conscious phases of the creative process. Reproductive imagination generates new ideas 
by dividing and recombining existing ideas to form new ones using cognitive processes such as 
association and analogy (Lin and Tsau, 2012); processes the rationalists claim account for the 
divergent thinking that is the cornerstone of the cognitive models of the creative process 
(Runco,  2014a). 
 Kant’s third proposition concerns the productive imagination which he defines as the 
imagination’s ability to synthesise new sensory experiences with what is already known in a way 
that actively generates new conceptual schemata that transcend existing knowledge. 
Furthermore, he argues that it is this transcendental ability of the productive imagination that 
gives rise to the intuitions that lead to the formation of these new schemata, the formation of 
which he describes as ‘a hidden art in the depths of the soul’ (Beaney, 2005, p. 112). 
Furthermore, while he sees the reproductive imagination as essentially passive, productive 
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imagination, he posits, is essentially active and coins the term ‘active imagination’ to signal this 
distinction. 
 It is this active aspect of the imagination that has drawn the attention of contemporary 
researchers. In Kant and the Power of Imagination (2007), Jane Kneller explores the links between 
Kant’s productive imagination and the creative process. According to Kneller, Kant makes 
strong claims for the imagination’s creative and enlivening powers (p. 107), particularly with 
regard to the way the imagination transforms what has been experienced into something new  
through  ‘images produced involuntarily’ or what he has called ‘unconscious ideas’ (p. 156).  
Even more significant are Kant’s claims that the mind presents these images ‘independently of 
empirical conditions’ (p. 100); that the productive imagination enjoys ‘freedom from empirical 
constraint’ (p. 158). This strongly suggests that artists and scientists use the imagination in very 
different ways. While the scientist is constrained by the domain’s requirement for empirical data, 
an empirical epistemology and the production of purely empirical knowledge, the artist is 
completely unfettered by these constraints. What drives the artist, instead, is meaning-making 
through image formation.  
Imagination as Meaning-Maker 
As well as revisiting Kantian conceptualisations of the imagination, modern researchers are also 
revisiting the works of Leo Vygotsky, finding in his theories, a framework for their view that 
the imagination plays an instrumental role in meaning-making (Gajdamaschko, 2005; Pelaprat 
and Cole, 2011; Lin and Tsau, 2012; Zittoun and Cerchia, 2013). Of particular interest is the 
Vygotskian notion that the imagination does more than reproduce images, or produce 
spontaneously generated imagery. According to Vygotskian thought,  while ‘human beings are 
by nature always engaged in a process of image formation’ (Pelaprat and Cole,  p. 402), the 
imagination is essentially in the business of reconciling differences and ‘filling in the gaps’ to 
create ‘a new whole, at which point the meaning becomes clear’ (p. 411). Drawing on the wealth 
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of material arising from ‘a person’s previously abundant and multiple experiences’, the 
imagination combines elements from this extensive database in such a way that they are so 
transformed ‘that the person could not pinpoint from where they came’. It is this transformative 
aspect that leads Vygotsky to speak of the ‘creative imagination’ rather than the productive 
imagination (Lin and Tsau, p. 209-210). In other words, it is the imagination’s capacity to create 
meaning through transformative image formation lies at the heart of his conceptualisation. It is 
the imagination that enables the ‘kind of conceptual combination, transformation, and 
formation’ that gives rise to ‘the radical, the new, the as-yet-unconceived’ (Stokes, 2014, p. 3); 
that creates the new conceptual spaces that allow ‘new meanings not possible before’ (Boden, 
1990, p. 108). 
This is nowhere more evident than in the arts for, according to Vygotsky, ‘everything 
that requires artistic transformation of reality, everything that is connected with interpretation 
and construction of something new, requires the indispensable participation of imagination’ 
because the imagination is a process ‘directly connected with meaning-making’ (Gajdamaschko, 
2005, p. 16). This is especially true of any engagement with fiction and poetry which demands 
an acceptance of ‘the counterfactual world of imagination’ (Zittoun and Cerchia, 2013, p. 308), 
where the internal expression of ‘thoughts, images, and impressions’ is given ‘external, physical 
expression’ through the images of the imagination that ‘provide an internal language’ for these 
internal emotionally charged images (Lin and Tsau, p. 211) This internal language of the 
meaning-making imagination is the language of metaphor.  
Imagination and metaphor 
While the notion that metaphor is the language of the imagination has its roots in Vygotskian 
theory (Lin and Tsau, 2012), Joseph Neisser (2003) provides an insightful exploration of this 
view. He asserts that metaphoric thought is ‘an act of imagination … appearing at the 
intersection of linguistic and psychological processes’ (p. 28). This intersection of linguistic and 
psychological processing is expressed as an imaginal model, but experienced in the form of 
100 
 
‘embodied imagination’ because the model itself is ‘an imagined presentation or enactment of 
the qualities of an embodied experience’ (p. 32). In other words, the source of the metaphorical 
image lies in the wealth of unconscious material amassed through first person experience. This 
unconscious material, however, carries both the ‘raw feel of the initial perceptual experience’ as 
well as the accompanying emotional responses to that experience (p. 45). It is thus ‘an array of 
meaningful experiences rooted in emotion, perception, and action [and]  metaphor is one way 
these experiences are integrated into more prototypically cognitive linguistic thought’ (p. 42). 
Neisser thus argues that a good metaphor ‘is one you can feel, not just one you can affirm. It 
doesn’t just inform the audience; it puts them in touch’ because it intimates certain experiences 
with which the audience can identify (p. 45, original italics). It does this by spinning long webs 
of association in which the complex ideas that are generated cannot simply be paraphrased. In 
fact, in his view, ‘paraphrase is (and should be) somewhat helpless to express all of what is 
meant by good layering of metaphor’  (p. 30). The good layering of a rich metaphor conveys 
multiple levels of meaning that open up new conceptual spaces, and, in turn, facilitate new 
metaphors and new embodiments of those metaphors (Boden, 1990). 
 Metaphors achieve this by virtue of the fact that they are more than mere 
representational images. Rather, they function as qualitative maps that evoke a gestalt, a 
compound, comprising emotional schema that illuminate an entire territory, not just the road 
immediately ahead (p. 38). As such, these imaginal models, argues Neisser, have a life of their 
own; they are swaying forms; ‘elusive, circulating, shimmering experiences imbued with the real 
life qualities of situated experience’ (p. 47), and it is these inherent qualities of the metaphor 
that give it the depth and richness that invite ongoing exploration and engagement.  
Imagination Integral to Art-making 
These three strands come together in the Jungian concept of Active Imagination that is 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. However, the significance of these strands for 
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this discussion on the domain-specificity of the creative process, enable an even clearer 
distinction to be drawn between the creative processes of scientific and artistic creativity.  
Not only is the former wholly constrained by the need to conform to the empirical 
demands of its domain, it is also a process that specifically, and rigorously, excludes personal 
experience, subjective reflections and emotional content. It is a process that is required to 
remain objective, impersonal and fact-based throughout as demonstrated earlier.  The domain 
of the artist, however, unfettered by the same empirical requirements, allows for a freer 
exploration of subjective experience, emotional impressions and personal perspectives.  The 
artist is therefore free to imagine objects, characters and events that do not necessarily 
correspond to external reality, whose existence is completely imaginary, and whose properties 
can defy factual knowledge because, for the artist, the imagination ‘does not have to be truth-
bound nor its products empirically verifiable’ (Stokes, 2014, p. 22). For this reason, where the 
language of scientific creativity consists of empirical facts, algorithmic formulas and measurable 
observations, the language of the artist is that of metaphor, of meaning-making through mental 
images. However, as will be argued, metaphors not only characterise the language of the arts 
domain – the process of generating these rich images is what distinguishes the artistic process 
from that of the sciences. In other words, it is the Kantian notion of the productive imagination, 
and the Vygotskian notion of the creative imagination, that enables the artist to generate the 
content of the artistic work.  
 This is a far cry from the objective, empirically based process that is required by the 
sciences.  While imagination does have a key role to play in their creative process in that it makes 
possible the conceiving of what has not yet been discovered or what is not yet known, and it 
acts as a bridge between what is intuitively sensed and later proven (Polanyi, 2004), it is 
overshadowed by the rational, cognitive processes of logic, method and rule-dictated 
conventions.  For the artist, however, the imagination is integral to the conceiving of the 
artwork – its very content, shape and form – as well as its execution. As will be demonstrated  
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in the next chapter, it is the artistic imagination that enables the birthing of the work, guides its 
subsequent development and the shapes the crafting of its final form.  
This chapter has sought to answer the first of the two questions posed in the previous 
chapter, namely, is there a creative process that is unique to art-making that differs significantly 
from the process used for the human-making activities of innovation and invention? It has 
argued that the reason the creative process was not included in the domain debate was 
attributable to the pervasive belief that the creative process is a uniform, domain general 
process, common to creative activity across all domains. However, the chapter has argued that, 
despite evidence supporting this notion, there is even more compelling evidence to support the 
view that the creative process is domain specific, and that the domain themselves shape the 
process. This has been demonstrated by comparing the processes underlying scientific and 
artistic creativity respectively in the light of the Wallas model with specific reference to the role 
played by the imagination in each.  The chapter has therefore concluded that, given the strong 
indications that the scientific process is aimed at discovering objective, physical realities, while 
the artistic process is concerned with the meaning-making through metaphor and then 
communicating that meaning in an imaginative way, these are two distinctive, domain-specific  
processes. 
 This discussion has, of necessity, been an overwhelmingly theoretical one due to the 
lack of existing conceptual frameworks that could enable a more focused discussion of artistic 
creativity in general and literary creativity in particular. However, the next chapter provides the 
necessary substance through its in-depth analysis of the artistic creative process as it addresses 
the second of the two questions posed, namely, what can be learned from artists’ accounts of 
their experience of the artistic creative process? 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ARTISTIC CREATIVE PROCESS EXPLORED 
Focussing on the what of creativity it has omitted a rigorous investigation and 
understanding of the experience of creativity. (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007, p. 219) 
 
 
 Chapter 3 considered whether it is possible to distinguish between the creative process used in 
scientific discovery and that used in creative artistic expression. There is significant evidence 
that supports the domain-general view that the creative process is a single uniform process 
common to all creative endeavours across all domains. However, there is equally compelling 
evidence that the creative process is domain specific. A resolution between these opposing 
views lies in the notion that, while the creative process may be domain general in certain aspects, 
the domain itself constrains the process in subtle but significant ways to the extent that it is 
possible to distinguish between the process used in scientific discovery and that used in artistic 
expression.  
A revisiting of the Wallas model revealed a hitherto overlooked proposition: the two 
processes differ markedly regarding the role played by the imagination. In scientific discovery, 
the imagination is limited to conceiving unknown and unexplored possibilities that are then 
investigated using the rational, logical methods this domain requires. By contrast, in the domain 
of the arts, the imagination is the key factor in its creative process, functioning as both the 
vehicle for and agent of artistic creativity. A brief overview of the Kantian and Vygotskian 
theories of the imagination indicated that there was convincing support for an approach that 
views the artistic creative process as an essentially imaginative one, concerned with meaning-
making. It creates this meaning through the use of metaphorical images that are generated by 
the imagination itself. 
This chapter examines the artistic creative process more closely, drawing on studies that 
focus on artists’ accounts of their creative experiences. In so doing, it demonstrates how 
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phenomenology has made it possible for these accounts to be regarded as a valid 
epistemological base, thereby addressing a significant gap in the creativity discourse, namely, 
that creativity is also a lived experience. It comprises three sections. The first identifies the 
common threads in the research studies that validate the speculative descriptions of the artistic 
creative process. The second section focusses on a close reading of four practice-led 
dissertations, highlighting aspects that have been overlooked, obscured or ignored by research 
to date. The third section demonstrates how one of these aspects in particular – namely, Active 
Imagination – is able to provide a convincing theoretical underpinning for those parts of the 
artistic process previously believed to be too mysterious to explain.  
CREATIVITY AS LIVED EXPERIENCE 
Given the deeply personal, subjective nature of artistic creativity, and that the making of art is 
among those human activities for which the rationale is simply ‘to feel the experience they 
provide’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 113), it is surprising that contemporary researchers find so 
little attention has been paid to the phenomenology of creativity (Mace and Ward, 2002; Nelson 
and Rawlings, 2007; Reed-Klein, 2014). In other words, investigations into artistic creativity 
appear to have ignored the subjective experience of the creative process as experienced by the 
artists themselves.  Mary-Anne Mace and Tony Ward (2002), for example, note that, despite a 
growing body of investigation into the factors associated with art-making, ‘very few studies have 
focused on understanding and describing what artists actually do during the creation of a work 
of art’ (p. 179).  
Bence Nanay (2014) argues that creativity and the creative process would be better 
explored as personal experience rather than impersonal phenomenon because ‘the right kind of 
analysis for the concept of creativity should be about our experiences’. In his view, the creative 
process is not merely a functional / computational mechanism that leads to the emergence of 
a creative idea; rather it is the way in which this mental process is experienced that makes the 
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creative process so distinctive. It should therefore be investigated as an ‘experience of creativity’ 
for these experiential descriptions would capture something about the creative process that the 
functional/computational descriptions favoured by the hard sciences do not (p. 30). Others 
agree, asserting that the ‘strictly objective explanations of operationally defined processes are 
always disconnected from real mental life, [and therefore] unable to explain situated existence’ 
(Neisser, 2003, p. 49) and that purely empirical studies do not accurately reflect the tasks and 
strategies used by artists in their natural environment (Mace and Ward, 2002).  
This need to find an alternative approach that would encourage the exploration of 
situated experience has seen creativity researchers increasingly turn towards phenomenology – 
an approach that concerns itself with the description, meaning and understanding of the lived 
experience (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007; Julmi and Scherm, 2015). With its focus on the 
immediate, ordinary experience – in other words, the experience as it is being lived – 
phenomenology is better able to explain how creative acts take place ‘within a system of 
meaningful interactions that can be mapped, explored, and transformed in precise ways’ 
(Bindeman, 1998, p. 76). It does so by examining how creativity is experienced, determining the 
essential features of this experience and observing the interactions between these elements 
(Nelson and Rawlings, 2007). 
The word phenomenology is derived from the Greek words phenomenon and logos, and is 
a term that describes the way of understanding an appearance or phenomenon, whether its form 
is overt, disguised or latent (Davidsen, 2013). Originally a philosophical construct developed to 
conceptualize the process and structure of mental life, phenomenology has been embraced by 
social scientists as a meaningful way to investigate the moment-by-moment unfolding of 
embodied human experience (Wertz, 2011). Now viewed as ‘the science of essential structures 
of consciousness or experience’, phenomenology aims to investigate subjective human 
experience to ‘make explicit the implicit structure and meaning of human experiences’, and to 
explore that which cannot be revealed by ordinary observation (Julmi and Scherm, 2015, p. 
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153).  It does so by capturing as closely as possible ‘the way in which the phenomenon is 
experienced within the context in which the experience takes place’ (Davidsen, 2013, p. 320). It 
is therefore quite different to the mode of enquiry favoured by the sciences in that it allows for 
different ways of knowing to be explored, validated and acknowledged, and for new 
understandings that are not ‘disembodied like objective knowledge’ (Romanyshyn, 2007, p. 89). 
 In addition to opening new lines of enquiry, phenomenology also allows for new data 
to be included in this research, thereby creating the space for a new epistemological base from 
which to draw conclusions, propose different hypotheses and infer new theoretical positions. 
More importantly, for the aims of this dissertation, phenomenology has made it possible, and 
indeed necessary, for the personal subjective experience of arts practitioners to be included in 
the creativity discourse. It addresses the silencing of the artist’s voice, effectively lifting the gag 
order placed on it by Guilford’s airy dismissal of the artist’s personal account of his / her 
creative process as being too unreliable for research. 
In a total reversal of this position, the view now emerging is that, ‘given the incomplete 
state of knowledge concerning what actually happens during the development of a work of art, 
we believe it is appropriate to let the artist’s relatively unstructured descriptions of what he or 
she did inform us, albeit by the application of a systematic method, as to the creative process’ 
(Mace and Ward, 2002, p. 182). Contemporary researchers are doing just that as they begin to 
explore artistic creativity in new ways by inviting artists to talk directly about their creative 
processes. This shift in focus is also reflected in practice-led dissertations where the main body 
of the dissertation is devoted to giving a critical account of the creative process behind the 
created artefact (Fogelberg, 2002; Maxwell, 2007; Newman, 2008; Bye, 2014). The findings of 
these research studies, as well as the accounts given in the cited dissertations, are explored in 
greater depth in this chapter.  
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WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS  
In the previous chapter, the artistic creative process was described in very broad terms as a 
process that is essentially organic, fluid and cyclical. According to these speculative descriptions 
(Ghiselin, 1952; Glaveanu et al., 2013), the artist sometimes begins with just the fragment of an 
intuited idea and then moves through a time of intense uncertainty until a shape or form begins 
to show itself, at which point he / she begins the process of capturing in concrete form what 
has only been sensed intuitively. During this part of the process, the artist becomes deeply 
engaged with the making of the artwork, delicately balancing the unfolding of the intuited sense 
of the artwork with the progressive development of its physical manifestation. This ongoing, 
dynamic interaction between artist and the artwork requires the artist to be open constantly to 
any new ideas, insights and intuitions that may arise as the work progresses. It also embraces 
ongoing reflection, revision and reworking until the artist feels satisfied that the realised artwork 
has expressed the intuited work as closely as possible. A sizable body of emerging research is 
providing evidence that not only supports this account of the artistic creative process, but also 
adds much-needed dimension and detail to its broadly speculative terms.  
 The findings of six recent research studies (Mace and Ward, 2002; Nelson and Rawlings, 
2007; Bourgalt, 2011; Botella et al., 2013; Raby, 2014; Reed-Klein, 2014), which are based, 
collectively, on 67 personal accounts of the creative process as experienced by the artists 
themselves, are particularly significant in this regard. They reflect agreement on seven aspects 
of the artistic creative process, namely, that 
1) the artistic creative process begins with a vague concept or feeling (Mace and Ward, 
2002), an incomplete vision (Botella et al., 2013) or a momentary sensory experience 
(Reed-Klein, 2014). Artists also consistently speak of having but a ‘vague intuitive sense 
of the artwork’ and the direction in which it might go (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007, p.  
221); 
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2) the artist engages in what Wallas identified as the stage of Incubation but June Raby 
(2014) terms ‘dream-thinking’ – a mental state which simply allows this early, vague 
intuited sense of the artwork to develop and unfold without any conscious attempts to 
shape, structure or regulate this unfolding. She finds that the artist is ‘very sensitive to 
new ways of thinking, new ideas’ and that the intuited artwork ‘is malleable in infinite 
ways, ready to unfurl in different configurations and possibilities’ (p. 288). Botella et al. 
(2013) suggest that during this stage, aspects or elements of the unformed sense of the 
artwork gradually begin taking form or shape as they resonate with what has already 
matured within the artist (p. 166). The artist, however, simply allows this process to take 
place, almost as a passive recipient, neither analysing why the coalescing elements feel 
right together, nor why they seem to be moving in a particular direction or taking a 
specific shape (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007); 
3) the emerging shape or form begins to acquire a new gestalt that is often accompanied 
by the artist experiencing a ‘deepening interest and involvement’ in the developing 
artwork. As this new synthesis of ideas begins to provide coherence to previously loose 
elements of the artwork, the artist is infused with an excitement that ‘leads to the 
experience of a creative breakthrough’ (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007, p. 229). Botella et 
al. also find clear evidence that these early stages of the creative process contain a strong 
emotional component which ‘was both exciting and pressing for the artist, who then 
became engaged in what was often a long-term project’ (p. 166). This heightened 
emotional experience is what is generally termed the moment of ‘inspiration’, which 
Pearl Reed-Klein (2014) defines as ‘whatever it is that one feels ignites, fuels, arouses, 
and compels the artist to progress toward creative actualization’ (p. 85).  Mace and Ward 
(2002) observe that, energised by this infusion of intense emotional energy, the artist 
then becomes actively engaged in ‘enriching and extending [the initial] concept through 
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idea association, metaphor, and analogy’ (p. 184), until a clear enough sense of the 
possible form and content of the artwork emerges so that the artist can begin its crafting;  
4) the early stages of crafting the artwork are marked by much uncertainty. Artists 
consistently report beginning the art-making process ‘without a clear idea of how it 
would come together as a total work’ (Bourgault, 2011, p. 268) and then allowing the 
form and nature of the artwork to emerge from ‘an ongoing dialogue between the 
original intentions for the piece and the ideas encountered throughout the process’ 
which shapes the emerging form and nature of the artwork (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007, 
p. 233).  During this ‘constant interplay between the developing vision or feeling for the 
artwork’ and the artwork itself, (Mace and Ward, 2002, p. 186), artists remain open to 
new ideas, perceptions and insights that surface during this interplay, or ongoing 
dialogue, even though this often means that ‘the work frequently falls into chaos as 
aspects are demolished and reconfigured into more integrated alignments’ (Raby, 2014, 
p. 291); 
5) as uncertainty gradually gives way to increasing clarity, the artist enters a ‘settled 
focussed state’, becoming deeply immersed in the art-making process, in which 
‘concentrated direction of attention is associated with heightened sensitivity’ (Nelson 
and Rawlings, 2007, p. 228). Artists describe this part of the experience as ‘being in the 
moment’, and as a time when their art-making seems to flow easily with ideas for the 
piece emerging ‘fluently and consistently, seemingly of their own accord’, bringing 
clarity and a growing sense of confidence about the artistic activity (p. 230); 
6) however, despite this growing sense of confidence, artists also report that, in the process 
of transforming ‘a purely conceptual entity into a conceptual and physical entity’, they 
find themselves wrestling with the constraints inherent in their chosen medium. 
Confronted by what was and was not possible, they find themselves ‘configuring and 
reconfiguring the original intuited ideas’ to the extent that both the content and the 
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mode of the artwork underwent considerable changes during the creative process (Mace 
and Ward 2002, p. 190). In their findings, Nelson and Rawlings (2007) portray the artist 
as both an active and passive agent in the process: actively wrestling with the physical 
constraints of the chosen medium but remaining passively receptive to any additional 
configurations that may arise to inform the developing artwork; 
7) an indication that the artwork is nearing completion, albeit it in provisional, draft or 
almost-finished form, is that, unlike the large increments of change made in the early 
stages, the end stage requires increasingly smaller and fewer adjustments (Mace and 
Ward, 2002). The artist becomes more focussed on evaluating the work’s aesthetic and 
conceptual qualities to determine ‘what is required to advance it or to consider it 
satisfactorily resolved’ (p. 187).  Changes are made until the artist feels satisfied that the 
artwork captures the original vision as closely as possible (Botella et al., 2013), and this 
is often accompanied by another “aha” moment as the artist “recognises” the physical 
representation of the original intuited concept (Nelson and Rawlings, 2007). 
 While these findings do appear to substantiate the speculative descriptions cited previously, 
they can be misleading because they create the impression that the creative process is a neat 
sequence of stages, with artists moving smoothly from one to the next. Even though researchers 
are careful to point out that the process is marked by a frequent looping back to earlier stages 
and a constant flow of feedback that guides the next stage, the overall sense is that the process 
moves forward stage by stage in a predominantly linear fashion (Mace and Ward, 2002; Botella 
et al., 2013). Much of this sense is rooted in the fact that the art-making process is a time-based 
one and therefore easily marked chronologically by the level of progress (or lack thereof) in the 
physical production of the artwork. In addition, because the development of the physical 
artwork is more readily monitored, the notion that the creative process is neatly mirrored in the 
development of the artwork has become a deeply entrenched assumption. This conflating of 
progress and process has given rise to the Staged Approach investigation of the creative process 
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which sees the process as an essentially sequential one, comprising anything from four to six 
distinctive phases (Mace and Ward 2002; Newman, 2008; Botella et al., 2013).  However, as will 
now be demonstrated, the more detailed accounts provided by the artists themselves suggest a 
process that is far more complex, multi-layered and cyclical than the one outlined by the 
research studies. 
WHAT THE ARTISTS SAY  
Personal accounts of the artistic process can be found in the great store of memoir, 
autobiography, journals, diaries and letters that line bookshelves everywhere. However, in 
keeping with the rigours of academic enquiry and the reservations expressed regarding these 
anecdotal accounts, the decision was made to focus only on the extended accounts provided in 
research-based publications for the purposes of this discussion. Four practice-led dissertations 
in particular provide a detailed account of the creative process used by the artists in conceiving 
and producing an artwork within their respective disciplines: Riding the Dragon: A Journey into the 
Creative Process by Sally Fogelberg (2002); The Dreamer: The Creative Process by Hilary Maxwell 
(2007); The Creative Process of Music Composition: A Qualitative Self-Study by Timothy Newman 
(2008), Active Imagination and Art Making by Joy Bye (2014). Each of these dissertations  provides 
a detailed account of the individual artist’s creative process, captured in the form of journal 
entries, working notes and/or video recordings. However, the dissertations, collectively,  offer 
a valuable exploration of the artistic creative process across the separate disciplines represented 
by each artist – Fogelberg is an artist, Maxwell, is a choreographer; Newman, is a musician and 
Bye is a sculptor.  The exclusion of any dissertation by a creative writer is not deliberate – the 
current format of the Creative Writing preferences a complete creative work, accompanied by 
a shorter reflective/critical commentary or exegesis, a practice not without its own problems 
(see, for example, Bourke and Neilson, 2004 who express their reservations about the inclusion 
of firsthand accounts in the exegesis). There is, therefore, very little research space for extended 
explorations of the writing process itself. Fortunately, doctoral researchers in the fine arts are 
112 
 
not impeded by such constraints. They can thus greatly enrich the discourse on creativity in 
general, and the creative process in particular, as evidenced in the selected dissertations.  As will 
now be demonstrated, these dissertation accounts not only encompass the aspects of the artistic 
creative process as identified in the six research studies already discussed above; they also draw 
attention to aspects of the artistic creative process that have either been overlooked or so 
minimised that their role in the process has been obscured.  
 More pertinently, this demonstration will show that these accounts reflect a process 
that, from early intuitive stirrings to the finished artwork, is characterised by multiple elements 
that are in constant, dynamic interaction with each other, rather than one that unfolds in a 
succession of neatly defined stages as laid in the summary of the six research studies.  This view 
of the creative process as a multi-faceted, fluid and organic one is best reflected by the Gestalt 
approach which argues that, because the whole is always greater than its parts, the creative 
process should rather be viewed as one in which many different components, working together 
in dynamic synergy, give rise to that unified whole. According to this view, the artist ‘conceives 
important aspects of the shape of the entire work before he or she has the details’ and the 
creative process involves moving towards or filling in ‘this often dimly perceived but compelling 
form’ (Newman, 2008, p. 74) – a form that gradually unfolds to reveal more of itself as the artist 
begins producing the artefact. This approach raises some intriguing possibilities in which the 
creative process can be likened to doing a jigsaw puzzle but without having the picture of the 
complete image to hand. One is left then with only being able to fit pieces that seem to belong 
together, guided purely by possible matches, emerging patterns and unfolding shapes, yet always 
aware that at any time new combinations may overturn any, and all, preconceived ideas of the 
possible outcome.  
Beginning and Ending 
As suggested by the research studies, each of these artists begins their creative process with little 
more than an idea or a fragment of an idea. Fogelberg sets out to produce a pen and ink drawing 
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inspired by a wild ginseng flower, unaware that this simple drawing will become a much more 
complex work than she initially intended.  Maxwell’s creative process is triggered by an image, 
that arises quite spontaneously, of a woman sitting on a wooden deck, swinging her leg over the 
water. As she begins to choreograph a dance around this image, it becomes an intricate work 
that explores its themes in an imaginative fusion of live dance and technology. Newman sets 
out to compose a duet for two pianos with little more than a fragment of music – a compelling 
chord that emerges as he is messing about on the piano. This initial chord later becomes the 
foundation of the entire piece, a blend of notation and improvisation as the two pianists respond 
to each other. Bye begins her creative process quite deliberately, using a method of projection 
in which she pours inks and thinned paints onto prepared paper and then contemplates the 
resulting patterns through half-closed eyes and in day-dreaming mode. When she can discern 
an image in these patterns she makes some initial sketches, then paintings, before casting the 
image in ceramic clay. In her dissertation, Bye maps how these images become a set of five 
sculptures that eventually formed a single, integrated work.  
None of these artists sets out to create the specific creative piece that emerges from 
their creative process; each artist, in fact, expresses some surprise as the work begins to take on 
its final form – a form neither planned nor envisaged at the outset.  Fogelberg, for example, 
notes in one of her later journal entries that:  
Two months is the longest amount of time I’ve spent on a drawing 
until now. But then, this one is composed of multiple scale 
relationships, unrelated elements, dissimilar time sequences, and 
including text from actual events. I’ve never done a drawing with 
multiple levels of complexity … [this drawing] uses essences of form, 
and it does more. It blends images that I might not ordinarily present 
together. It uses text which is related to story. The entire drawing also 
tells a story, rather than makes a statement as I have done in the past 
(p. 34). 
Nearing the end of her choreographic work, Maxwell is surprised at how the new material added 
to the dance at this late stage, suddenly reveals its underlying themes, none of which were pre-
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planned. In her notes, she writes that the dance is now ‘not so much a story, but [an exploration 
of] emotions and aspects of a relationship … the ideas of searching, recollection, and self-
recognition became core themes within the work’ (p. 37). In the latter stages of reworking the 
material he has generated so far, Newman reports that it is only then that he comes up with ‘a 
significant new idea’ that sees his composition taking what will be its final shape (p. 178). Based 
on this new idea he expands some sections, makes considerable changes to the chord sequences 
already written and develops new material to link the sections together.  These represent quite 
substantial deviations from his initial ideas about the composed work.  Similarly, in her review 
of her sculptured works, when Bye maps the way they link together in a powerful representation 
of an inner journey based on ancient archetypes, she writes ‘I have been astounded by the 
relevance of these archetypes and my relationship to other works that feature these archetypes. 
I didn’t intend or begin with these archetypes’ (p. 97). 
 Three of the artists clearly express a deep sense of satisfaction when the work seems to 
have been reached its completion. Maxwell concludes her account with the words: ‘These 
[minor] adjustments were made … the choreographic structure, including the music and screen-
dance of The Dreamer, was completed (p. 47); Fogelberg comments on the demanding task of 
stippling the remaining white spaces as she completes the drawing, saying: ‘I haven’t used 
stippling since I was a student. I now understand why; because it is so tedious and time 
consuming … But look at the result. The feeling of satisfaction is worth the labour’ (p. 43), and 
in reflecting on her creative process, Bye writes: ‘satisfaction is reached and the image or 
representation it true to itself’ and that moment occurs when the artwork appears to reflect the 
intuited image most closely (p. 152). 
All these accounts then seem to verify what researchers marked as the beginning and 
ending of the creative process, with very little deviation from the way these stages were 
described by the artists participating in the studies. However, the dissertation accounts of the 
process that lies between the beginning and the ending of the art-making, provide evidence of 
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subtleties not so readily captured in the research studies.  Their more detailed accounts of this 
intermediate stage of the creative process throw these subtleties are into starker relief, showing 
more vividly how the initial image or fragment evolves into the larger, more textured, multi-
layered artefact. That all these artists report very similar experiences suggest that these subtleties 
form an integral part of the creative process and therefore deserve closer inspection. Four 
specific features of their accounts provide examples of the nuances that are not captured in 
either the speculative descriptions or the research findings – the role of attention, the period of 
play, the internal dialogues and a series of creative insights rather than one moment of bright 
illumination. 
Attention and Intention 
What is not reflected in the six research studies discussed earlier in this chapter is a subtle layer 
of engagement at the start of the creative process that is clearly evident in the dissertation 
accounts – the interplay of attention and intention. Fogelberg and Maxwell both begin their 
creative process because something catches their attention – for Fogelberg it is the wild ginseng 
flower, for Maxwell it is the mental image of the woman sitting on the dock. In both cases, the 
image or object is intriguing enough to invite further exploration by the artist. Newman, on the 
other hand, only begins with a clear intention: ‘I want to write something, anything … my only 
frame or direction is that it is that I write for two pianos, one improvising and one reading 
notation. So I plunge in …’ (p. 181). He then lets his hands move freely over the keys until a 
sequence attracts his attention. Bye uses a blend of both – she begins with an intention – to 
make a sculpture – but then uses her projection method to find an image that invites further 
exploration.  These accounts therefore strongly suggest that the creative process begins when 
something – either external to the artist or arising from within – is sufficiently compelling, 
intriguing or curious enough to attract the artist’s attention, arousing interest and inviting 
further exploration. 
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Playing around 
The artists signal their acceptance of this invitation by engaging in a time of unstructured “play”. 
Fogelberg makes many rough sketches of the ginseng flower while on an artist’s retreat before 
beginning her drawing. Maxwell first works alone in her studio, embodying her mental image 
and mimicking the actions of the woman just as she had envisioned them. She is then joined by 
the two dancers, and for a few rehearsals they simply generate improvisations based on the 
image, toying with possibilities. After noting the few minor chords that attracted his attention, 
Newman notes: ‘I begin to go back-and-forth between them, looking for ones that sound good 
consecutively … I start playing around with other structures’ (p. 182).  Bye reports that once 
she has “seen” / imagined an image on the paint covered surface, she traces the outline and 
paints in some detail. She then makes a number of more detailed sketches and/or paintings, 
before starting to model it in clay, all the while mentally playing with the image and what it 
could represent. 
 This time of playing around with ideas and possibilities in an unstructured, non-
judgemental way is not specifically mentioned in the six studies, yet the importance of play in 
creativity and art-making has been stressed by other researchers (see Romanyshyn, 2007; 
McLees, 2010; Bateson and Martin, 2013; Stevens, 2014). They argue that it is through such 
imaginative and playful activity that the unconscious material that will guide and shape the work 
is accessed. It is this playful activity that ‘can feel foolish, a waste of time, inefficient, completely 
beside the point’, that invites ‘as-yet-unimagined possibilities’ (Romanshyn, 2007, p. 138).  Rob 
Pope (2017), however, takes this a step further, arguing that play does much more than simply 
facilitate creativity. In his view, it is a vital component in the creative process – it is the artist’s 
very willingness to play that initiates the co-operative relationship between artist, the idea and 
the work which lies at the heart of artistic endeavour. Indications that this may be more than 
just a speculation is reflected in the fact that all the dissertation accounts record playful 
engagement with ideas and possibilities occurring throughout the creative process.  
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 The dissertation accounts also record that while the artists generate a substantial number 
of ideas during this time, many of these ideas are not incorporated into the final artwork. 
Conversely, the artists also find that, as the work nears completion, an idea fragment, initially 
set aside at the start of the art-making process, does in fact become an integral part of the 
artwork – it is often the single component that draws the whole work together in a meaningful 
way. Newman, for example, notes: ‘An encounter with a sound or idea during my piano 
improvisations, which later reoccurs and is solidified in another context, is a common 
occurrence in the sketch stage of my process’ (p. 159). Fogelberg, Maxwell and Bye all make 
similar observations, yet this aspect of the creative process is not mentioned in the six research 
studies.  
The dynamic interplay between artist, idea and artwork  
That art-making involves a dynamic interplay between the artist, the emerging ideas and the 
developing artwork is only hinted at in the speculative descriptions and mentioned in very broad 
terms in the six studies. For example, Glavaneau et al. (2013) use the term ‘material undergoing’ 
to describe the interaction between the artist and the developing work (see Chap. 3, p. 77), while 
the research studies simply allude to an ‘ongoing dialogue’. The dissertation accounts, however, 
demonstrate that this dynamic interaction plays a much more significant role in the creative 
process than is suggested by the research findings. This is vividly reflected in the number of 
questions the artists continually ask of themselves, the emerging ideas and the developing 
artwork throughout the creative process. Even as she is sketching the first flower, Fogelberg 
asks, ‘How is the light bringing out the form? What’s the dark doing?’ (p. 13). Having completed 
it, she then asks ‘What else can I add? What could I possibly do here that is different?’ (p. 18). 
She adds the soybean plant, but notes: ‘That upper third still feels empty, even with the shading 
in the bottom. What are you going to put there, Sally? What needs to happen?’ (p. 27), and later 
when pencilling in the barn she asks: ‘How far down do I bring it?’ (p. 30). This questioning 
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continues even as she is completing her drawing with the stippling effect: ‘This is weird. Why 
am I stippling?’ (p. 40).  
Maxwell begins her process by asking the woman in her image ‘Why are you here? … 
Where are you going? Are you somewhere unfamiliar? What is the temperature of the air? What 
time of day is it? What do you see around you? Are you alone?’ (p. 29). Newman’s account is 
similarly peppered with questions:  
Ok...so what am I hearing? What am I hearing here? (p. 183) … I gotta 
put it into a framework here. Where is all this material gonna be? (p. 
187) … I erase and rewrite whole notes creating bass movement of the 
roots of the chords. ‘Then what?’ I ask. Does this question mean that 
I am satisfied with what I have? (p. 197) … I'm just thinking about 
strategy here. Uhmm...but...to what aim? Where...? (p. 245) … Ok. So, 
what do we have so far? Do I want a parallel phrase there? (p. 249) …. 
So, how are we doing with the shape here?  (p. 250) … What's next? 
What do I do next? (p. 252). 
The significance of these questions is twofold – firstly, they illustrate exactly how the artist 
engages with their emerging ideas and developing artwork, and secondly, the questions are 
answered as the artwork unfolds. It is this question-and-answer phenomenon that has given rise 
to the notion of an ‘ongoing dialogue’. However, the dissertations make a further distinction 
possible for, in looking more closely at this questions-and-answer dynamic (whether explicitly 
recorded or implicitly understood), it seems there are, in fact, two dialogues taking place. They 
sometimes occur simultaneously, but, more often than not, as separate conversations. The first 
dialogue seems to occur between the artist and the emerging ideas, while the second takes place 
between the artist and the developing artwork. 
Dialogue between artist and emerging ideas 
This dialogue is concerned with the generation of ideas and concepts, and it appears to be 
characterised by the asking of a question and then waiting for the answer to arise. Whether what 
comes to mind, or emerges from a period of play, will be incorporated is guided solely by 
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whether or not it feels right. Fogelberg, for example, repeatedly refers to setting the drawing 
aside as she waits for more clarity. Her journal notes record comments, such as:  
I’ll wait and decide to shade in the background or leave the white of 
the paper. It’ll develop in time (p. 16) … I’ll crochet and maybe the 
answer will come (p. 19) … It feels unfinished, but I can’t see where to 
go next. I’ll leave it out on the board and maybe the answer will come 
(p. 32) … I’ll lay in what I can and ponder it as I take a break from the 
drawing and take care of other things (p. 33). 
The answers to her questions seem to come mostly from considering a possibility and then 
either discarding it, for example, deciding not to include the house or the bug, or cautiously 
pencilling it in, as she does with the text she adds later. Her decisions are consistently guided by 
what ‘feels right’ to her. Both Maxwell and Newman record similar experiences – of following 
an idea as far as they can, before stepping back to wait for further clarity. The decision to then 
go with a new idea is made solely on the basis that it ‘feels right’, even if they can’t quite yet see 
where it will fit into the final work. 
 This practice of being guided by what ‘feels right’ has generally been regarded as the 
intuitive part of the creative process, without any meaningful explanation as to exactly how it 
functions. Some modern researchers (for example, O’ Connor and Aardema, 2005; Bacon 2017; 
Liamputtong and Rumbold, 2008; Ellis, 2014) also use the term ‘felt sense’ when addressing 
this aspect because it is largely a knowing that is accompanied by a strong emotional component 
and a physical sensation that cannot be readily understood or explained in purely rational terms 
when it occurs. Signs that this phenomenon is attracting more focussed attention is found in 
the work of Danko Nikolić (2016), who, as an extension of his research into synesthesia, makes 
an interesting argument for what he terms ideasthesia. He defines it as the phenomenon of 
“sensing concepts” in which the triggering of a concept is accompanied by physical or emotional 
sensations, but in such a way that there is a very close correlation, or careful balance between 
the two. According to Nikolić, this is the hallmark of art-making activity and that the artist 
strives to achieve this delicate balance, guided only by what “feels right”. 
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Bye’s account, however, shows how this felt sense can also alert the artist to remain 
open to the emergence of a new idea by stalling the current creative process. Having already 
sculpted the Guardian Cat and the Sacrificial Elephant, she finds herself inexplicably 
preoccupied with the cat image. She tries to circumvent what she experiences as ‘the blocking 
by the Guardian Cat’ by painting a series of cat images in acrylics. She then notes:  
However, as I tried to paint the image of the twin cats, one cat began 
to resemble a rabbit. At first, I tried to correct this to the idea I had 
already formed. But the work wouldn’t allow me to do this and, after a 
struggle, I chose to go with the image of the rabbit. The rabbit emerged 
and so instead of cancelling it I went with it. Thus, my work Rabbit-
Guide came to me as the result of the morphing of my Guardian Cat 
into a rabbit (p. 80).  
Newman and Maxwell report similar instances of ‘accidentally’ stumbling on to new 
compositional elements – Newman recalls that after some ten minutes of chord generation, he 
is ‘messing with the notes’ when his finger slips. Remarking on this slip, he notes: ‘Umm I like 
that … Then, out of the blue, an important idea surfaces, a held a4, then a chord. (This turns 
out to be the very opening of the piece)’ (p. 184). Maxwell and one of the dancers are rehearsing 
some of the dance movements when the dancer spontaneously places one box on top of the 
other and perches herself on top. As she begins swinging her leg, Maxwell finds a place for a 
part of the original image that she had initially discarded. She notes: ‘The leg swinging phrase 
was developed and became an important part of the choreographic work’ (p. 41). In all these 
instances, the artists embrace these new ideas and developments because they ‘feel right’, 
reflecting the creative process as one of finding ‘the right combination of elements’ until there 
is a ‘balance that feels right’ (Newman, 2008, p. 108). 
Dialogue between artist and developing artwork 
The second dialogue takes place between the artist and the developing work as the artist begins 
the task of giving expression to the emerging ideas in such a way that the physical manifestation 
matches the initial conception as closely as possible. The focus now shifts from what feels right 
to focussing on what works, what is effective. This is the guiding principle as the artist begins 
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balancing what is being expressed and how it is being expressed with what has been conceived.  
Fogelberg illustrates this very clearly, noting in one entry for example, that ‘the background 
feels naked, unfinished. With the ginseng and goldenseal and soybeans in the foreground, the 
drawing feels out of balance. It needs other images’ (p. 28). This dialogue therefore concerns 
composition, technique, the effects of adding or subtracting compositional elements, and 
medium constraints.  It is a dialogue very much influenced by the developing artwork, described 
by artists as the stage when the object ‘posed a question’ to the artist, not the other way around 
(Botella et al., 2013, p. 167). In Fogelberg’s account the beginning of this dialogue with her 
developing artwork marks a pivotal moment in her creative process:  
Well, there, little plants, I guess I have to let you have your way. Where 
was it that we made this shift to me listening to you instead of me being 
in control? Ah, I know, it was when I started to let the undulation of 
the shadows behind the soybeans shape the foreground. Those 
shadows brought a deeper connection. Now, the drawing will be 
something that I can’t see now, can’t even imagine. Now, I follow … 
(p. 28) … Now, I realize that I can just let it take its own shape; it’ll do 
what it’s going to do. I am only along for the ride. This is a good lesson 
(p. 32). 
While Newman is not as explicit about this dialogue with the unfolding artwork, he does note 
what he calls an ‘emerging problem’ that surfaces as he begins writing the music score:  
I want to firm up what I have and ‘write this out’ but I do not want 
to make it too firm … This is an emerging problem … I start to 
consider the variables as they work together, not separately as in the 
beginning of the process. As the pieces of the puzzle start to emerge 
I am confronted with how firm to make them. When I make 
something firm it affects everything else and may change other 
things I've already done (p. 195) … Now spending time on mid-
level detail—chord order—I erase and rewrite whole notes creating 
bass movement of the roots of the chords. ‘Then what?’ I ask. Does 
this question mean that I am satisfied with what I have? Obviously 
not, I just keep going over the chords again and again. Then, finally 
something different happens … Uncommonly, I then show some 
approval of what I've written: ‘I think that's good; I think that's 
alright’ (p. 197). 
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This process of letting the developing artwork shape his decisions is described in greater detail 
in his narrative account of putting the final composition together – it reflects how he continually 
allows the developing music score to inform the sequence, the links and the flow of his final 
composition through the thirty-two drafts it takes to achieve that. 
 Maxwell uses video footage of the ‘developing material’ to seek ‘connections between 
movement ideas, and dominant characteristics and qualities’. Once she has established what the 
predominant characteristics are, she explores ‘the different methods through which the ideas 
could be developed and become interrelated’ (p. 38). However, it is only when she visits the 
stage where the work is to be performed that the underlying themes of the dance become clear. 
In her account she describes how, as she began structuring the piece into ‘an aesthetic whole’, 
she found herself frustrated ‘because I kept waiting for meaning and the concept of the piece to 
reveal itself’, noting that ‘the progression of the structuring process began to stagnate’.  This 
impasse ends when she visits the venue and sees how ‘the space could be a representation of 
the two facets of the mind, the conscious and subconscious’. She then decides to make the 
configuration of the stage ‘an additional component in the piece’ and returns to the studio to 
complete her dance (pp. 43-44), shaping it according to the insights she has gained from seeing 
the stage itself.  
Bye’s account only hints at this second dialogue, not because it doesn’t happen, but 
because her account is more focussed on reflecting the way these inner dialogues unfold, and 
the framework she uses to describe this unfolding is based on the Jungian concept of Active 
Imagination. This approach to describing the artistic creative process holds so many implications 
for our understanding of the process that it is discussed in much greater detail in a following 
section.  
 These dissertation accounts not only provide clear support for Pope’s assertion that a 
dynamic relationship lies at the heart of the creative endeavour, but also suggest that the artist 
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experiences this dynamic interaction through ongoing internal dialogues with the emerging ideas 
and the developing artwork.  
Small spirals of creativity 
Contrary to both the speculative descriptions of the creative process and the research findings, 
none of the dissertation accounts records insight as coming in one moment of blinding 
illumination in which everything becomes immediately clear. All the accounts rather reflect a 
process that is better described as comprising many small moments of insight, or small spirals 
of process. To return to the jigsaw puzzle analogy, it is as though the artist must not only engage 
in completing a puzzle without a guiding picture, but must generate the very puzzle pieces 
needed for the task, using a micro-version of the overall creative process each time. The 
dissertations also show how a newly generated puzzle piece can act as a trigger for the formation 
of the next piece – which may, in fact, be the very piece that is needed and so finds its way into 
the final artwork. Every one of the dissertation accounts provide an unequivocal demonstration 
of how each component of the final artwork seems to arise from its own cycle of creative 
processing. Fogelberg and Bye both clearly trace the development of each component from the 
initial idea to final form and then explain how it comes to occupy the place it does in the overall 
artwork.  Newman explicitly states that his account reflects ‘the building of a large-scale form 
over time’, showing quite specifically ‘how the form started with little, one-section parts’ which 
‘grew in size and developed different sections’ to form larger parts which were then ‘readjusted 
over my compositional process until I arrived at the final shape of the piece’ (p. 176).  
These dissertation accounts, therefore, present a very different portrayal of the creative 
process than that contained in the speculative descriptions or the research findings. The latter 
both portray the process as one continuous flow, albeit with many feedback loops and/or 
movements back on forth across the various stages. Neither considers the possibility raised by 
the dissertation accounts that the over-arching creative process, in fact, comprises a series of 
smaller cycles or spirals of the creative process, which generate the individual components, 
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shape their development, and indicate their placement within the context dictated by of the 
developing artwork because the placement feels right and effectively expresses what has been 
conceived.  
Unlike the other descriptions of the creative process, this view of the process 
comprising many spirals of creativity allows for the unexpected moment of insight that all the 
dissertation artists record as occurring in the final stage of their art-making process. Without 
exception, each one describes a moment when this last piece of the puzzle falls into place, so 
to speak. Coming just as artwork is nearing completion, it is this final component that brings 
the artwork to a satisfactory conclusion. This facet of the process is not mentioned in the 
descriptions or the six research studies.  
However, these four examples of aspects of the creative process that are not included 
in current conceptualisations are over-shadowed by an even greater lacuna, namely, the scant 
regard given to the role played by the imagination in the process – in these accounts, the wider 
discourse on creativity, in general, and the creative process, in particular (Pelaprat and Cole, 
2011; Zittoun and Cerchai, 2013; Stokes, 2014; Jung, Flores, and Hunter, 2016).  
Of the four dissertations, only that of Bye gives the imagination any consideration at all, 
focussing specifically on the role played by active imagination in her creative process. Her view 
that Active Imagination is integral to the artistic creative process is, however, well supported by 
contemporary researchers and practitioners alike (Miller, 2004; Bacon, 2017; Schaverien, 2005; 
Tomlinson, 2008; Sullivan, 2016) and provides a valuable insight into those aspects of the 
artistic creative process conventionally thought of a being too mysterious to explain.  
ACTIVE IMAGINATION  
While the term Active Imagination was first coined by Kant (cf. Chap 3, p. 96), it was Carl Jung 
who developed it as a deliberate technique for engaging with the characters, objects and events 
that inhabit dreams. Modern Jungian psychologists, however, have expanded his original idea 
so that the concept now embraces a specific method for ‘becoming actively involved with that 
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which arises from the Unknown in dream, fantasy, and intuition’ (Eisendrath, 1977, p. 65), in 
other words, as a way of engaging with what arises from the unconscious through a ‘dialogical 
interaction between the ego (consciousness) and spontaneously emerged unconscious material’ 
(p. 63). 
According to Jungian thought, the unconscious contains a great wealth of forgotten 
memories, repressed ideas, subliminal perceptions, and contents that are not yet ‘ripe for 
consciousness’ (Tomlinson, 2008, p. 120). This content lies immediately below the threshold of 
consciousness and most often surfaces in dreams, but it can be deliberately accessed through 
Active Imagination as demonstrated in Bye’s account of her creative process. She vividly 
describes how she uses Jung’s technique in her creative process, beginning, as he advised, ‘with 
any image. Contemplate it and carefully observe how the picture begins to unfold ... do nothing 
but observe what its spontaneous changes are... Hold fast to the one image you have chosen 
and wait until it changes by itself. Note all these changes and eventually step into the picture 
yourself...say what you have to say to that figure and listen to what he or she has to say’ (Bye 
2014, p. 13). Her account shows quite clearly how she uses Active Imagination as a way of 
‘letting the unconscious surface and then coming to terms with that material’ (Chodorow, 2006, 
p. 225). There are, however, a number of salient features in this apparently simple description 
that have become significant topics in the discourse on modern depth psychology, namely: 
1) The creative process is triggered or activated by cues that arise either consciously or 
unconsciously (Zittoun, and Cerchia, 2013; Baumeister, Schmeichel and DeWall, 
2014). In other words, the cues can arise from the inner world of the artist in the 
form of spontaneous images, sounds or sensations or be promoted by objects, 
incidents and events in the external world, as reflected in both the research findings 
and the dissertation accounts. 
2) Active Imagination, however, is a deliberate and conscious act undertaken with the 
specific intention of accessing the contents of the unconscious (Sullivan, 2016) 
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through an image or a chain of images and their related associations (Schaverien, 
2005). 
3) This act requires “a suspension of disbelief” to permit the unconscious material to 
surface and then a readiness to engage with whatever arises without judgement 
(Schaverien, 2005). Ian Irvine (2008) stresses the importance of setting critical 
thinking aside, while Christopher Seeley and Peter Reason (2008) describe it as a 
time of ‘dwelling in uncertainty’ in which the act of suspending allows ‘spontaneous, 
empathic, intuitive responses to come forward’ (p. 37). 
4) The unconscious material that surfaces contains a meaning of its own that is usually 
presented in the form of a symbol or metaphor that needs to be deciphered and 
interpreted (Neisser, 2003; Miller, 2004; Schaverien, 2005). This, argues 
Romanyshyn (2007), is because ‘a symbol holds the tension between what is 
invisible and what is visible …between what shows itself in light and what hides 
itself in darkness … it requires for its expression a language that hints at meaning 
and does not attempt to define it or pin it down’ (p. 27).  
5) The process of uncovering the hidden meaning of the image or symbol takes the 
form of a dialogue between the conscious and the unconscious (Schaverien, 2005; 
Sullivan, 2016) through which a new direction or a ‘third living thing’ emerges which 
results from resolving the tension between ‘what is invisible and what is visible’ 
(Miller, 2004, p. 3). 
6) The resolution of this tension is guided by felt sense. This is because the subliminal 
or unconscious contents are highly charged with emotional energy (Eisendrath, 
1977). Through Active Imagination, this affect is transformed into image in a 
transformation process that ‘allows the conscious and unconscious to flow together 
into a common product in which both are united’ (Chodorow, 2006, p. 224),  in 
what Jungians term a collaboration of conscious and unconscious (Irvine, 2008). In 
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this way, Active Imagination allows ‘aspects of our personal history to be re-
imagined, re-created, and re-aligned, or brought into consciousness’ (Bacon, 2017, 
p. 20) to inform and shape the process of art-making.  
7) This dialogical collaboration takes place in a psychic space termed imaginal space, a 
space which is neither entirely conscious nor entirely unconscious, but is instead ‘a 
region of reality that is intermediate between sense and intellect’ (Romanyshyn, 
2007, p. 158) that allows for ‘a different modality of thinking’ (Zittoun and Cerchai, 
2013, p. 306). In a seminal work on this topic, Mary Watkins (1986) demonstrates 
how these imaginal dialogues, or ‘inner conversations of thinking’ (p. 18), reflect ‘a 
movement towards inner coherence’, in which new worlds of meaning are created 
(p. 67). 
8) This collaboration is an ongoing dynamic relationship in which ‘the unconscious 
figures penetrate into consciousness and the conscious attitudes penetrate into the 
unconscious’ (Bye, 2014, p. 13) and because of this mutual exchange the embodied 
image, or final artwork, ‘may reveal far more than the artist consciously intended,’ 
becoming ‘profoundly symbolic’ in such a way that ‘no other mode of articulation 
could convey its meaning’ (Schaverien, 2005, p. 145). 
Bye’s account clearly demonstrates how the theoretical underpinnings of Active Imagination 
can illuminate the more shadowy areas of the artistic creative process. Although she is the only 
one of the four artists who uses this Jungian construct to describe her creative process, the 
other three all reference the use of inner or imaginal dialoguing as an integral part of their 
creative processes. As has already been demonstrated, all, without exception, show the artist 
constantly engaging in conversations with their emerging ideas and developing artworks, 
strongly suggesting that they too are using Active Imagination in a similar way to Bye, even if 
they do not frame these conversations as she does. The next chapter explores this particular 
aspect of the creative process in greater detail, providing an in-depth discussion of inner, 
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imaginal dialoguing to demonstrate the central role it plays in the artistic creative process. This 
discussion will also present compelling support for one of the key arguments of this dissertation, 
namely, that the artist is more reliant on the imagination than the scientist, as mooted by Wallas 
(see Chapter 3, pp. 86-86), and that it is possible, on this basis alone, to distinguish between an 
artistic creative process and the process used in scientific discovery.  
This chapter has examined the artistic creative process as reflected in six research studies 
and four practice-led dissertations. By highlighting the consistencies in this research and in the 
dissertations, it has demonstrated the extent to which a phenomenologically-based investigation 
is able to surface aspects of the artistic creative process that are obscured by the scientific 
approach favoured by those advocating a purely cognitive understanding of this process. The 
detailed discussion of the research studies and the dissertations reflects a number of 
commonalities that echo the descriptions of the artistic creative process as outlined by Ghiselin 
and Glaveanu et al. Both portray the process as being intrinsically organic, dynamic, and 
uncertain. The dissertations provided valuable insights into how artists navigate this fluid, 
malleable process, pointing to the key role played by the inner dialogues that take place in 
imaginal space. The chapter showed the extent to which the artists all seemed to use a form of 
Active Imagination to generate the content of the artwork, and then to find the form best suited 
for the physical, material expression of that content. It offered clear evidence, drawn from all 
four dissertations, that strongly suggests that the artistic creative process is one in which both 
the content and the form of final artwork arises from the dynamic interplay between the 
unconscious and conscious elements of the artistic creative process.  
The high level of consistency between the findings of the six research studies and the 
four practice-led dissertations, suggest that it is possible to conceptualise a process that is unique 
to art-making. Furthermore, that it is also possible to capture the various aspects of this process 
in a model that reflects the dynamic interaction between them. The next chapter proposes a 
model of this process that not only depicts its various aspects and the interaction between them, 
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but also demonstrates how this view of the artistic creative process is substantiated by the 
compelling research emerging from contemporary neuroscientific studies.    
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CHAPTER 5 
ARTISTIC CREATIVITY EXPLAINED 
The mystery of finding or touching the unknown is present during the creative process; as 
is the release of energy and magic when the unknown is revealed and becomes part of a 
drawing. (Fogelberg, 2002, p.  66) 
 
The previous chapter explored the artistic creative process in some detail, drawing on six 
research studies and four practice-led dissertations. It demonstrated the extent to which 
significant aspects of this process have been excluded in purely cognitive conceptualisations of 
the artistic creative process. The chapter concluded that the clearer understanding afforded by 
a phenomenological approach raises the possibility that this process can be captured in a model 
that identifies its key elements and  maps the interactions between them.  
This chapter aims to do just this by proposing a model of the artistic creative process. 
A brief discussion on the challenge of developing an appropriate model is followed by a 
discussion of the key premise underlying the proposed model and the neurobiological research 
that supports this premise. The next sections identify and explain the model’s key conceptual 
elements and map the relationships between them to show how the proposed model provides 
a tentatively systemic view of the artistic creative process. This detailed presentation of the 
proposed model also demonstrates the extent to which it has been shaped and informed by 
contemporary neurobiological research. The integration of this research into the model design 
provides a strong empirical foundation for the proposed model. However, it also demonstrates 
how first-hand subjective experience accounts can be combined with third-hand objective 
knowledge so that they stand in mutually enriching relationship with each other. This is 
demonstrated in the concluding section which presents a neurophenomenological model of the 
artistic creative process. This conceptualisation of the process thus invites a revised 
understanding of the process that challenges current thinking in unexpected and deeply 
significant ways.   
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MODELLING THE PROCESS 
Developing The Model 
According to Murray Webster, Lisa Rashotte and Joseph Whitmeyer (2008), models fall into 
two broad categories, namely, theoretical models and intuitive models. They define theoretical 
models as the representation of ideas that are grounded in explicit, general propositions of a 
theory (p. 5).  As such, these models serve to encourage the clear statement of ideas, increase 
the precision of argument, reduce ambiguity and enable informative predictions (p. 4) – which 
is why they have become a commonplace component of the empirical methodology that marks 
scientific inquiry (Pemberton, 1993).  
  Intuitive models, on the other hand, represent ideas from ‘a range of scholarly and 
informal thinking … but without links to any general, formal theory’ (p. 5).  For this reason, 
Webster, Rashotte and Whitmeyer regard intuitive models as ‘better suited to folk wisdom than 
to science’ (p. 16), stating that, because these models ‘resonate with anecdotal evidence, none 
holds up to the strength of predictably that the theoretical models provide’ (p. 17). Given such 
deep reservations about models not grounded in a formal theory, how does one go about 
developing a model for findings arising from the phenomenological enquiry that marks practice-
based research – findings that will, in all likelihood, ‘resonate with anecdotal evidence’? 
 This question is convincingly addressed by Yolanda Havenga, Marie Poggenpoel, and 
Chris Myburgh (2014) who argue for a model that lies between these two categories, namely, a 
model based on ‘inductive theory-generating research’.  They define theory-generating research 
as research that is informed by, but not grounded in, any specific formal theory. It therefore 
remains open ‘to the possibility of seeing new things’ when investigating the real-life 
phenomenon (p. 149), and thus allows the phenomenon to be explored in ‘an open, non-leading 
manner’ (p. 152). The advantages of adopting this approach are twofold. In the first instance, 
the resulting diagrammatic model acts as ‘a visual metaphor of the real-life phenomenon’ which 
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depicts the key concepts identified in the research and the dynamic relationships that lie between 
them. Through this depiction – this ‘creative and rigorous structuring of ideas’ – the model is 
then able to project ‘a tentative, and systematic view of phenomena’ (p. 149). In the second 
instance, because the model simply represents a broad conceptual framework, it functions as a 
valuable precursor to theory rather than as a representation of theory (p. 155). For these reasons, 
Havenga, Poggenpoel and Myburgh argue that this approach offers a more appropriate avenue 
to developing discipline-specific theories; theories that are led by, and in line with, evidence-
based practices (Adams, 2014). 
Faced with a very similar challenge, namely, to develop a clearer understanding of the 
artistic creative process as experienced by the artist, and then to capture that understanding in 
a descriptive, conceptual model in the absence of any widely accepted formal theory of that 
process, I have followed the model development process outlined by Havenga, Poggenpoel and 
Myburgh (p. 153). This process involves five aspects, namely,  
• defining the purpose of the model 
• identifying and describing the key concepts to be used 
• mapping the relationships between them 
• structuring the model 
• contextualizing the model.  
In the interests of clarity, a diagrammatic representation of the key conceptual elements to be 
discussed and how they relate to one another is presented after the section on the purpose of 
the model. 
Purpose of the Model 
The purpose of the proposed model is to reflect the artistic creative process as experienced by 
the artist as closely as possible (Nanay, 2014). Many models of the creative process have been 
proposed (for insightful overviews see Lubart, 2001; Mace and Ward, 2002), but the current 
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view is that these models are too rational, too computational and too rigid to encompass the 
richly textured, multi-layered, dimensions of the creative process – particularly regarding the 
role played by the imagination and affective factors in the process (Morag, 2016; Polvinen, 
2017). This model aims to address this gap by providing a more detailed, comprehensive 
representation of the dynamics of the creative process as suggested by the artists’ accounts 
examined in the previous chapter. These accounts call for a model that embraces key elements 
such as the unconscious becoming conscious in the generation of ideas, the expressing of those 
ideas in the physical form of an artefact, the active role played by the imagination, moments of 
insight, and the flow of interaction between emerging ideas and the developing artwork.  It also 
needs to encompass the additional elements identified in that chapter, such as attention, play, 
inner dialogue, incubation, reflection and evaluation.  
The proposed model aims to do just that, as demonstrated in the next section in which 
the model is presented and briefly described. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of 
each of the key elements which demonstrates how the model is grounded in relevant research 
findings in the field of neurobiology.  
Map of the Key Conceptual Elements 
A mapping of the key conceptual elements of the proposed model (see Fig. 1 overleaf) shows 
two triangles lying side by side, one upright and the other inverted to represent the two distinct 
activities that mark the creative process – the generation of ideas and the expression of those 
ideas in physical form. The first upright triangle represents the generation of ideas. It is open 
ended at its base to reflect the rich repository of material that is held in the unconscious. Its 
tapered point reflects the stage when the developing artwork requires no further creative input 
in the form of generated ideas.  
The second, inverted triangle represents the developing artwork, the physical artefact. 
Its tapered point, which represents the moment the artist begins working on the physical 
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artefact, is set a distance above the base of the first triangle. The space between this point and 
the base of the first triangle represents the time the artist spends playing with various ideas, an 
activity that may or may not involve physical activities such as note-making, sketching, 
movement, etc. The open-ended side of this inverted triangle represents the stage at which the 
artwork is becomes public in the form of an exhibition, a performance or publication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The space between the two triangles represents the imaginal space in which the artist actively 
engages with the emerging ideas and the developing artwork. It is here that the imagination 
plays its key role of generating and refining the ideas that are given expression in the final 
artwork. It does this through the kind of conceptual blending that gives rise to the novel ideas, 
unique perspectives and innovative approaches that render the artwork potentially creative.  
IDEA 
EXPRESSION 
[FORM] 
IDEA GENERATION 
[CONTENT] 
 
 
 
SUBJECTIVE / INTERNAL 
Emerging Ideas  
OBJECTIVE / EXTERNAL 
Developing Artwork 
Playing with Possibilities  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Figure 1: Map of the Key Conceptual Elements 
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The broken lines of each triangle represent the way the artist, while deeply focussed on 
the developing artwork, nevertheless, remains open to new, unexpected and surprising 
possibilities that may arise at any time during the entire creative process.  These possibilities can 
arise from within the artist, in the form of spontaneous moments of insight, as well as from 
without, in the form of ideas drawn from the artist’s external environment. The arrows placed 
throughout the model represent the constant flow of thought, art-making and reflection which 
is the dynamic interaction that lies at the heart of the creative process.  The arrows therefore 
represent the essential permeability of the creative process which allows all these elements to 
interact with each other in a fluid, dynamic way.  
Key Premise Underlying the Model 
The model is based on a key premise drawn from creativity research and supported by findings 
from neurobiological studies. The premise is that the creative process involves two distinct but 
closely interwoven processes, namely, the generating of ideas and the expressing of those ideas. 
Stated a little differently, the premise is that idea generation – the process that gives rise to the 
content of an artwork – is quite distinct from idea expression – the process that results in the 
physical form of the artwork. 
 The notion that the creative process involves two distinct thinking processes has drawn 
much research attention. This attention, however, has focussed mainly on the question of how 
unconscious thinking becomes conscious thought (Suler, 1980; Allen and Thomas, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011; Kosslyn and Miller, 2013).  The creative process, therefore, is viewed as a 
rather straightforward two-stage process comprising idea generation and idea evaluation / 
revision (Ritter, van Baaren, and Dijksterhuis, 2012; Lui et al., 2015) – an approach neatly 
captured in both the Geneplore model (Korba, 1993), and the Darwinian model proposed by 
Simonton (2015). Despite an inherent flaw in this view of the creative process – which is 
discussed later in the chapter – it has been widely embraced by creativity researchers. Its 
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popularity, however, has obscured an alternative, largely unexplored view that posits a very 
different conceptualisation of the creative process. 
 According to researchers such as Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1996), Robert and Michele 
Root-Bernstein (2004) and Kaoru Yamamoto (2010), the creative process has less to do with 
unconscious becoming conscious thought, and more to do with two different kinds of cognitive 
process altogether. While they agree with the broad consensus that the creative process involves 
two kinds of thinking, they argue that the demarcation should rather be along the lines of the 
lines of idea generation and idea expression. Their central contention, therefore, is that the 
creative process is better understood as a process primarily concerned with the generation of 
content and the development of form rather than unconscious thinking becoming conscious 
thought.  
Csikszentmihalyi, for example, describes the challenge of the creative process as 
‘keeping the mind focused on two contradictory goals – the whisper of the unconscious’, which 
gives rise to content, and ‘the rational seeking for the right form’.  He further distinguishes 
between the two by asserting that, while ‘the first requires openness’, the second requires ‘critical 
judgement’ (p. 263).  Robert and Michele Root-Bernstein frame the creative process as the 
transforming of ‘intuitive, imagistic and private’ ideas into ‘the public language of words, 
numbers, images, sounds, or movement’ (p. 141), and assert that much of the confusion in 
creativity research arises from a failure to differentiate between ‘the formal mode of 
communication chosen by individual creators with the mode in which they do their creative 
thinking’. Furthermore, they strongly object to the assumption that ‘people think in the same 
terms that they use to communicate’ because their research suggests that ‘thinking and 
communicating require very different skills’ (p. 144). 
In his view of creativity, Yamamoto makes a distinction between ‘the principle of 
origination and the principle of form’. These two principles, he asserts, are ‘in a dialectical 
relationship with each other’; a relationship that gives rise to ‘the paradoxical experience of the 
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oneness of duality’. He cites Mary Wigman (1966), an icon in the world of modern dance, who 
describes creativity as straddling two spheres: ‘there are always two currents, two circles of 
tension, which magically attract one another.... [and] penetrate one another’ – the evoking of 
the image and then the process of transforming its fleeting matter into its final form (p.345). 
This dance between idea and form, says Yamamoto, is ‘the sine qua non of creativity’ (p. 346, 
original italics).  
The dissertation accounts discussed in the previous chapter provide clear evidence that 
artists themselves describe their creative process as a dance between idea and form. They make 
a sharp distinction between the way in which unfolding ideas give rise to the content of the 
artwork and the way in which the developing form gives physical expression to those ideas in 
the final artefact. Newman (2008), for example, observes that he worked in two distinct stages 
– one in which he sat at the piano and generated musical material, sketching a draft in pencil, 
and the other as he sat at the computer, working on successive drafts until the piece was 
finished. From these two stages, he collected two sets of data – a p-data pool during the first 
stage and the f-data pool during the second. He notes that ‘each pool had different qualities and 
involved different collection methods’ and that, while the p-data is multi-part and multi-layered, 
representing an ‘open-ended system’ with ‘a vague and ill-defined goal’, the f-data represents ‘a 
goal-oriented additive process’ (p. 127). For him, the clear distinction between the two stages is 
that the p-data reflects the process of generating his material, whereas the f-data reflects the 
process of developing the form of the final piece.  
In her dissertation account, Maxwell makes a more insightful distinction, distinguishing 
between ‘subjective creativity’ and ‘objective knowledge’. She defines subjective creativity as the 
‘intuitive thought that stimulates the production of uncensored and spontaneous ideas’ and 
gives conceptual direction to the work. Objective knowledge, on the other hand refers to the 
‘practical skills [that] pertain to explicit knowledge’, i.e., the choreographic skills, techniques and 
devices that are based on ‘the knowledge of space, time, and shape’ and are used ‘to generate, 
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develop, and structure movement’ (p. 6). Fogelberg describes her process as an embodiment of 
both ‘internal and external elements’ (p. 1). While not as explicit on this distinction, Bye 
nevertheless describes a very different process when she is developing her artwork to the 
meditative process she uses to generate her ideas. This is particularly well illustrated in her 
account of the sculpture entitled “Slippery Mountain”. Her reflection on her process shows that 
while the conceptualisation of the piece was marked by a gradual unfolding of ideas, the 
sculpting of the physical artwork required a different process. She found it technically 
challenging and was only able to arrive at solutions through a very mechanical trial-and-error 
process.  
The significance of these dissertation accounts within the context of this discussion is 
that they provide much-needed substance to the alternative view that the creative process is 
better understood as a process of first generating content and then expressing that content in 
an appropriate form. The proposed model is based on these accounts and as such serves to 
extend the emerging discourse on this alternative view of the artistic creative process.  What 
rescues it from being just another speculative attempt to describe the artistic creative process, 
however, is the compelling evidence provided by key findings in contemporary neurobiology. 
As will now be demonstrated, these findings provide a sound, empirical foundation for the 
proposed mode. More importantly, they offer solid, evidence-based accounts for aspects of the 
creative process that run counter to prevailing theories. 
KEY NEUROBIOLOGICAL FINDINGS  
The past decade has seen a surge of research into brain activity; research that has yielded some 
surprising discoveries, owing to the development of modern brain imaging (fMRI) (Andreasan, 
2011). The increasingly sophisticated use of this technology has enabled neuroscientists to 
identify two key neural networks, namely, the default mode network and the dorsal attention 
network (Kaufmann and Gregoire, 2015; Lui et al., 2015; Beaty et al., 2016; Christoff et al., 
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2016). Moreover, they have found that these two networks account for two different thinking 
processes (Beaty, Benedek, and Schacter, 2016), a finding that not only brings greater clarity to 
our understanding of the creative process, but also extends it in unexpected ways (Lui et al., 
2015).  
The discovery of the default mode network ‘marked a paradigm shift in cognitive 
science’, moving research attention from investigations into ‘external, goal-directed, task 
performance’ to examinations of the ‘phenomenon of inner experience’ (Kaufman and 
Gregoire, 2015, p. xxvii). The roots of this shift lie in an early study of the brain-at-rest which 
found that, contrary to prevailing views, the brain was not merely idling away in neutral gear or 
amusing itself in gentle mind-wandering when not engaged in a specific task. Instead, it found 
clear evidence of significant levels of activity in multiple brain regions known as the association 
cortices. This activity indicated that, rather than being at rest, the brain was, in fact, actively 
connecting thoughts and experiences in a random free-floating manner (Andreasen, 2011). 
Other studies provided clear evidence of increased metabolic activity in these associative 
cortices whenever the brain is not engaged in externally presented cognitive tasks (Andrews-
Hanna, et. al., 2010; Esterman et al., 2013; Beaty et al., 2016;  Christoff et al., 2016). Their 
findings strongly suggest that the brain is habitually engaged in randomly connecting thoughts 
in this free-floating manner unless it is required to focus on a specific task, and, even then, it 
will intersperse this focussed thinking with instances of mind-wandering. In other words, this 
random, free-floating thinking is the brain’s default tendency – hence the term Default Mode 
Network (DMN) (Andreasen, 2011). This has led to a dramatic shift in thinking in which the 
brain-at-rest is now understood to be a very restless brain indeed (Richardson, 2012). 
In addition to the discovery of this restless activity in the brain, researchers have also 
found that the DMN is primarily inward-focussed, in that its main activity is reflected in 
‘spontaneously occurring, internally oriented mental processes’ (Christoff et al., 2016, p. 719). 
These internally oriented processes include all forms of spontaneous and self-generated 
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thought, such as mind wandering, mental simulation (day-dreaming), autobiographical retrieval, 
and episodic future thinking (Beaty et al., 2016). The DMN is thus deemed to be the process 
by which we turn our attention away from the external world and tune into the world within 
(Kaufman and Gregoire, 2015) and as such, is now regarded as a key role player in creative 
cognition, specifically when it comes to the ‘generation of candidate ideas’ (Beaty et al., p. 92).  
The Dorsal Attention Network (DAN), on the other hand, is outward-looking and its 
processes are deliberate rather than diffused (Chun, Golomb and Turk-Browne, 2011; Lui et 
al., 2015). It is, therefore, the network that is ‘preferentially recruited when we turn our attention 
towards the external world’ (Christoff et al., 2015, p. 720), especially when we are engaged in 
deliberate, goal-directed tasks. Because its focus is the external environment, the DAN is more 
constrained in its processes than the DMN (Christoff et al., 2015). Furthermore, its recruitment 
during goal-directed tasks that require planning, step-by-step execution, ongoing evaluation and 
critical monitoring of progress (Lui et al., 2015), suggest that its processes are essentially rational, 
logical, and sequential (Lui et al., 2015; Beaty et al., 2016; Ptak, Schnider and Fellrath, 2017). 
Additional investigations have shown that the brain constantly shifts between these two 
networks depending on whether it needs to focus on an externally oriented task or not 
(Kaufman and Gregoire, 2015).  Studies, for example, show that as attention shifts between the 
internal and external environments, there are ‘corresponding reciprocal shifts between DN 
[DMN] and DAN recruitment: when regions of the DAN are active, there is often a 
simultaneous deactivation of the DN [DMN] in many different task paradigms’ (Christoff et 
al., 2016, p. 720). In other words, only one kind of thinking is possible in any one given moment 
(Beaty et al., 2016). The shifts between DMN and DAN processing are controlled by the 
executive attention or control network – the neural network that monitors which of the two is 
activated at any one time (Kaufman and Gregoire, 2015). This neural network, therefore, is 
responsible for actively monitoring mental processes, maintaining the focus of attention and 
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enabling mode switching between the two key neural networks of the DMN and the DAN 
(Rothbart and Posner, 2015).  
These key neurobiological findings enable an extended version of the model’s 
underlying premise, namely that the DMN, with its inwardly focussed, free-floating random 
process in preferentially recruited during idea generation when the content of the artwork is 
being conceived, while the DAN with its outward focus, and more constrained goal-directed 
process, is preferentially recruited during idea expression when the physical form of the artwork 
is being developed. This is the essence of the discussion that follows below as the model’s key 
conceptual elements are identified and described.  
However, before embarking on this discussion, it is important to note that even this 
brief outline of the findings emerging from contemporary research indicates the first significant 
departure from current thinking on the creative process. They challenge the discourse on 
unconscious and conscious thinking in an unexpected way; contrary to the supposition of a neat 
correlation between the DMN/DAN and unconscious/conscious thinking, neurobiological 
research finds that both kinds of thinking are found in each of these networks (Ozaki, 2010; 
Christoff et al., 2016). In other words, one can be conscious of the random, free-floating process 
of the DMN, and the DMN can also, unconsciously, process in a goal-directed, task-focussed 
way. How then to distinguish between the two networks if both use conscious and unconscious 
processing?  
Neurobiologists make this distinction according to three criteria – focus, content and 
process. The recruitment of a particular network thus firstly depends on whether attentional 
focus is directed inwardly or outwardly. Inward attentional focus engages the DMN, while 
outward attentional focus recruits the DAN (Chun, Golomb and Turk-Browne, 2011; Christoff 
et al., 2016; Lui et al., 2015).  Secondly, the networks are distinguished by the source from which 
each draws its content (Christoff et al., 2016).  The DMN draws its material primarily from 
unconscious content while the DAN relies more on material that is easily, and more consciously, 
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accessed (Lui et al., 2015). Lastly, the networks are distinguished by their differing processes, 
with the DMN being associated with a spontaneous, diffused process and the DAN with more 
deliberate, constrained and sequential thinking processes. These differences will be clearly 
demonstrated in the ensuing discussion of the model’s key conceptual elements. This discussion 
will also highlight the close correlations between the artists’ accounts of their creative process 
and the findings of neurobiological research regarding these two neural networks.   
KEY CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS 
Idea Generation  
The artists’ experience of how ideas are generated was extensively explored in the previous 
chapter so will not be repeated here in detail. Broadly speaking, their accounts all reflect a 
process that begins with the seed of an idea which invites further exploration and engagement. 
As the artist begins to play with these threads of thought, images fragments, and suggestions of 
something sensed, ideas begin to unfold, sometimes in unexpected ways. They describe this 
process as being very fluid, dynamic and uncertain, and being guided throughout by an intuited 
sense of whether ideas ‘feel right’. Their descriptions include references to inspiration, 
incubation and intuition – the very concepts Guilford dismissed as being too vague and fanciful 
for serious consideration. However, as indicated above, neurobiological research is providing 
strong scientific evidence to validate these personal accounts. Pertinent findings from this 
research are discussed below, with particular reference to the unconscious, inspiration, 
incubation and intuition.  
The unconscious 
There is a widespread consensus that ideas originate in the unconscious (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; 
Bindeman, 1998; Aldous, 2005; Claxton, 2005; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; Thrash et al., 
2010; Baumeister, Schmeichel, and DeWall, 2014). Yet defining the unconscious has proved 
problematic for it has neither substance, nor its ‘own separate ontology with its own location 
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in the psyche’ (Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 32). This has led some to question whether it even exists 
(Macann, 2015). Neurobiological research, however, is finding clear evidence that brain activity 
involves not just processes of which we are unaware, but also content that lies below our level of 
awareness (Berlin, 2011). This research not only differentiates between content and process but 
also brings clarity to what is meant by the terms conscious and unconscious. 
The current view is that conscious content refers to material that is accessible and 
describable while unconscious content comprises material that is inaccessible and beyond 
description (Morag, 2016; Paulson, Hustvedt, Solms, and Shamdasani, 2017). This unconscious 
content is described by Carl Jung as consisting of 
Everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment 
thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now 
forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my 
conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying 
attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future 
things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to 
consciousness: all this is the content of the unconscious (from C. Jung, 
1960, The structure and dynamics of the psyche, quoted in Moore and Cross, 
2014, p. 309). 
While neurobiological research into how all this takes place in our brains is still in its infancy, it 
is being significantly informed by memory research which is investigating how memory is 
constructed (Moscovitch et al., 2016; Beaty et al., 2017; Devitt, Addis, and Schacter, 2017), 
encoded (Morag, 2016) and then remembered, or rather, reconstructed (Benedek et al., 2014). 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to embark upon a detailed or meaningful summary 
of these findings as this is a vast and complex field of research. It is possible, however, to give 
some indication of what these findings are suggesting.   
 According to this research, our brains store everything we have ever experienced 
through our senses – what we see, smell, taste, touch, hear. This includes sensory information 
that we are aware of, but also much that we absorb subliminally or unconsciously (Berlin, 2011; 
Albanese, 2015). Much of this information is stored in our episodic memory but it is stored in 
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the form of fragments rather than whole experiences – which is why the act of remembering is 
more an act of reconstructing than simply recalling (Benedek et al., 2014). Over time the 
fragments become so further fragmented, distorted or corrupted, that they no longer resemble 
anything we would recognise as belonging to the originating experience (Paulson, et al., 2017).  
It therefore becomes difficult, or impossible, to retrieve them deliberately and consciously, in 
other words, they become inaccessible and indescribable.  However, when these fragments are 
encoded, they are emotionally tagged (Dietrich, 2004; Morag, 2016), so that even when the 
fragment itself has changed form, it leaves an emotional or affective trace.  
These memory fragments, wordless sensation and traces of emotional encoding 
constitute the rich murky sea of the unconscious that is the playground of the DMN (Roberts, 
et al., 2017), with some research suggesting that the DMN is constantly toying with this 
immense wealth of material (Zhong et al., 2008), endlessly combining, recombining and re-
recombining its constituent elements in a playful, random, free-floating way (Stevens, 2014). 
Occasionally some of these combinations surface in our consciousness as partial images, threads 
of sound, sensations of movement. They all come, however, loaded with the emotional charge 
carried by the fragments used in their creation (Berlin, 2011; Chun, Golomb and Turk-Browne, 
2011; Morag, 2016).  
It is this emotional charge that explains why artists describe their experience of new 
ideas coming to the surface as “felt sense”. Emerging ideas either felt right and were retained, 
or didn’t and so were shelved or discarded (Mace and Ward, 2002; Treadaway, 2009). Felt sense 
can thus no longer be regarded as a fanciful notion in the light of this neurobiological research 
which explores emotional tagging and the way the DMN uses these tagged memory fragments 
to produce emotionally laden combinations. This same research into the emotional charge of 
these DMN generated combinations also provides a possible explanation for the creative 
phenomenon of inspiration.  
  
145 
 
Inspiration  
Inspiration is defined as ‘a motivational state that is evoked in response to getting a creative 
idea and that compels the individual to transform the creative idea into a creative product’ 
(Thrash et al., 2010, p. 470).  In other words, inspiration occurs when the creative idea that 
originated in the unconscious is so intensely charged when it reaches the conscious that is exerts 
‘a compelling, evocative press on the individual’ (p. 485).   
This possibility overturns the conventional idea that inspiration comes first, and the 
creative ideas follow. Instead, it is the emotionally charged idea that comes first and is so 
compelling in its intensity that the artist feels impelled to give it physical expression. All the 
dissertation accounts discussed in the previous chapter reflect this. While Fogelberg begins with 
a simple drawing, she soon finds herself being drawn into a more complex artwork as new ideas 
emerge; Newman notes how his composition only begins to flow when he finds a compelling 
chord, Maxwell traces her impulse to create to the spontaneously generated image of a woman 
looking out over the water that so captures her attention, and Bye observes she can only begin 
creating an artwork once she has found an image that intrigues her.  
Support for this view of inspiration is suggested by neurobiological studies that consistently 
find that ‘unconscious processes take place milliseconds before conscious awareness’ and that 
‘unconscious brain activity predicts decisions seven seconds before conscious awareness of 
decision made’ (Berlin, 2011, pp. 5, 12). Given the millisecond gap between unconscious idea 
and conscious awareness of it, it is easy to see how inspiration has assumed to be the starting 
point of art-making when, in fact, it is preceded by the emergence into awareness of emotionally 
charged material originating from the unconscious. The artist then finds this material so 
intriguing that they feel compelled to give it some form of expression (Fontana, 2016). 
However, the corollary is that if the unconscious material does not carry a high enough 
emotional charge to break through into consciousness or invite the artist’s engagement, this 
content subsides back into the unconscious. This is one of the conclusions drawn by Heather 
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Berlin (2011) in her extensive and insightful review of recent neuroscientific research into the 
unconscious, entitled The Neural Basis of the Dynamic Unconscious. She posits that the threshold for 
unconscious material to enter consciousness is determined by the quantity and quality of neural 
firing in the brain. In her discussion of this ‘threshold of conscious awareness’ (p.6), she cites a 
substantial body of research in support of the view that ‘subliminal priming evokes activation 
in several cortical areas’; that this neural activity includes ‘emotional processing’ below the level 
of awareness’, and that unconscious processing occurs in ‘relatively isolated loops’  with neurons 
not firing strongly enough for conscious awareness. However, in a fraction of a second,  a 
‘collection of mono- or polysynaptically coupled neurons’ can form a ‘coherent assembly’  by 
virtue of synchronised activity ‘between widely separated brain regions’. These ‘co-ordinated 
dynamic states of the cortical network and the transient synchronization of widely distributed 
neural assemblies’, if stronger than other coalitions formed in the same way, then spill over into 
consciousness (p.20). Exactly what the tipping point might be for this spilling to occur, to what 
extent the threshold is fixed, what its defining parameters might be and if it varies across 
individuals, are all questions that await further research.   
There is, however, another aspect of inspiration that is currently being validated by 
neurobiological research, namely, that inspiration is not solely confined to ideas that arise 
spontaneously from within – it also occurs when the artist’s attention is captivated by an external 
stimulus (Thrash et al., 2010; Chun, Golomb, and Turk-Browne, 2011). Both Fogelberg and 
Bye begin their art-making in response to a prompt drawn from their external environment – 
Fogelberg’s drawing is stimulated by the wild ginseng flower while Bye’s ideas for her sculptures 
arise from the random shape she paints beforehand.  
The research that supports this aspect of inspiration did not result from investigations 
into inspiration. Instead, the focus of this enquiry was whether the processes of the DMN are 
in any way task-related or goal-directed. Initial thinking was that, because these were 
unconscious processes, the DMN would not respond to task-relatedness in the same way, and 
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to the same extent, as the more goal-directed DAN (Shen et al., 2016). Findings, however, show 
that, while the DMN processes cannot be managed or controlled, they can be deliberately 
recruited to accomplish tasks and achieve goals (Norman, 2010; Dijksterhuis, 2013; Pinho et 
al., 2016; Zich, 2008). There is clear evidence that the DMN does engage its processes to 
facilitate the completion of a task or the achievement of a goal – it just does so in a different 
way to that of the DAN. 
Whereas the DAN can be controlled and managed to produce logical, rational strategies 
and outcomes, the DMN is best left to its own devices after being presented with the stimulus 
of a question, a problem or just an intriguing idea in a deliberate strategy termed ‘priming’ 
(Kihlstrom, 1987; Dijksterhuis and Meurs, 2006; Berlin, 2011; Martens, Ansorge, and Kiefer, 
2011; Smallwood, 2013). It will immediately begin its automatic work of randomly linking the 
memory fragments contained in the murky sea of the unconscious in response to the stimulus, 
thereby generating the unexpected and novel possibilities that mark creative thought (Berlin, 
2011; Beaty et al., 2016).  
However, whether the ideas generated by the DMN are internally or externally 
prompted, they cannot be generated on demand. The DMN, it seems, works to its own 
schedule, and there is no way of telling how long the gap will be between prompt and the 
generation of a possible idea and the subsequent unfolding of that idea. This gap is what is 
termed the period of incubation.   
Incubation 
Many studies have substantiated the crucial role incubation plays in the creative process. They 
have found that ‘productivity is significantly increased when creative people activate 
nonconscious processes in off-task or incubation periods’ (Gallate et al., 2012); that incubation 
periods show clear evidence of active unconscious processing (Gilhooly, Georgiou and Devery, 
2013) and that interpolated tasks that have a low level of cognitive demand not only stimulate 
remote associative processes but also increase verbal fluency (Hao et al., 2014). More recent 
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studies have not only demonstrated a direct link between the “offline” memory processing that 
occurs during incubation and the DMN process (Tan et al., 2015), but have also shown that 
creative ideas are more likely to arise from the ‘diffuse, relaxed, and loose attentional state’ 
associated with DMN processing. In fact, studies show that the ‘common practices of focusing 
attention sharply and shutting down seemingly irrelevant thoughts might become barriers to 
discovering the embryo of a creative idea’ (Lui, 2016, p. 198) because the sharply focussed 
processes of the DAN actively inhibit the recruitment of the DMN and thus makes its random 
free-floating process impossible. All this evidence strongly suggests that what we understand as 
incubation is the time period taken by the DMN to generate the ideas we need for problem-
solving or art-making. 
While we cannot manage the DMN process, studies show that we can enhance the 
conditions conducive to its optimal functioning. The diffuse, relaxed, loose attentional state that 
encourages DMN processing can be induced by low level cognitive activities such as routine 
tasks, driving, showering and walking (Chun, Golomb, and Turk-Browne, 2011; Kaufman and 
Gregoire, 2015). Activities such as these do not require the outwardly focussed attention of the 
DAN, so leave the DMN free to engage in its free-floating processing.  
Instances of incubation, either deliberately induced or inadvertently encountered, are 
found in all the dissertation accounts.  For example, Fogelberg, unsure of how to pursue her 
drawing, makes the following note in her journal:  
I’ll crochet and maybe the answer will come. The rhythm of crochet 
feels like meditation. My hands are busy; my mind is focused on the 
regularity, like in the rhythm of shading in the drawing. My best 
decisions come from this place of stillness (p.19). 
 
In another entry she records leaving her unfinished drawing on the board and turning to ‘other 
things’ as she ponders what to do next (pp. 32-33). Even later in the process, she writes: ‘At 
dusk, I took my usual walk through the labyrinth and an answer came to the question that had 
plagued me for so long’ (p. 84).  
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 This pattern of rise and fall in idea generation is also evident in observations made by 
Maxwell and Newman. Their accounts clearly show idea generation occurring in cycles, or in a 
succession of moments of insight, suggesting that the creative process is marked by many spirals 
of creativity. It is as though once the artist begins working with the initial idea the stage is set 
for supporting ideas to surface, and these supporting ideas continue to surface, intermittently, 
throughout the process, right up to the final stages. Attention thus ‘coils and uncoils, its focus 
sharpens and softens, like the systolic and diastolic beat of the heart’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, 
p. 242). The artist experiences this ebb and flow in the form of the rise and fall of the intuitive 
awareness that goes hand in hand with incubation.  
Intuition 
The previous chapter referenced the work of Barnaby Nelson and David Rawlings (2007) who 
conducted a phenomenological study of artistic creativity. In their findings they note that ‘the 
artist experiences the creative process as being dominated by intuitive mental processes’ (p. 231) 
in which the artist is guided purely by a vague intuitive sense of what feels right.  
This intuitive sense has been described as a knowing that ‘seeps into conscious 
awareness without the conscious mediation of logic and the rational process’ (Boucouvalas 
1997, p. 7). This knowing commonly makes itself felt holistically, as a vaguely sensed gestalt, 
(Dietrich, 2004; Richards 2010; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012), as though the intuited ideas had 
been processed ‘at the bottom of a murky river, and the results written on a blackboard that is 
then released to float upward to the surface’ (Laughlin, 1997, p. 25). That these attempts to 
describe the intuitive nature of idea generation are unsatisfyingly vague and speculative is simply 
because, at that time it was ‘extremely difficult to attempt to operationalize and quantify these 
processes’ (Korba, 1993, p. 6). Neurobiology, however, is now providing possible explanations 
for this intuitive unfolding of ideas as experienced by the artist.  
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 This research defines intuitive intimations as ‘conscious realisations that result from 
unconscious processes’ (Thagard, 2014, p. 2), i.e. ideas that originate in the DMN becoming 
conscious thought. As mentioned above, the DMN is constantly connecting fragments in the 
unconscious in random, free-floating ways. It accesses these fragments from multiple brain 
regions in a process termed spreading activation (Dietrich 2004; Berlin 2011; Gilhooly, 
Georgiou, and Devery, 2013; Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek et al., 2014), an activity marked by the 
increased alpha-band activity in the DMN (Kounios and Beeman, 2009). This increase in alpha-
band activity is reflected in neuron spiking – a term that refers to the way neurons fire in a 
variety of patterns across the millions of neurons in the brain (Tsuda, 2001; Thagard, 2014), 
thereby generating a myriad of unexpected, illogical combinations (Raby, 2014). These 
combinations in turn produce ‘large and weak semantic ﬁelds’ composed of a wide variety of 
concepts, including those ‘that are only distantly related’ (Kounios and Beeman, 2009, p. 206).  
However, no matter how weak these semantic fields might be, their formation is readily detected 
by the executive attention network which then triggers an attentional shift to the DMN 
(Kounios and Beeman, 2009). This attentional shift increases internal focus on the generated 
combinations, thereby strengthening them so that they acquire the necessary intensity to enter 
consciousness (Berlin, 2011; Franklin et al., 2013; Rothmaler, Nigbur, and Ivanova, 2017). 
 Within the framework of the artistic creative process discussed in the previous chapter, 
this part of the process is experienced by the artist as an invitation to engage with the emerging 
idea, and then begin playing with the possibilities it suggests. This playful attitude encourages 
even more intuitive ideas to arise (Laughlin, 1997) as it helps to maintain the internal attentional 
focus, thereby encouraging this spontaneous processing that is ‘the underlying mechanism for 
intuition’ (Dietrich, 2004, p. 1018). As noted in the previous chapter this cycle of becoming 
aware of an emerging idea, accepting its invitation to engage and then toying with the 
possibilities it opens up, recurs throughout the artistic process.   
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 The simple lines of the first triangle in the model represent this dynamic and complex 
process of idea generation, that embraces inspiration, incubation and intuition. As already 
stated, the artist at this stage is only concerned with felt sense – if the idea feels right, if it reflects 
what has merely been sensed as it surfaced from the unconscious. It is only when the artist feels 
that there is a potential fit, does the art-making process begin. This is represented by the second 
triangle which depicts the process of externalising the internally generated content, or, more 
simply stated, the process of expressing the emerging ideas in an appropriate physical form.  
Idea Expression 
There is a broad consensus in the wider discourse on the creative process that the process is 
incomplete unless the generated ideas are given physical expression (Yamamoto, 2010; 
Glaveanu et al., 2013; Freiman, 2015a). In other words, ‘first, there must be the basic idea or 
conception; secondly the idea must be embodied in concrete and articulate form … a material 
product’ (Maxwell, 2007, p. 5) for, unless the artist engages with ‘the complementary discipline 
of formulation and integration’ the generated ideas will remain just that – merely ideas; their full 
potential ‘a mere promise’ rather than a realised ‘culminating creation’ (Yamamoto, 2010, p. 
345).  
Despite this broad consensus that ideas must be given physical expression for the 
creative act to be considered complete, the discourse on this topic is muddied by the many 
different terms used to discuss this distinction. For example, Root-Bernstein and Root-
Bernstein (2004) speak of the difference between thinking and communicating; Glaveanu et al. 
(2013) distinguish between what they call undergoing and doing to describe the way creative 
ideas are generated (undergoing), and the expression of those ideas (doing), and Jeb Puryear 
(2015) distinguishes between creative ideation and creative production.  
These diverse notions are all embraced in the model’s second key conceptual element, 
namely, idea expression.  This concept encompasses the kinds of thinking, the specific forms 
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of doing and the technical expertise that are involved in giving form to the generated ideas with 
the intention of communicating them to an audience through a physical artefact. As 
demonstrated below, all the dissertation accounts provide insightful observations on this 
process of giving form to the ideas.  
The Art-Making Process 
In each case, the artist clearly sets out to develop an artwork, or creative product, which will 
give concrete expression to the generated ideas. This is their creative task, and, as will be 
demonstrated, it is a task that requires cognitive skills such as planning, sequencing of 
activities and an ongoing evaluation of what is taking shape.  
Fogelberg, for example, notes that ‘a different kind of reflection occurred while I was 
drawing …  I engaged in mental discussions of modulating light and dark, moving the eye, 
weighing design choices, and including or excluding compositional material’; issues, she says, 
that are related to ‘technical practice’ (p. 60). Her account is peppered with examples of this 
kind of reflection. Early on in her art-making process she asks ‘How is the light bringing out 
the form? What’s the dark doing?’ (p. 13). Her concern about shading is only addressed months 
later when she writes: 
Holy Cow! Taking the photography classes really helped this drawing 
… Now, I understand how I use the white of the paper better. Because 
I use black blacks rather than dark grey as black, I have a broader range 
of value to use in drawing. Instead of using the middle area on a value 
spectrum, I also use both ends of the spectrum. That range adds depth. 
Now, I can be thinking about the depth of my darks and the ways they 
work with the lights as I proceed into the final steps of this drawing (p. 
37). 
Maxwell similarly gains clarity on her developing artwork through the use of technology. She 
writes that as she worked on realising form:  
I would frequently examine the video footage of the developing 
material, seeking connections between movement ideas, and dominant 
characteristics and qualities … the knowledge I gained of editing and 
change of perspective began to influence how I perceived my 
choreographic process. Editing techniques, such as speed 
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manipulation, alternate viewpoints, and various filters, including 
blurring effects and colour distortion, were devices that offered 
innovative ways of looking at how movement can be expressed, and 
how different angles of the body suggest various sensibilities and 
moods (p. 39). 
Her observation that the process of developing an appropriate form for the generated ideas 
impacts and shapes those ideas is echoed in Newman’s account. Like Fogelberg, he observes 
that concerns about form are present early on in his creative process. His ensuing notes 
reflect how this awareness of form begins to shape his material. While still in the stage of 
generating potential material, he writes:  
Form is emerging. I'm following my composition teacher Ludmila 
Ulehla's directive to let the form come out of the material … The new 
fledgling composite form causes an awareness of the lack of a larger 
form: Shape...I have to now think of some shape of this thing. 'Cause 
now I have a few colours and some ideas...I gotta put it into a 
framework here. Where is all this material gonna be? (p. 187) 
A later journal entry notes that ‘as I start to notate the music, I begin to refine and define the 
rhythm and the voicing of the chords’ (p. 200). This is very similar to Maxwell’s account of how 
the video footage refined her notions of dance movements. Both accounts therefore suggest 
that it is only when the artist begins giving expression to their initial ideas that a further defining 
and refining of the content is possible.  In other words, idea expression facilitates further idea 
generation – an aspect of the creative process that is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter.  
Bye’s concerns, on the other hand, have more to do with the materials of her medium. 
She gives a detailed account of the problems she faced in sculpting the Slippery Mountain and 
her many attempts to construct something that would reflect ‘the complexity of a mountain 
which has depths with many … precarious, labyrinthal, impassable paths to the summit’ (p. 
116). She tells how she tested a range of possible materials and construction methods until she 
was happy with the result. Her engagement with form is expressed as an engagement with the 
materiality of her medium.  
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It is clear from the above that all the dissertation accounts contain a narrative which 
is specifically concerned with the physical making of the artwork – the skills, materials, 
techniques, and devices that will give it form and structure. It is also clear that this narrative 
only begins when the artists commence their art-making.  This phenomenon is consistent 
with the finding of Glaveanu et al. (2013) who observe the significant impact external 
constraints have on the creative process, particularly those constraints relating to the materiality 
of the developing artwork. All the participants in their study reported ‘facing difﬁculties related 
to materials and tools’ (p. 12). Irrespective of discipline, they found it challenging to deal with 
the constraints of their chosen medium and a substantial part of the early stages of developing 
the artwork was spent exploring material properties to determine their ‘solidity, rigidity, 
ﬂexibility, or fragility, and to know exactly what needs to be used and when’ (p. 7). The 
dissertation accounts provide clear evidence of this but also support the specific finding of this 
study that the expression of ideas is constrained by external factors in a way that is absent from 
the generation of those ideas. This finding is corroborated by neurobiological research – 
research that clearly reflects a positive correlation between these artists’ accounts of their art-
making process and the processes of the Dorsal Attention Network (DAN). 
Art-making and the DAN 
As stated earlier, the two neural networks are distinguishable in accordance with three criteria, 
namely, focus, process and content. Where the DMN is associated with an internal focus, a 
spontaneous free-floating process and the contents of the unconscious, the DAN is associated 
with an external focus, a deliberate and conscious cognitive process and the contents of the 
working memory. This section explores the link between the DAN and the art-making process 
when generated idea are given physical expression. 
 While neurobiologists agree that the DAN is externally focussed (Chun, Golomb and 
Turke-Browne, 2011; Esterman et al., 2013; Smallwood, 2013; Pinho et al., 2016; Beaty et al., 
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2016; Christoff et al., 2016; Lui, 2016; Rothmaler, Nigbur, and Ivanova, 2017), their discourse 
tends to define ‘external’ as that which pertains pre-eminently to the physical environment 
(Christoff et al., 2016). But there are those who prefer a more extended definition and thus 
assert that the DAN is recruited for any externally oriented mental activity (Kim, 2015). In 
similar vein, Marvin Chun, Julie Golomb and Nicholas Turk-Browne (2011) include physical 
objects in their conceptualisation of external, and therefore argue that the DAN is also recruited 
when physical objects are the ‘targets of external attention’ (p. 73). These wider perspectives of 
the DAN being recruited for any externally oriented activity and any time physical objects 
become the targets of external attention, provide the first clear link between the DAN and idea 
expression.  
The relationship between subject and object, or mind and matter, has been the focus of 
much speculation; its discourse captured in the enactive theory which recognises ‘the deeply 
embodied nature of human cognition’ (Robertson, 2013, p. 15).  This theory informs the finding 
by Glaveanu, et al. (2013) that as artefact takes on form and shape, the creative process is 
marked by a ‘physical, sensorial, sensible presence of the work’ that invites the engagement and 
encourages further development (p. 5). The dissertation accounts all provide strong evidence in 
support of this view. Neurobiological research, however, is shifting this discourse from mere 
speculation and anecdotal reporting to scientific explanation. 
A consistent finding in the neurobiological studies on the artistic creative process to 
date is that the DAN is preferentially recruited when the artist becomes focussed on the form 
of the artwork (Fink, Graif, and Neubauer, 2009; Lui, et al., 2012; Lui et al., 2015). This, 
neurobiological findings say, is because the ‘tangible and material existence’  of the developing 
artwork, renders it a ‘target of external attention’ and thus evokes the ‘externally oriented 
activity’ which is the focus of the DAN process (Schaverien, 2005, p. 144).  
It is important to note, however, that in their attempt to show how neurobiology can 
lead to a model for the creative process, the neurobiologists use the very limited, and limiting, 
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conceptualisation of the creative process as consisting of just idea generation and idea revision 
or idea evaluation. As mentioned earlier, this conceptualisation of the creative process contains 
an inherent flaw. In arguing that the creative process only comprises these two stages, it omits 
an entire stage that must necessarily precede the evaluation of the generated ideas, namely, the 
stage of giving expression and form to the ideas. Before the ideas can be evaluated and revised, 
they first need to be formed and expressed.   
This overlooking of such a critical stage in the creative process has given rise to the 
reductionist, and somewhat misleading, view of creativity as involving no more than idea 
generation and idea evaluation. It has also meant that creativity researchers had no reason to 
explore the possibility that the process may be more complex than that, despite evidence to the 
contrary as is so vividly illustrated by the dissertation accounts. For this reason, the contention 
of the proposed model that the creative process rather comprises the two distinct, complex but 
closely interwoven processes of idea generation and idea expression presents a significant 
challenge to the prevailing theories.  As will be demonstrated later, the proposed model argues 
that, rather than being a distinctively separate stage, evaluation recurs throughout the creative 
process. That it is the process of giving form to the generated ideas that is the critical second 
stage – not the evaluation of those ideas.  
These studies, however, do provide strong evidence to support the second link between 
the art-making process and the DAN, namely, the cognitive process underlying both.  As 
illustrated above the dissertation accounts describe the process of giving expression to the 
generated ideas in a way that suggests a mode of thinking that is conscious, deliberate, and 
sequential. It is also clearly task-focussed and goal-oriented. However, it is also constrained in 
a way that idea generation process is not; a constraint imposed by the materiality of the medium. 
These aspects are all closely associated with the DAN. A number of studies find a positive 
correlation between the conscious intention, deliberate process and task-focussed nature of 
giving form to ideas and the DAN (Fink et al., 2009; Esterman et al., 2013; Stevens, 2014; Lui 
157 
 
et al., 2015; Christoff et al., 2016; Bashwiner et al., 2016; Beaty et al., 2016; Rothmaler, Nigbur, 
and Ivanova, 2017). 
Studies such as these find that the DAN tends ‘to be implicated in active tasks, 
particularly tasks related to motor performance and event sequencing’ (Bashwiner et al. 2016, 
p. 3); supports ‘externally focused visuospatial planning’ (Christoff et al., 2016, p. 721); assists 
in maintaining attentional control (Esterman et al., 2013), and plays a key role in the evaluation 
of creative output (Lui, 2016) – processes that Beaty et al. term ‘strategic functions’ (p. 88). 
Furthermore, researchers find that it uses ‘deliberately constrained thought’ (Christoff et al., 
2016, p. 728) – a distinctive mode of thought characterised by the conscious, top-down 
attentional processes synonymous with rule-based behaviours (Christoff et al., 2016; Lui et 
al., 2012) and the ‘consciously monitored step-by-step execution of [such] behaviour’ (Lui et 
al., 2015, p.  3364). These processes require ‘concentration on task-relevant thoughts (Lui, 2016, 
p. 198). This need to be task-focussed and goal-directed is closely associated with the 
preferential recruitment of the DAN (Esterman et al., 2013; Beaty et al., 2016; Lui, 2016, 
Bashwiner et al., 2016; Christoff et al. 2016; Majerus, et al., 2018). Its recruitment serves to 
‘modify [the candidate ideas] to meet the constraints of task-specific goals’ (Beaty et al., 2016, 
p.  88), and to keep attention sharply and narrowly focussed on the task at hand until it is 
complete (Christoff et al., 2016; Lui, 2016; Rothmaler, Nigbur, and Ivanova, 2017) 
The words used to describe the DAN – conscious, deliberate, task-focussed, 
constrained, sequential – could just as easily be used to describe the process of idea expression 
given in the dissertation accounts. The illustrative examples discussed above reflect a close 
correlation with this part of the creative process and the kind of thinking associated with the 
DAN. Further evidence that supports this correlation is found in the studies that compare the 
creative process of experienced or expert practitioners with that of novice practitioners (Fink, 
Graif, and Neubauer, 2009; Kowatari et al., 2009; Lui et al., 2015). These studies consistently 
find that novices are overly concerned with form, as evidenced in the frequency with which 
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they recruit the DAN. These studies also find that the final artwork produced by the novices 
is judged as having less creative content than that of the experienced practitioners, suggesting 
that ‘experts may be able to more readily suspend cognitive control and enter into a state of 
defocused attention that may enable the production of more innovative and original work’ (Lui 
et al., 2015, p.  3367). 
Idea expression and the DAN are also positively correlated with regard to the third 
distinguishing criteria, namely, content. Maxwell defines this as ‘objective knowledge’ which 
embraces the practical skills, techniques and devices that are needed to give the artwork form 
and structure. Her definition mirrors the neurobiological findings that, unlike the DMN which 
draws its content from the unconscious, the DAN draws its content from learned knowledge, 
acquired skills and developed expertise. Furthermore, these findings describe this content as 
conscious because it is both accessible and describable. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
studies into working memory.   
These studies find a close link between the DAN and working memory (Lui et al., 
2015; Brissenden, et al., 2016; Majerus, et al., 2018). They find that it is the limited capacity 
working memory that constrains the DAN to task-focus or task relevant thoughts, as well as 
restricting its processing to conscious cognitive processes such as attentional control, problem 
solving, and reasoning (Fougnie et al., 2014). However, the working memory also restricts the 
content of the DAN in three specific ways. 
Firstly, because of its limited capacity, the working memory can only process and  hold 
a restricted amount of information at any one time (Fougnie et al., 2014; Eriksson et al., 2015; 
Brissenden et al., 2016). It thus, primarily,  uses pre-existing neural pathways in its processing 
and pre-existing concepts already stored in long-term memory for its content (Eriksson, et al., 
2015). This means that the content accessed by the DAN tends to offer obvious solutions, 
routine methods, and familiar conceptualisations, (Rothmaler, Nigbur, and Ivanova, 2017; Lui 
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et al., 2015) – the kind of learned knowledge, acquired skills and developed expertise that 
experienced artists accumulate over time through the practice of their craft.  
Secondly, the limited capacity of the working memory means that it will only access 
knowledge or content ‘that is relevant to the task’ at hand (Kowatari et al., 2009), i.e. the content 
that is directly related to the goal, structure and context of that specific task (Eriksson et al., 
2015). In the neurobiological studies on the creative process, this is described as the narrow 
focus or selective attention (Lui et al., 2015) that marks the recruitment of the DAN when the 
artists are concerned with form. This narrow focus or selective attention will only entertain 
content that facilitates the performance of the task.  
Thirdly, the working memory only accesses content that is easily accessible (Baddeley, 
2010; Lui et al., 2016). Given that neurobiologists define conscious content as content that is 
both accessible and describable, it is not surprising that memory research finds that ‘working-
memory content is consciously experienced’ (Eriksson, et al., 2015, p. 43). Indications that it is 
so, is reflected in the clarity and coherence with which the artists discuss their art-making 
process in their dissertation accounts.  
Findings such as these, therefore, lend convincing support to the argument that the 
DAN is recruited when the artist begins engaging with form. There are unmistakably clear 
correlations between the DAN and the art-making process which the artists describe as being 
deliberate, conscious, sequential, task-focussed and expertise or skill reliant. These correlations 
thus substantiate the model’s contention that the creative act comprises the two distinct 
processes of idea generation and idea expression, each of which recruits a different neural 
network. The dynamic interaction between these two networks is what lies at the heart of the 
creative act. This is the model’s third key conceptual element. 
THE DYNAMIC DANCE BETWEEN CONTENT AND FORM 
The premise underlying this third key conceptual element is that the creative product arises 
from the dynamic, organic interaction between idea generation and idea expression. The 
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dissertation accounts reflect this aspect of the creative process quite vividly. They all show how 
ideas take shape and then how the early stages of giving them form stimulates the generation 
of yet other ideas that in their turn act on the developing form.  
In the accounts given by Fogelberg and Bye, this interactive dynamic is so interwoven 
they are only able to discern its different threads in their reflections on their creative processes. 
Newman’s account makes brief mention of form influencing his unfolding ideas and then, later, 
new ideas emerging even as he is in the final stages of completing his composition. Maxwell, 
however, provides a more explicit comment, stating that, for her, the creative process involves 
‘two modes of thought in an interlacing relationship where objective knowledge rationally 
analyzes, steers, and refines subjective, creative ideation, revealing the most salient concepts and 
choices’ (p. 7). Other artists have made similar observations on this dynamic interaction 
between unfolding idea and emerging form. For example, in her reflection on her creative 
process, Cathy Treadaway (2009), a visual artist, says  
the hand rendering process takes time and provides periods of 
reflection in parallel with fabrication of the artwork … slowness of 
making in handcraft provides an opportunity for idea association and 
imaginative thought to develop and for critical aesthetic decisions to 
be considered (p. 236).  
 
Marcelle Freiman (2015a) finds that ‘the act of writing thoughts, then reading and changing 
them, enable[s] a kind of thinking that … is made easier’ through this recording of the thoughts 
in ‘the external medium’ (p. 60).  
These accounts all align with the findings of Glavenau et al. (2013) who observe that, 
in all sixty of their participants, an undergoing (a further unfolding of ideas) takes place in the 
‘physical, sensorial, sensible presence of the work, the confrontation with it’. In their discussion 
of the ‘cyclical nature of artistic activity’, they speak of the ‘dynamic between doing and undergoing …  
between an initial imperfect and incomplete idea and external conditions’ as an integral part of 
the creative process (p. 5, original italics). In other words, they find that the creative process 
involves a dynamic interaction between idea generation and idea expression in which each is 
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continually informing and shaping the other. Their finding is reflected in the ‘simplified model 
of the artistic creative process’ proposed by Palle Dahlstedt (2015). His model is based on a 
principle he terms ‘turn-based evolution’ (p. 37) which posits that the artistic creative process 
is marked by ‘the repeated iteration between conceptual and material representation’ (p. 42). 
Neurobiological support for this dynamic interaction is found all the research studies cited in 
this chapter. These findings provide valuable insights into how the two neural networks of the 
DMN and the DAN engage independently, yet co-operatively, during the artistic creative 
process (see, for example, Lui et al., 2015), clearly demonstrating this constant shifting between 
the internal world of idea generation and the external world of idea expression.  
Part of this dance includes the process of evaluation, as evidenced in the findings of the 
first study into the neurobiology of the creative process. This study found that evaluation occurs 
throughout the creative process and occurs in both the DMN and the DAN (Ellamil et al., 
2012); a finding that presents a direct challenge to the view of creativity as comprising just the 
two stages of idea generation and idea evaluation. While the researchers did expect to find 
evaluation taking place in the DAN because of its analytical processing, they were surprised to 
discover that the DMN was also involved in evaluation. They found clear evidence of an 
evaluative process in the DMN, which differed from that of the DAN, in that it was not based 
on rational factors but affective ones. Instead, it was ‘activated during the evaluation of 
emotional reactions and internally generated affective information which may facilitate the 
formation and awareness of “gut reactions” that individuals monitor during creative work’ (p. 
1784). The researchers therefore conclude that creative evaluation 
[is] also associated with recruitment of areas not typically associated 
with deliberate analytical processing, such as the default network 
and the so-called “salience network”, which integrates highly 
processed sensory data with visceral, autonomic, and hedonic 
information to help an organism decide what to do or not to do. 
There is increasing evidence that, in addition to resting state 
processes, default network regions engage in a range of affective and 
visceroceptive evaluative processes (p. 1790). 
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The dissertation accounts all provide ample evidence of this finding. They clearly show how the 
inner dialogues reported by the artists reflect an ongoing evaluation of both emerging ideas and 
developing artwork. Right from the outset, when the initial idea presents itself, to the final 
polishing of the artwork, the artist is continually evaluating both content and form. However, 
as the previous chapter demonstrated the two dialogues can be distinguished by the two very 
different questions asked by the artist. When evaluating the emerging ideas, the artist asks if it 
‘feels’ right, while, when evaluating the developing artwork, the question becomes ‘does this 
work?’. Both the dissertation accounts and this study into the evaluative mode of thought in the 
creative process thus patently indicate that idea evaluation is not in fact a distinctive second 
stage of the creative process as has been maintained. More importantly they demonstrate that 
the demarcation on which the proposed model is based, namely content and form, is a truer 
reflection of the artistic creative process.  
As already mentioned, the use of two-stage models, like the Geneplore model, to  
explore the neurology of the creative process is questionable because they exclude the stage of 
giving physical expression to the generated ideas. However, these investigations do clearly 
reflect the dynamic interaction between the DMN and the DAN – between content and form 
– but with one interesting qualification. While the researchers observe that novice practitioners 
recruit the DAN more frequently than expert practitioners, they find that the neural network 
shifts in expert practitioners are less attenuated and appear to occur more seamlessly. In their 
discussion of this observation Michael Esterman, Sarah Noonan, Monica Rosenberg, and 
Joseph DeGutis (2013) state that:  ‘While speculative, we posit that this state parallels the 
experience of “flow” … a sense of full immersion, a synching of self with task, during which 
high-level performance is achieved with relative ease’ which suggests that optimal performance 
‘may entail a degree of task transcendence, perhaps akin to the notion of “non-striving” in 
meditation practice, a state that cannot be achieved through effortful control or application of 
analytical, linear, evaluative strategies’ (p. 2720).  
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This possibility may well explain why Maxwell is so careful to clarify her experience of 
the interplay between subjective experience and objective knowledge while the other three 
artists do not dwell on this in any great detail. These three artists are all mature, experienced 
practitioners, each making specific reference to previous works or a body of work already 
completed.  For them the skills, techniques and craft knowledge of their respective disciplines 
are so engrained that they do not experience any marked shift when moving between idea 
generation and idea expression. Their experience of the creative process is rather closer to that 
described by Yamamoto earlier, namely, as a dialectical relationship that gives rise to the 
paradoxical experience of the oneness of duality. The dissertation accounts reflect this 
paradoxical experience in the form of two inner dialogues – one with the unfolding ideas and 
the other with the emerging artwork. The previous chapter explored this is some detail, 
demonstrating how these dialogues take place in imaginal space. This imaginal space comprises 
the final key conceptual element of the model.   
Inner Dialogues and Imaginal Space 
In the proposed model, the imaginal space in which the inner dialogues take place is depicted 
as permeating and extending beyond the two triangles of idea generation and idea expression 
as though it is the very fabric of the artistic creative process – broad enough to contain all the 
aspects of this process discussed so far, yet pliable enough to embrace the variety of individual 
experience. The premise underlying this conceptual element is that while neurobiology explains 
the dynamic interaction between the DMN and the DAN, the artist experiences this interaction 
as an imaginative act. This is clearly reflected in the dissertation accounts which all show that 
the artists are deeply engaged in an imaginative process as they wrestle with shaping both the 
content and form of their work. Evidence to support this premise is found in three streams of 
research, namely, studies into the imagination as lived experience, the Jungian concept of Active 
Imagination, and early explorations into the phenomenon of imaginal inner dialogues. 
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The Phenomenology of the Imagination  
The significant body of research into the phenomenology, or lived experience, of the 
imagination provides substantial support for the notion that the artist’s experience of the 
dynamic DMN/DAN interaction can be described as an imaginative one. Findings from this 
research describe the imagination as  
• primarily an intra-psychological process which straddles two worlds – the external world 
of sensory experience and the internal world of thought, thereby acting as mediator 
between these two worlds (Gordon, 1985; Pelaprat and Cole, 2011; Richardson 2013; 
Lin and Tsau, 2012); 
• powered primarily by the internal or inner world but finding embodiment and 
expression in the external material world (Gordon, 1985; Neisser, 2003; Lin and Tsau, 
2012; Morag, 2016); 
• involving the interaction of both conscious and unconscious, spontaneous and 
deliberate processes (Gordon, 1985; Chodorow, 2006; Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Zich, 
2011; Spaulding, 2016; Brogaard and Gatzia, 2017);  
• using fluid, dynamic conceptual blending as its modus operandi (Freiman, 2015) in 
which inputs from different concepts or meanings are blended to create a third 
emergent structure that ‘contains and compresses more and different information than 
is contained in the two initial inputs’ (Blair, 2009, p. 94); 
• packaging its outcomes – the third emergent structure – as metaphors that need to be 
deciphered to realise their full meaning (Neisser, 2003; Blair, 2009; Frieman, 2015b). 
These metaphors then ‘function as qualitative maps that evoke a gestalt, a compound, 
comprising emotional schema that illuminate an entire territory, not just the road 
immediately ahead’ (Neisser, 2003, p. 38). They therefore contain a depth and richness 
that invites further exploration and engagement; 
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• drawing on everything that has been learned, perceived, sensed and experienced and 
then ‘through these multiple modalities, come to new perspectives, ideas, or modes of 
acting which open new avenues in the real world’ (Zittoun and Cerchai, 2013, p. 322); 
• being the agency most tasked with transformation and meaning-making through its 
ability to create new meanings via the emergent structure (Neisser, 2003; Pelaprat and 
Cole, 2011; Fontana, 2016; Morag, 2016). It is the imagination that enables the kind of 
‘conceptual combination, transformation, and formation’ that gives rise to ‘the radical, 
the new, the as-yet unconceived’ (Stokes, 2014, p. 3). 
The close correlations between this description and the neurobiological explanation of the 
dynamic DMN/DAN interaction are immediately obvious. Both draw on material originating 
from internal and external sources; both involve an interweaving of this unconscious and 
conscious content, and both use deliberate and spontaneous processing. However, the 
imagination research adds a further dimension, namely, the key role played by the imagination 
in transcending apparent paradoxes to create a new, transcendent meaning that is greater than 
its constituent parts.  
 That this is an integral part of the art-making process is amply illustrated in both the 
dissertation accounts of Fogelberg and Bye. In her reflection on her creative process, Fogelberg 
discusses how her drawing becomes imbued with deeper meanings for her that extend far 
beyond the rendition of the wild ginseng flower. She writes,  
With the drawing completed, I have an opportunity to reflect on it and 
the process of art making. I explore new areas of discovery initiated 
through creating the drawing. It is a time to separate from the drawing 
in order to reflect upon deeper meanings. By separation from the 
drawing, I begin to recognize the intense connection with it on many 
levels (p. 60). 
In this observation, Fogelberg is clearly linking the process of art-making, the creating of the 
drawing, to finding ‘new areas of discovery’ and recognising intense connections on many levels. 
She identifies these new areas of discovery and intense connections quite clearly during her 
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reflection on her creative process. She writes articulately about how the death of Junior (the old 
farmer) and his son’s grief over his father’s death merges with her own experience of loss, 
specifically the loss of creative and cognitive ability from the concussion she suffered in a car 
accident. This theme of loss is broadened as she reflects on the decline in the farming industry, 
the loss of a landscape that was part of her childhood, and the loss of a whole way of life while 
she draws. Her dissertation carefully maps the way she merges and blends what she has 
experienced with these other stories of loss through her inner dialoguing with the emerging 
ideas and the developing form. Her account includes an additional layer of exploration as she 
comments on the books she reads during this time of art-making. She later divides them into 
two categories – books she reads for emotional inspiration and books she reads to hone her 
craft. This reading too forms part of her creative process in which she finds that ‘concepts 
change as I reflect and attach meaning’. She says that for her the creative process of producing 
the drawing was essentially a process of blending and integrating strands to arrive at ‘something 
new’ (p. 69) 
Bye’s reflective comments on her creative process are equally revealing. For her, art-
making is mainly about finding new meaning. In her creative experience, she finds that as she 
works with the initial, spontaneously generated image, ‘the symbolic nature of the image 
becomes apparent’ and deepens in meaning ‘as the work progresses’. During the art-making 
process, Bye, like Fogelberg, enriches her thinking with additional reading; in Bye’s case by 
exploring the ways the image is represented in a range of mythologies and diverse cultural 
histories. This, she says, helps her ‘to understand the symbolism and see what it says about my 
inner life. The symbolic approach can provide new and useful perspectives’ (p. 52). She 
describes her process as an ‘intuitive method of working’ – a method, that ‘involves a 
concentrated dialogue between the fantasized, unconscious material and its representation with 
the hand and the eye’ (p. 153). That Bye is clearly referring to the dynamic interaction between 
emerging ideas and developing form is evidenced in her discussion of the paradox that lies at 
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the heart of her creative process, namely, the inherent contradiction between ‘the enduring 
nature of fired clay and glaze and the impermanent, fugitive character of the images that come’ 
(p. 152). The resolution of this conflict, however, is reflected in the completed artwork, which 
then symbolises the integration achieved, and the new meaning discovered. Both these accounts 
thus clearly demonstrate the close link between art-making and meaning-making, a link explored 
in depth in Chapter 3 (see pp. 97-98) which  argued that meaning-making lies at the heart of 
art-making. 
This view is totally in keeping with the second stream of research that supports the 
premise of the model’s third conceptual element that the DMN/DAN interaction is 
experienced by the artist as imaginal inner dialogues.  This second stream of research explores    
the theory of Active Imagination, a richly textured, multi-layered and complex concept that 
took Carl Jung decades to develop.  Insightful overviews of Jung’s work in this regard are 
plentiful (e.g. Eisendrath, 1977; Miller, 2004; Schaverien, 2005; Bacon, 2007; Jordan, 2015), but 
all concur that Active Imagination goes hand in hand with the psychological work of finding a 
new transcendent meaning through resolving conflicts and reconciling paradoxes.  
 Jeffery Miller (2004), for example, describes Active Imagination as the conscious and 
unconscious engaging ‘in a kind of polarized dance’ that gives rise to a new, third thing that is 
‘not a mixture of the two but qualitatively different’ (p. xi). This dance is also described as a 
dynamic dialogue between the unconscious and consciousness that facilitates the emergence of 
a ‘union of conscious and unconscious contents’ (p. 2) that transcends the polarity between the 
two. It is this transcendent union of opposites, this emergent gestalt, says Pauline Eisendrath, 
(1977) that is pregnant with meaning. Both she and Melissa Lara (2010) not only demonstrate 
how integral art-making is to the emergence of this transcendent gestalt, but also discuss this in 
terms that parallel the artistic creative process. Lara makes the keen observation that Active 
Imagination involves a dialogue ‘between the force or movement of the fantasy and the reality 
function of making a satisfying expression’ (p. 63), thus providing a clear link between the inner 
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dialogues of Active Imagination and the inner dialogues between the emerging ideas and 
developing form as experienced by the artist. It is not surprising, therefore, that so many artists 
choose to articulate their creative process within the framework of this Jungian concept. Its 
conceptualisation and language provide the means to describe their experience of the creative 
process in a meaningful way.  
Both streams of research discussed so far, namely, research into the phenomenology of 
the imagination and the Jungian concept of Active Imagination, clearly provide solid support 
for positioning the imaginal inner dialogues firmly at the centre of the creative process. 
Additional endorsement for this positioning is found in the third research stream, the more 
recent explorations that focus specifically on the phenomenon of imaginal inner dialogues. 
Jane Zich (2008, 2011), an accomplished artist and experienced depth psychologist, 
recounts how she engaged in an intense painting process using Active Imagination. Over a 4-
year period she produced a series of over 200 mixed-media paintings called “Vision Journey”. 
She describes this process as being ‘unique for me in revealing experientially several nuances of 
how consciousness and the unconscious might dialogue’ (2008, p. 46). She tells how, niggled by 
a recurring image of a blue panther, she simply asked the panther: “Why are you back? What 
do you want from me?” She finds that the resulting paintings of the panther created ‘both a 
contract to dialogue and a portal into a lucid dreaming realm where sustained dialogues with 
the images became possible’ (p. 47). When she experienced a creative block, she learnt to 
revitalise her creative process by asking more questions:  
Frustrated by weeks of silence following the appearance of the bronze 
lion in my dream, I finally requested that Lion energy make itself better 
known to me. “Who are you?” I finally insisted out loud. Almost at 
once, Lion energy surged back into my painting process, a clear 
response to my request (p. 54). 
She sees this continual asking of questions and then being open and responsive to what shows 
up as the artist being a ‘proactive partner’, with both a speaking and a listening role in the 
dialogue (p. 57). Three years later, as she reflects on her artistic creative process, she elaborates 
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on this observation. She identifies a clear pattern of exchange in the dialogues between 
consciousness and the unconscious. In this exchange, the new images arising from the 
unconscious bring with them corresponding tasks for the conscious. She concludes: ‘To some 
degree, consciousness gets to decide whether, when, and how to undertake each task. If ego 
consciousness accepts the appropriate work, the dialogue is likely to advance to the next stage’ 
(2011, p. 15). This observation highlights the key role inner dialogues play in the artistic creative 
process.  
However, while Zich’s insights are a valuable addition to those arising from the 
dissertation accounts, they are located within the realm of personal anecdote, alongside those 
of the other accounts consulted in the course of my research (see for example Chodorow, 1988; 
Tomlinson, 2008; Treadaway, 2009; Lara, 2010). What shifts these accounts from being purely 
anecdotal to being meaningful contributions to a growing body of compelling evidence that 
sees imaginal inner dialoguing as integral to the artistic creative process is an exploratory study 
conducted Deborah Hellerstein (2008). 
Hellerstein’s investigation of this phenomenon that ‘lives in a liminal space between 
being a conscious process and a preconscious or nonverbal process, a space that is rarely 
investigated’ (p. 4) provides undeniable corroboration of these personal accounts and a 
framework of grounded contextualisation. The primary focus of her research is ‘to explore the 
subjective meaning artists gave to the activity of conducting an internal dialogue while they 
created their art’ (p. 76). To this end she interviews 25 professional, experienced artists from a 
range of artistic disciplines, inviting them to respond freely to the question: ‘Do you engage in 
an internal dialogue when you make art and if you do can you describe it?’ (p. 295).  
Her extensive literature overview provides the necessary context for her investigation. 
Citing the scholarship of over 23 modern psychologists, such as Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, 
Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott and Jean Piaget, Hellerstein demonstrates the extent to which 
inner dialoguing is familiar terrain within psychoanalytical literature. Her overview clearly 
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illustrates the widely supported view that our inner life is essentially dialogic in nature; that ‘our 
days are full of an inner life made up of unrecognized encounters with imaginary others’ as we 
‘constantly slide back and forth between the “imaginal” and the real’ (p. 60). 
In broad terms, this view states that  
• our very notion of ‘self’ comprises ‘multiple selves and self-states’ and that we are in 
continual conversation with these multiple self-states (p. 38) 
• it is through this intrapsychic interaction of internal voices, these internal dialogues, that 
we create the ‘sense of coherency’ which gives rise to our sense of self (p. 58).  
• these internal dialogues take place in a transitional space that is ‘an intermediate arena 
of experience somewhere between inner and outer reality’ in which we can contemplate, 
or play with, differing ideas and realities ‘in the safety of [our] imagination’ (p. 29).  
Hellerstein then extends this scholastic context by drawing on works from other disciplines 
such as Literary Criticism, Philosophy, Religion and Anthropology. In so doing she adds 15 
more voices to this conversation, showing just how deeply the concept of inner dialoguing is 
embedded in the broader discourse on human consciousness. Her comprehensive literature 
thus patently illustrates how integral imaginary, internal conversations are to the way we make 
sense of our world and our place in it. 
However, her overview also highlights the strong links between these inner dialogues 
and art-making. For example, Freud advocates directing one’s attention to the unconscious in 
one’s own mind to listen for possible developments and then to lend these developments 
‘artistic expression instead of suppressing them by conscious criticism’ (p. 13); Jung asserts that 
it is ‘an artist’s ability to conduct a dialogic process between her or his two independent (one 
conscious, the other unconscious) personalities’ that enables their creativity (p. 15), and 
Winnicott posits that it is ‘artist’s practice of conducting an inner dialogue’ during art-making  
that allows the artist to inhabit the transitional space of play where anything and everything is 
possible (p. 29). 
171 
 
 Yet, despite this wealth of support for the notion of inner dialogues, and their 
connection to art-making, Hellerstein is puzzled by the fact that this phenomenon has not been 
included in the research into the creative process.  She finds there is no research ‘linking internal 
dialogue to the creative process’ and it is for this reason that she embarks upon a study she 
defines as ‘exploratory and qualitative in nature and potentially theory forming’ (p. 76). The 
focus of Hellerstein’s study therefore is ‘the subjective experience of artists who reported that 
they used an internal dialogue as they made their art’ with the stated intention of describing ‘the 
artists’ experience of how their dialogic process worked and to note important commonalties 
and variances in their responses’ (p. 8).  
From the transcripts of the interviews she identifies no fewer than ‘15 types of internal 
dialogic processes within four distinct categories that are integral to an internal dialogic 
processes’ (p. 296). This evidence not only supports her early assertion that ‘the writings of 
Plato, Bakhtin, Nietzsche, and Mandelstam … all support my premise that the inner life of 
artists is packed with social dialogic elements’ (p. 47), but also leads her to the confident 
conclusion that ‘an important finding of this study is that for many of the artists acknowledging 
that they carried on an inner dialogue and experiencing themselves as existing in a relational 
matrix were interwoven concepts both integral to their art making process’ (p. 297).   
Her detailed discussion of her interviews with the participating artists shows that they 
are not only aware of this inner dialoguing, but that they ‘in fact prized it as an important 
component of their creative process’ (p. 295). Their responses clearly indicate that they ‘had a 
specific understanding of the meaning of the term inner dialogue’ (p. 303), with many describing 
their experience of these inner dialogues with ‘precise and sometimes poetic detail’ (p. 318). 
They speak of engaging in ‘a surprising range of internal experiences that they considered 
dialogic’, describing themselves ‘carrying on internal dialogues with music, movement, their 
objects of art, their muse and parts of themselves’ (p. ii). Their descriptions of these dialogues 
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include vivid accounts of engaging in the two dialogues reflected in the proposed model, 
namely, the dialogue concerned with content and the other concerned with form.  
An artist identified only as Eva, makes a clear distinction between the two dialogue. She 
describes how ideas would come to her as she played solitaire: 
things float through my head, that’s almost a sort of meditative thing 
because, you know you sort of let things float through, you don’t grab 
on to them, but then you just wait until I hear myself – this idea is right. 
So, there is the dialogue (p. 92) 
Later, she describes a different dialogue, one she has with the painting itself: ‘the painting talks 
back and says, this is right, no, no, you need to change, that, it’s like these are direct sorts of . . . 
dialogue (p. 103). Seth, a writer, describes his written pieces as emerging from the conversations 
he hears his characters having in his head. Once he begins writing, however, this dialogue is 
joined by the conversation he has with the work in progress. He describes this dialogue as 
conversation with the text that is ‘telling the writer in him what worked and what didn’t work’ 
(p. 183). For him, this dialogue with the developing form of the work extends to include revising 
the text as a dialogic experience: 
I would consider that a dialogue ‘cause you make it the first time and 
then you revisit, and revisit and revisit and revisit, and each sort of 
revisitation during revision is kind of a conversation with the old and 
then the new … [Hellerstein]: You mean you’re having a dialogue with 
the text? [Artist]: Yeah (p. 178).  
 
A particularly articulate account of how this inner dialoguing is experienced is given by an artist, 
with the pseudonym of Magpie: 
I can remember this one with this painting. I was painting it. It’s a 
painting with a lot of heads and water. I was thinking there’s something 
lacking. It doesn’t have the zing. Something is not there yet. And I 
don’t know what it is. At least the canvas was telling me that there was 
something not there. I had gone through my list, my mental list, of all 
things that one can change or things that one can do…just a simple 
list. What is the composition? Is the composition in trouble? And then 
you go through the elements of the composition. Is that what is a 
problem? Is the colour a problem? You're going through all of these 
things. Is the symbolism a problem? You’re going through all of these 
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things that you know through experience have helped you to get 
somewhere. And you don’t get an answer. I can remember sitting there 
saying okay, I need something else, just something else. And it’s sort 
of like the muse tripped in the door and said, “put in the blue head. 
Put in the blue head.” And then I argue – “but that’s so inconsistent 
with the rest of the painting.”  And the muse says, “Yes, and that’s why 
it’s right.”  And I say, “Okay. I will make the head blue.” And it worked! 
And it made the painting. It’s something – you go through everything, 
go through everything, go through everything. What is it, what is it, 
what is it, what is it, what is it? And then suddenly – and it doesn’t 
necessarily come from yourself. It comes from someplace else (p. 240).  
This quotation is of necessity a lengthy one because it clearly illustrates the kind of inner 
dialoguing that takes place as the artist grapples with both conscious art-making – the 
composition and form of the piece – and the spontaneously arising ideas that ‘come from 
someplace else’. It also illustrates the dynamic, interactive nature of this switching back and 
forth between the inner dialogues on idea and form and the artist. Magpie is not the only one 
to describe her creative process as incorporating this dynamic interaction. Others, like J, also 
describe a process characterised by  
a switching back and forth between words and feelings, each reacting 
in response to the other, pushing him to decide what to keep, as he 
painted or wrote, and what to eliminate. In his definition of the concept 
of dialogue, feelings were a comparable language to words (p. 126).  
These aspects of the creative process are echoed in various ways by the other artists Hellerstein 
interviewed. They frequently spoke of ideas arising spontaneously ‘from someplace else’, 
describing how the ideas first emerged as inchoate impressions that were intriguing enough to 
cause the artist to turn their attention inward and wait for further unfolding. Many spoke of 
taking long walks, playing music or engaging in other kinds of repetitive activity as they waited 
on this unfolding. Others talked of making notes and sketches as they waited. All referred to 
using inner dialoguing to clarify what they wanted to express and how best to express it, 
constantly switching back and forth in dialogues between emerging ideas and developing 
artwork. In this regard, their responses to Hellerstein’s question closely align with the narratives 
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given in the dissertation accounts which also reflect the integral role played by inner dialogues 
in the artistic creative process.  
 All the research cited thus far with regard to the phenomenon of inner dialoguing – the 
dissertation accounts, the psychological research into imagination as lived experience, and early 
scholarly explorations of the phenomenon of imaginal inner dialoguing itself – provides strong 
support for the siting of this third conceptual element, the inner dialogues that take place in 
imaginal space, at the centre of the proposed model. Some, however, would question the 
inclusion of these inner dialogues as the model’s third conceptual element, arguing that they are 
based on data arising from ‘untrained psychological introspection’ and have not been 
scientifically verified. To which the artists (and psychologists) would respond that unlike the 
‘naturalistic science of mind’, their accounts tell the truth about the artistic creative experience 
(Gallagher and Varela, 2003, p. 93). This raises the question whether, instead of perpetuating 
the Cartesian divide between lived experience and scientific enquiry, it is possible to find an 
approach that combines first-hand accounts with third-hand knowledge in a single research 
approach; one that facilitates the integration of ‘subjective and objective data in order to add a 
new dimension to both kinds of data’ (Hunt 2011, p. 64). Could there be an approach that 
allows the objective findings from hard science to sit companionably alongside the findings 
obtained from subjective accounts that describe the lived experience of the phenomenon being 
investigated? And would such an approach make it possible to construct a model that 
encompasses both in a single systemic framework? 
A NEUROPHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE  
These are exactly the issues that occupy Francisco Varela (1996) as he contemplates the gap 
between the scientific studies of consciousness and the lived experience associated with 
cognitive or mental events. He believes a new perspective is needed – one that is based on the 
‘intrinsic circularity in cognitive science wherein the study of mental phenomena is always that 
of an experiencing person … cognitive science cannot escape this circulation and must cultivate 
175 
 
it instead’ (p. 346). He therefore proposes an approach that aims to ‘marry modern cognitive 
science and a disciplined approach to human experience’ (p. 330) so that ‘one obtains an 
intellectually coherent account of mind and consciousness where the experiential pole enters 
directly into the formulation of the complete account, making direct reference to the nature of 
our lived experience’ (p. 345). He terms this approach neurophenomenology, and, in an essay 
published in 2003, together with Nathalie Depraz, he demonstrates how it can illuminate and 
enrich imagination research. The essay shows how neurophenomenology enables an enquiry 
that goes beyond merely proposing a bridge between ‘a scientific view of imagination’ and the 
Buddhist notion of ‘human transformation’ by embracing, ‘the entire phenomenon in all its 
complexity and weave it as a unity with its many dimensions, which need and constrain each 
other without residue – in the body and brain’. In other words, a neurophenomenological 
approach makes it possible to explore the imagination from ‘its material-brain basis to its 
experiential quality without discontinuity’ (p. 196). The essay begins with a discussion of the 
material-brain basis of the imagination to show how it arises from a large-scale integration of 
multiple concurrent processes, all interacting in dynamic, nonlinear ways. However, Varela and 
Depraz argue, this explanation of the neural processes underlying imagination is only half the 
story. It does not reflect the fact ‘imagination is, most strongly and directly, a lived experience’. 
It fails to include the imagination’s essentially affective or emotive qualities; account for the way 
it is ‘constantly generating a coherent reality’ that constitutes our inner world, or, show the 
extent to which it ‘belongs to the very core of human consciousness’ (p. 205). Varela and Depraz 
then demonstrate how the full picture only emerges when scientific data regarding the neural 
processing of the imagination is combined with lived experience.  They thus conclude that 
neurophenomenology does create a ‘new conceptual space’ in which the empirical and the 
experiential can be brought together ‘as corresponding mutual constraints’ (p. 224).  
 Those who have welcomed this approach and embraced the new conceptual space it 
offers include John Kaag (2009) who says that ‘this shift seems appropriate and necessary if we 
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are to examine the processes of the imagination’ (p. 184). He points to new evidence that not 
only shows brain processing to be ‘fundamentally multi-modal and cross-modal’ (p. 185), but 
also clearly indicates that ‘mental connections are accompanied by a particular quality of feeling 
that cannot be reduced to the quantitative study of neural activation’ (p. 186). He therefore 
argues that ‘cognitive science must refine its methodology and expand its focus in order to shed 
light on the metaphysical insights of recent embodied phenomenology … to enrich, rather than 
reduce, the forms of human creativity’ (p. 202). 
Sina Fazelpour and Evan Thompson (2015) offer a neurophenomenological 
exploration of the Kantian brain, i.e. the mental phenomena arising from the brain's self-
organized and spontaneous, pattern-generating activity. They defend their use of this approach 
by pointing out that any precise mapping of the connections between neural network activity 
and psychological mental function has always been a challenge. This challenge is made more 
complicated if the mapping aims to include consciousness i.e. the subjective and experiential 
aspects of the mind. In their conclusion they argue that the value of neurophenomenology lies 
in its use of ‘first-person reports of moment-to-moment subjective experience in order to 
uncover information about brain rhythms and dynamic coordination’ and that these reports 
‘can stand in a mutually constraining and illuminating relationship to cognitive-neuroscience 
evidence about the physiological processes sustaining moment-to-moment experience’ (p. 225). 
 Of even greater relevance to this dissertation is the argument presented by Pierre 
d’Argyll and Dolores Fernández Martínez (2013). They find that ‘the scientific method has 
systematically excluded the presence of the subjective subject’ and, for this reason, they argue, 
‘there are very few works on artistic creation from a purely neurological perspective; much less 
establishing a bridge between neuroscience and humanities’. Their hypothesis, therefore, is that 
an ‘introspective analysis of the elements involved in the genesis of an artwork’ as described by 
the artist, combined with ‘the latest findings of the Neurobiology of memory and creation, can 
offer new insights into the creative process more faithful to the thought of the artist’ (p. 21).  
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  While Varela cautions that the methodology for this approach still needs to be 
developed, some researchers have been quick to see the potential it offers. Frederic Peters 
(2000), for example, argues that the value of this approach lies in ‘the integration of neurological 
and phenomenological perspectives within a single analytical lens’ (p. 379). It thus offers 
researchers a powerful analytical tool that combines ‘objective neurological explanations’ with 
‘phenomenological descriptions of the view from inside’ (p. 380). Lauren Reinerman-Jones, 
Brandon Sollins, Shaun Gallagher and Bruce Janz (2013) welcome neurophenomenology 
because it provides ‘an integrated and holistic approach for understanding and exploring 
experience’ that, by its very nature, is truly inter-disciplinary (p. 287). In their view it ‘promises 
to be a productive tool for future holistic experience explanation’ (p. 306). 
Whether neurophenomenology will deliver on these promises remains to be seen. 
However, its basic tenet that first-person subjective experience can be meaningfully combined 
with third-person objective knowledge (Hunt, 2011) so that they ‘stand in a mutually 
constraining and illuminating relationship’ (Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015, p. 225), is of 
significant relevance to the proposed model. It provides a conceptual framework that supports 
the model’s integration of the neurobiological findings regarding the DMN and the DAN with 
the phenomenological data contained in the artist accounts. The proposed model is therefore 
best described as a diagrammatic representation of the neurophenomenology of the artistic 
creative process. As such it offers both a new understanding and a new explanation of this 
process – one that combines the subjective experience of the artist with the objective science 
of neurobiology. 
A Neurophenomenological Model of the Artistic Creative Process  
This descriptive explanation of the proposed model has of necessity been a lengthy and detailed 
one as the model incorporates many elements that have not previously been included in the 
discourse on the artistic creative process. The discussion of the three key conceptual elements 
that comprise the model has demonstrated that neurobiology provides a scientific foundation 
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for the first two elements represented by the triangles, while phenomenology accounts for the 
third element – the imaginal space that lying between the two triangles that is the site of the 
inner dialogues that are so integral to the process of art-making.  
 Varela’s neurophenomenological approach makes it possible to combine the two 
threads of this chapter’s argument, namely, the phenomenology of the artistic creative process 
and the neurobiological research that supports these accounts. Moreover, his approach makes 
it possible to depict both these threads in a single model. The figure below is thus entitled “A  
Model of the Neurophenomenology of the Artistic Creative Process”.  
Figure 2: A Neurophenomenological Model of the Artistic Creative Process 
 
IDEA GENERATION 
Spontaneous, random, process 
Compelling images  
Incubation, Inspiration  
Intuition and Felt Sense 
THE ARTIST 
IDEA EXPRESSION 
Deliberate, considered, process  
Craft and technique 
Constraints of medium and material 
 
DEFAULT MODE NETWORK (DMN) 
Random free-floating processing 
Unconscious emotionally tagged 
content. 
 
DORSAL ATTENTION NETWORK (DAN) 
Logical, sequential, rational processing 
Conscious content i.e. acquired 
knowledge, and learned skills.  
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF THE ARTISTIC CREATIVE PROCESS 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE  ARTISTIC CREATIVE PROCESS  
IMAGINATION 
DYNAMIC  
NEURAL 
INTERACTION 
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According to this model, the DMN, marked by its inwardly focussed, free-floating process, is 
the network primarily responsible for generating the random combinations that emerge into 
consciousness as spontaneous ideas, images or inchoate sensations. The DAN, with its 
outwardly focussed, deliberate, rational processing is the network that is recruited when 
planning, developing and shaping the physical artwork. Through the dynamic interaction 
between the DMN and the DAN, the emerging ideas are shaped by the developing form of the 
artwork, but, by the same token, the developing artwork exerts an influence on the ideas 
emerging as the artwork takes shape.  
 However, the artist experiences this dynamic interaction as a series of inner dialogues 
that take place in imaginal space. These dialogues are portrayed as ongoing imaginary 
conversations the artist conducts with the emerging ideas and the developing artwork. It is 
through these conversations or dialogues, that the artist finds their way to clarity of meaning 
and precision of expression, in an organic, fluid process that often proceeds in a series of stops 
and starts rather than in a smooth, linear trajectory. By embracing both neurobiology and 
phenomenology, the model provides a more rounded, neurophenomenological account of the 
artistic creative process. In so doing, it embraces the very concepts Guilford dismissed as to 
vague and subjective for consideration, incorporates the valuable insights arising from first-
hand accounts, and includes aspects of the creative process routinely overlooked in the purely 
cognitive explanations of the process.  
This chapter has proposed a revised understanding of the artistic creative process in the 
form of a new model which distinguishes between the process of generation ideas (content) 
and the process of giving expression to those ideas (form). It has demonstrated the validity of 
this model by illustrating the extent to which it is both informed and shaped by contemporary 
neurobiological research. In so doing, the chapter has also identified the points at which the 
model presents significant challenges to the prevailing perspectives on the creative process. It 
has specifically shown that: 
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• The creative process cannot simply be viewed as the process of unconscious thinking 
becoming conscious thought. It also has to embrace the challenging task of giving that 
thought physical expression.  
• Inspiration is not the point at which the artistic creative process begins – instead, 
inspiration follows the awareness of an emotionally charged notion that arises from the 
DMN; 
• Evaluation is not a distinct stage of the creative process, but rather an ongoing part of 
the entire process; 
• Evaluation is not solely the work of the DAN – the DMN has its own evaluative process 
that is shaped by affective factors; 
• The artistic creative process is better understood as the dynamic interplay between 
emerging idea and developing form as mirrored in the dynamic interaction between the 
DAN and the DMN. 
As significant as these departures may be, they are somewhat overshadowed by the role played 
by the model’s third key conceptual element, namely, the imagination. It is no coincidence that 
this element occupies centre stage in the model diagram for it is the contention of this 
dissertation that it is in the imagination that the artistic creative process unfolds. The next two 
chapters provide significant support for this view in the course of a discussion on the extent to 
which the proposed model is able to provide a satisfactory account of the creative writing 
process.  
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CHAPTER 6 
MODELS OF THE WRITING PROCESS  
Looking at the basics of a creative writer’s style, or their choice of words, does not explain 
why theirs is ‘Creative Writing’, as opposed to being a shopping list or a bicycle repair 
manual, or why theirs is a particular kind of Creative Writing, or Creative Writing of a 
definable shape, ‘colour’ or complexion. (Harper, 2007a, p. 6) 
 
The previous chapter proposed a model for the artistic creative process as experienced by the 
artist. According to this proposed model, the artistic creative process comprises three key 
elements, namely, the generating of the ideas that give rise to content, the expression of those 
ideas in an appropriate form, and the centrally situated imaginal space in which content and 
form are combined to give rise to the finished artefact. The dynamic nature of this process is 
rooted in the interaction between the neural networks of the DMN and the DAN, but it is 
experienced by the artist in the form of inner imaginal dialogues. This combination of first-
hand experience with third hand knowledge in the proposed model is made possible by the new 
research framework of neurophenomenology. 
This chapter addresses the question as to why a model of the creative writing process is 
even necessary given the proliferation of cognitive process models that purportedly provide a 
full account of the writing process. It begins by arguing that, whilst making a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of the writing process, cognitive process models are unable 
to provide a satisfactory account of the process of writing imaginative fiction. Through a close 
scrutiny of the Flower-Hayes model, the chapter highlights its inadequacies and the gaps in its 
representation. It posits that these inadequacies lie not in the model itself but in the fact that 
the model only accounts for one kind of writing, i.e. writing that is dominated by DAN 
processing. In contrast, an overview of the emerging conversation among Creative Writing 
scholars identifies four key differences between the writing process depicted in the Flower-
Hayes model and emerging views on the creative writing process. The discussion of these four 
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differences demonstrates that the creative writing process closely mirrors that of the artistic 
creative process outlined in Chapter 4. The chapter thus concludes that it is highly likely that 
the proposed model is able to provide a more satisfactory account of the creative writing 
process. 
COGNITIVE PROCESS MODELS OF THE WRITING PROCESS  
Gaps in Cognitive Process Models  
The 1980s saw the development of a number of models of the writing process. They were 
identified as cognitive process models because they were based on the findings emerging from 
the new research arena of cognitive processing. This apparently happy marriage between 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology led to such an interest in investigating the writing 
process that by the early 1990s, no fewer than eleven different models had been developed to 
explain this process (Pemberton, 1993).  Of these, the model that gains the most traction is the 
one developed by Linda Flower, a compositionist, and John Hayes, a cognitive psychologist. 
Known as the Flower-Hayes model (1981), it soon becomes ‘perhaps the best-known and most 
universally applied in process-oriented classrooms‘ (McLeod, 1991, p. 96) and  widely regarded 
as ‘the standard model accepted by composition theorists as well as cognitive psychologists who 
study writing’ (Bloor, 1997, p. 24). 
Flower and Hayes assert that their model is based on ‘a theory of the cognitive processes 
involved in composing’ that will lay the  groundwork ‘for more detailed study of thinking 
processes in writing’. They argue that  ‘the process of writing is best understood as a set of 
distinctive thinking processes which writers orchestrate or organise during the act of 
composing’ (p. 366), and are thus best investigated through behavioural studies. Their writing 
process model, based on the findings of these  studies, comprises three phases – Planning, 
Translating and Reviewing. The Planning phase incorporates the sub-processes of setting clear 
goals for the planned text, generating the ideas which will form its content and  organising these 
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ideas to provide a coherent outline for the text. The phase of Translating  ‘is essentially the 
process of putting ideas into visible language’ (p. 373), while the Reviewing phase involves the 
two sub-processes of evaluation and revision in which the writer is constantly evaluating stylistic 
and organisational choices.  However, they are careful to point out, the writer does not move 
through these phases in a series of neat sequential steps. The process is recursive so that the 
writer may, at any point, cycle back to the first phase to generate new ideas or re-organise the 
material, or back-track to the second phase to rewrite something using a more considered word 
choice.  
It is this recursive aspect that leads Flower and Hayes to claim that their model 
represents ‘a major departure from the traditional paradigm’ (p. 367) which previously 
conceptualised the writing process as a linear, stage-based one.  Furthermore, they argue that 
their model addresses the issue that renders these earlier models so problematic, namely, that 
what is being modelled is ‘the growth of the written product, not the inner process of the person 
producing it’. In contrast, the Flower-Hayes model, they claim, with its emphasis on cognitive 
processing, accounts for ‘the more intimate, moment-by-moment intellectual process of 
composing’ (p. 367), thus placing ‘an important part of creativity where it belongs – in the hands 
of the working, thinking writer’ (p. 386).  
As a systemic model of the writing process, the Flower-Hayes model does make a 
significant contribution to the discourse on the writing process. Its impact is far-reaching –  
contemporary scholars continue to refine and elaborate its basic tenets (Chenoweth and Hayes, 
2001; Hayes, 2012; Quinlin et al., 2012), exploring the possibilities it offers in a wide range of 
contexts from Business Writing (VanDeWeghe, 1983) and academic essay-writing (Wiener and 
Costaris, 2012) to song-writing (Rodriguez, 2014). The model also serves as a key reference 
point in broader discussions of the cognitive processes of  writing, as illustrated in Anne 
Becker’s insightful review of these models (2006). She not only identifies the Flower-Hayes 
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model as being the first of the cognitive process models but also as the one that ‘initiated a new 
and highly productive approach to composition research’ (p. 25).  
This lively conversation taking place in the corridors of Composition Studies is met with 
a curious silence from the Creative Writing Department down the hall (Berg, 2010). Creative 
Writing scholars later attribute this silence to an embedded reluctance to engage in any form of 
robust enquiry (Haake, 1994; Bizarro, 2004; Mayers, 2005). However, as Chapter 2 argued, none 
of these allegations are justified. The wave of rational-positivist-behavioural research that 
follows Guilford’s address, precludes any exploration, investigation or discourse on a process 
that embraces the ‘vague’ notions of imagination, incubation and intuition. These cognitive 
process models, as will be demonstrated,  perpetuate this exclusion, in that they are developed, 
in the main, by cognitive psychologists who ‘like to work at the algorithmic level’, developing 
process models that are preferably computational or mathematical models’ that can be tested in 
‘numerous experiments’ (Gentner, 2010, p. 133). 
There is no room in these computational/ mathematical models for the kind of 
intrinsically organic and dynamic creative process described by Brewster Ghislein (1952); a 
process, as the next chapter will demonstrate, that is very closely aligned to the creative writing 
process as experienced by the writers themselves. Ghiselin’s contribution is ignored because it 
is based on personal accounts of the creative process. The work of Janet Emig in the 1960s, 
like that of others exploring the writing process as lived experience, suffers a similar fate 
(Gebhardt, 2011). Her study of the writing habits of professional writers and poets is dismissed 
because it is based on ‘idiosyncratic, at times puzzling, and often unreliable descriptions of 
creative processes’ (Verbruggen, 2017, p. 6). Valuable insights arising from contributions such 
as these are discounted by cognitivists because they are based on an introspective analysis that 
is ‘notoriously inaccurate’ (Flower and Hayes, 1981, p. 367). Moreover, the accounts are set 
aside because the process they describe cannot be observed and measured within the confines 
of the positivist-behavioural research paradigm. In contrast, the Flower-Hayes model is clearly 
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a product of this paradigm (Galbraith, 2009), conforming to its parameters on a number of 
levels. According to this model,    
• the writing process is ‘a rhetorical act’ in which writers attempt to solve or respond to 
a rhetorical problem by writing something (p. 369). This is in line with the positivist 
view of creativity as being just another form of problem-solving; 
• studies of the writing process focus on the ‘moment-by-moment intellectual process of 
composing’ (Flower and Hayes, 1981, p. 367). By restricting the study to the 
‘intellectual’, or purely cognitive process of writing, the model is neatly able to side-step 
those vague concepts Guilford found so problematic because they could not be 
measured: imagination, intuition, incubation, and inspiration; 
• the writing process is best investigated using the same protocol analysis ‘which has been 
successfully used to study other cognitive processes’ because it is best suited to  
capturing ‘a detailed record of what is going on in the writer's mind during the act of 
composing itself’ (Flower and Hayes, 1981, p. 368). More importantly, it is a 
methodology that the allows for behaviour to be observed and measured, a key element 
in the positivist-behavioural paradigm. 
Initially, few find anything to fault in both the model design and the research that underpins it 
for, as Don Pierstorff (1983) says: ‘Professors Hayes and Flower have done so much so well’. 
He does, however, question the extent to which experiments in protocol analysis ‘are affected 
in as yet unidentified ways’, leading one to wonder ‘if there is a quantum difference between the 
approaches used by that writer who consciously and vocally observes himself in the act of 
writing and that writer who writes in her normal writing environment, unobserved save by 
herself’ (p. 217). Others, however, have come to interrogate the model far more rigorously.  
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Critiques of Cognitive Process Models 
Michael Pemberton (1993) provides an insightful overview of the discourse that challenges the 
validity of cognitive process models as the primary representation of the writing process. He 
draws together criticisms of these models, and the information process models that preceded 
them, to demonstrate that both ‘are too specific and too bound by the cognitive in their 
purported descriptions of composing processes’ (p. 41). They are thus simply too mechanistic, 
reductionistic and limited in scope ‘to account for the full range of activities that writers engage 
in as they think about their writing’ (p. 47).  Pemberton also draws attention to some deeper 
underlying concerns expressed by these critics.  
His overview shows the extent to which cognitive process models were originally 
developed to explore the process involved in solving well-defined mathematical or logical 
problems; ‘problems that have clear goals and clear criteria for determining successful 
solutions’.  The critical discourse, he asserts, is now arguing that, because ‘writing problems’ are 
‘typically “ill- defined”, lacking easily distinguished goals and criteria for completion’, questions 
have to be asked as to ‘how well cognitivist assumptions can apply to this new domain’. 
Furthermore, the discourse avers that the imposing of the cognitivist framework on the writing 
process, is based on a faulty premise, namely ‘that components in the process of generating and 
shaping meaning to achieve a purpose in writing correspond to the components in the process 
of solving problems in logical, spatial, or quantitative relationships’ (p. 51).  This in turn raises 
questions regarding the validity of the research methodology used to reveal underlying writing 
processes, because these processes may be so complex or so hidden that they cannot be mapped 
using the standard protocols. Pemberton thus posits that ‘these models are in danger of 
seriously falsifying the inherent complexities of writing behaviour’ (p. 41).  
Richard Stewart (1994) reaches a similar conclusion. He  questions the methodology 
used by cognitivists in general, and Flower and Hayes in particular, asserting that ‘despite the 
richness of what can be learned through Flower and Hayes’ methods, they possess inherent 
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design weaknesses that need to be recognized’ (p. 35). Such inherent flaws include the 
unaddressed issue of how speaking aloud while writing interrupts the natural flow of thought 
and image making; the level of  unrepresentative data that means affective ideation is totally 
ignored; the incompleteness of the participants’ verbal reports, and the artificiality of the setting 
and conditions for writing. He therefore contends that the acceptance of Flower and Hayes’ 
ideas about composition ‘will lead us away from, rather than toward, a valid understanding of 
how writers write’ (p. 35).  One limitation, in particular, contributes the most to a misleading 
understanding of the writing process, namely, the scant attention paid to the role affective 
processes play in the process. He finds that cognitivists either exclude or barely acknowledge 
‘subconscious mental events, as well as other depth phenomena’ (p. 35) as evidenced in ‘the 
difficulty cognitive models have in representing affective processes adequately’ (p. 47). His 
argument echoes that of Susan McLeod (1991) who asserts that cognitive process models ignore 
affect because emotions, attitudes, beliefs, moods, and conations simply don’t ‘fit neatly under 
the cognitive umbrella’ (p. 95); affect is viewed as  ‘a regrettable flaw in an otherwise perfect 
cognitive machine’ (p. 97). Stewart thus cautions that embracing ‘a purely cognitive approach 
to creativity is to risk losing touch’ with its  ‘affective, imaginal, and intuitive aspects’ (p. 36).  
Two contemporary research studies led by Marion Botella (2011, 2013) confirm 
Stewart’s misgivings. The first study finds that ‘existing models do not correspond completely 
to the reality of artistic creation’ (Botella, Zenasni, and Lubart, 2011, p. 19) due to their focus 
on the cognitive components of the creative process and their neglect of the affective part of 
that process. The second study (Botella et al., 2013), an empirical investigation into the creative 
process based on interviews with 27 visual artists, finds that the artistic process ‘involves more 
than cognitive components alone’ (p. 162). Using the real-life experience of the participants ‘as 
described in their own words’, Botella et al. identify six stages of creative activity that include 
both cognitive and non-cognitive processes which interact in a ‘cyclical and dynamic’ way. Their 
detailed description of this process includes explicit references to felt sense, incubation, 
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inspiration, inner dialogue, visualisation, and ‘strong emotions’ (p. 167). These findings are 
corroborated by other studies that specifically investigate the role played by affect in the creative 
process (McLeod, 1991; Russ, 2003; St-Louis and Vallerand, 2015, Nir, 2017). They identify a 
number of affective factors, such as ‘affective ideation and primary process thinking, extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation, conflict resolution, and sublimation’ that impact the creative process 
(Russ, 2003, p. 143) and demonstrate the extent to which affect facilitates the cognitive 
flexibility necessary for idea generation and content conceptualisation. These findings are so 
conclusive that researchers confidently assert  that ‘affect seems to be embedded in the creative 
process’ itself (St-Louis and Vallerand, 2015, p. 175). The cognitive process models reflect very 
little, if anything, of this affective aspect of the writing process. As will be demonstrated later 
in the chapter, one of the reasons for the omission of the affective aspect in these models is 
that the kind of writing being investigated is predominantly DAN dominated writing.  
Debunking the Myth 
A careful consideration of these and other critiques of the cognitive process models reveals that 
the criticism is largely levelled at what these models are not reflecting, rather than what they do 
claim to represent. There is a clear sense that these critiques arise from an awareness that there 
is a writing process that is very subjective, deeply internal and intensely private;  a writing 
process that is a lived experience rather than a purely rational one, and as such, ‘always 
comprises pre-verbal, pre-reflective, and affectively valenced states (processes, events), which, 
while not immediately available or accessible to thought, introspection, and verbal report, are 
intransitively “lived through” subjectively’ (Hanna and Thompson, 2003, p. 137). But, as 
Chapter 2 clearly demonstrated, the prevailing positivist-behavioural paradigm meant there was 
no need to accommodate this affective dimension at the time the cognitive models were being 
developed. More importantly, there was also no need to explore the unquestioned assumption 
that cognitive process models provided a valid account of the writing process for all kinds of 
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writing.  This unquestioned assumption was further entrenched by the compositionists 
themselves.  
Donald Murray (1972), for example, makes a distinction between what he terms creative 
and functional writing, but then asserts that ‘the process which produces “creative” writing and 
“functional” writing is the same’, despite the products of that process being as divergent as 
business letters and poetry (p. 6). While he doesn’t define exactly what he means by these two 
kinds of writing when presenting his model, he is quite explicit about what he finds 
objectionable in the term “creative writing”. All too often, he says, this term describes writing 
that is ‘precious writing, useless writing, flowery writing, writing that is a luxury rather than a 
necessity’ (Murray, 1982, p. 135). While his view of creative writing may not be as extreme, 
Peter Elbow (1981) shares Murray’s view that the same writing process can be used to write an 
essay or generate a poem.  In Writing with Power, Elbow devotes an entire chapter to show that 
‘Poetry is No Big Deal’, demonstrating how to generate poems using the cognitive techniques 
that underlie his approach to the writing process. Even though he describes himself as a ‘non-
poet’, he says he frequently writes poems ‘in the fashion described in this chapter’ (p. 101).  
It is therefore not surprising that Flower and Hayes see no need to clarify the kind of 
writing their model is intended to represent. Such a distinction is not deemed necessary in the 
developing discourse on the writing process; a discourse that mirrors the broader conversation 
on the creative process taking place at the time. As the in-depth discussion in Chapter 3  
demonstrated, many creativity researchers assert there is no difference in the creative process 
underlying scientific innovation and that which is used in artistic expression.  They claim that 
both forms of creativity use the same process. That this single process gives rise to a such range 
of diverse products is attributed to personality and domain constraints. Within this context, the 
assumption that cognitive process models account for all kinds of writing – from scientific 
report writing to imaginative fiction writing – thus goes largely unchallenged.  
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Flower and Hayes therefore make no distinction between the process involved in 
writing essays and that involved in the writing of narrative fiction and poetry. It is only in 2010 
that Hayes alludes to the need to ‘identify certain specialized writing activities’ and qualifies this 
by defining ‘what we most commonly think of as writing’ as ‘the activity of producing text to 
be read by other people – for example, writing articles or school essays’. He terms this ‘formal 
writing’ (p. 375). Others, however, do perceive the need to be more specific. For example, 
Richard VandeWeghe (1983) in an article on how he has adapted cognitive process models to 
improve his skills in business communication, writes:   
Knowing full well that there is no single writing process model, but 
rather multiple models of writing processes, I begin the discussion 
by talking about the ways I compose a variety of discourses – letters, 
memos, reports, essays, etc. – in a variety of ways, some being more 
suited to one discourse situation than another (p. 15). 
The discourse on the cognitive writing process is far less vigilant in distinguishing the specific 
kind of writing it is addressing. The notion that cognitive process models account for all kinds 
of writing process thus persists, bolstered by scholarship that appears to support this idea, such 
as Anthony Bloor’s (1997) proposal of a cognitive model of fiction writing. Despite drawing 
heavily on the Flower-Hayes model, Bloor bases his model on the analysis of texts ‘created by 
professional fiction writers’, (p. 19) to ‘make inferences about thinking processes’ that can be 
confirmed or refuted by research in the cognitive sciences (p. x). His cool, rather clinical analysis 
of how the chosen texts reflect the thinking process underlying their production, arises from 
his research focus, namely, to address the ‘need for on-line planning tools’  for students ‘who 
perform most of their writing in a writing laboratory or resource centre’ (p. 3) owing to a ‘lack 
of writing software aimed specifically at fiction writers’ (p. 4, original italics). To this end, his 
aim is to ‘design a hypertext that will assist a student's thinking about their writing, and is 
designed for the environmental conditions in which most of their writing takes place’ i.e. the 
writing laboratory (p. 12). The model he proposes, not surprisingly, echoes that of Flower and 
Hayes, except it comprises more sub-processes.   
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 By contrast, James Fuller (1998) places the writer, rather than the finished text or 
disembodied thinking processes, at the centre of his investigation.  His exploration of the 
‘nature of students’ cognitive operations as they write narratives for three separate purposes, 
namely, to report, to explore, and to create’, finds that ‘students writing imaginative narratives 
used a greater number and richer array of cognitive operations than when writing narratives to 
report and explore’ (p. 1).  More specifically, he finds that ‘the thought processes of students 
writing narratives did not follow a rigid pattern of cognitive operations’. Instead, the data 
consistently reflects this thinking ‘as a lively and fluid activity, responsive to the thinker’s 
emotions, and goals, and responsive to the emerging material of thought itself  (p. 82), 
characterised by a ‘flexible and fluid orchestration of the various cognitive operations’ (p. 128). 
This evidence strongly supports his hypothesis that the Flower-Hayes model ‘is a process for 
expository writing, not narrative [writing]’ and ‘what is needed is a study of how writers think 
when they write narratives’ (p. 32). Admittedly, this is a very early study of the possible  
differences in different kinds of writing, and Fuller’s focus is explicitly on cognitive processing 
but, in the course of his argument, Fuller introduces a subtle but significant shift in perspective 
which is significant with regard to this dissertation.   He argues that narrative writing differs 
from expository writing because narrative thinking is ‘the cognitive process by which we make 
meaning out of the chaos of experience’ (p. 8). For this reason, he suggests that narrative writing 
is better conceptualised ‘as an artistic process’ (p. 12). These telling observations, together with 
Fuller’s description of the cognitive process of narrative writing, are reflected in the growing 
swell of conversation within the contemporary discourse on the creative writing process that is 
discussed later in the chapter.  
Contextualising Cognitive Process Models 
It is clear, then, that the value of these critiques of cognitive process models rests in what they 
do not represent rather than finding fault with the models themselves. This suggests that the 
models do, in fact, provide a valid account of a particular kind of writing process – it’s just not 
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one that provides a meaningful account of all kinds of writing, specifically the kind of writing 
used to generate imaginative fictional text, i.e. the creative writing process. What is lacking, then, 
is a conceptual framework that embraces the distinction between these two different kinds of 
writing; that is able to contextualise the cognitive process models in a way that affirms the 
valuable contribution they make to our understanding of the writing process as a whole, but, at 
the same time clearly delineates their specific area of application. As will now be demonstrated, 
the model proposed in this dissertation is able to provide such a conceptual framework.  In 
keeping with its dominance as the most referenced of all the cognitive process models, the 
Flower-Hayes model is used to illustrate the following contention, namely, that cognitive 
process models are models of a writing process that is dominated by the constrained content 
and processes of the DAN. 
According to the detailed discussion of the DAN presented in the previous chapter, 
evidence that the DAN has been activated or recruited is indicated by the presence of a range 
of distinctive markers, such as   
• an attentional shift to focus on the completion of a specific task which is clearly 
defined with regards to its parameters and goals, 
• a reliance on working and long-term memory to access pre-existing knowledge 
of both form and content, 
• a thinking process that is predominantly ordered, logical and  sequential with 
decisions regarding content and form made deliberately and rationally, 
• an emphasis on planning, objective monitoring and measured evaluation, 
• a strong focus on form, technique and craft throughout the process. 
The description of the Flower-Hayes model (1981) and the research that underpins it, carries 
clear evidence of all these markers. Participants in their research studies were given a specific 
writing task, such as ‘Write an article on your job for the readers of Seventeen magazine’. They 
were then asked to ‘work on the task’ while voicing their thoughts aloud near an unobtrusive 
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tape recorder (p. 368). The very nature of the task – that it is quite specific, with a clearly stated 
goal and defined parameters – indicates activation of the DAN. This is underscored by the 
requirement to engage with the external environment – participants are required to  speak their 
thoughts aloud so these can be recorded – and the DAN is preferentially recruited when 
attention shifts to the external environment.  
 Based on this recorded data, Flower and Hayes then design their model, which, they 
assert, reflects their finding that ‘the act of composing itself is a goal-directed thinking process’ 
(p. 366). This assertion is perfectly in keeping for a  writing process modelled on data that is 
populated with DAN markers. For example, the planning process entails ‘retrieving relevant 
information from long-term memory’ which is defined as ‘a relatively stable entity’ with ‘its own 
internal organisation’ – although the model is later modified to include ‘the addition of working 
memory’ which  ‘was an obvious oversight in the original model’ (Hayes 2012, p. 370).   The 
generated  ideas are then organised into an outline of headings and sub-headings. This organising 
process allows the writer to develop the current topic by identifying categories and the 
subordinate ideas which support and illuminate the topic. However, during this organising 
process the writer also ‘attends to more strictly textual decisions about the presentation and 
ordering of the text’ (p. 372, italics inserted). Furthermore, the actual writing of the text is 
described as a constrained process in which the title ‘constrains the content of a paper’, a topic 
sentence ‘shapes the options of a paragraph’ and ‘each word in the growing text determines and 
limits the choices of what can come next’ (p. 371, italics inserted) These choices made within 
the confines of these constraints are closely related to the goal-setting that forms an integral part 
integral of the planning process. These examples, in which the references to the many DAN 
markers are indicated by italics, clearly show how closely Flower and Hayes are modelling a 
writing process arising from the activation of the DAN. Their model can, therefore, be 
contextualised, within the framework of the proposed model, as a well-defined representation 
of a DAN-dominated writing process. Furthermore, by thus affirming what the Flower-Hayes 
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model does contribute to our understanding of the writing process as a whole, yet clarifying its 
application within a broader context, this contextualising also indicates what these cognitive 
models do not, and cannot, address or embrace, namely, a writing process that is significantly 
rooted in and shaped by DMN content and processing.  
This is evidenced in contemporary studies. Researchers using the Flower-Hayes model 
as a framework to explore brain activity, during ‘the actual creation of a literary text’ find they 
are unable ‘to control processes during phases that did not involve writing, such as the 
“brainstorming” period’ (Erhard et al., 2014, pp. 20, 22). A more recent, in-depth study 
investigates the creative writing process in a controlled environment that conforms to the 
experimental conditions of a scientific experiment (Fürst, Ghisletta and Lubart, 2017). The 
stated aim of this study is ‘to manipulate the creative process experimentally and evaluate how 
some of its dynamic features are related to the creativity of a real-life product’ (p. 202). However, 
despite arguing that the Geneplore model, with its ‘Generation/Selection perspective was the 
best fit for the central aim of the present study’, the researchers are careful to point out that the 
Generation stage, with its ‘high levels of preparation, ideation, incubation, and insight’, was not 
‘explicitly assessed in this study’ (pp. 203-204). They thus deliberately exclude that stage of the 
creative process which is associated with ‘searching for many ideas, having wild ideas, making 
original associations of ideas, trying various options, exploring unusual possibilities’, in short, ‘a 
warm, chaotic, divergent kind of thinking’. Instead they choose to focus on Selection, ‘which 
consists of evaluating, sorting and selecting ideas, criticizing one’s own work, developing and 
formalizing ideas, searching for improvements …  a cold, thorough, convergent kind of 
thinking’ (p. 205).  The role played by Idea Generation in the creative writing process is thus 
narrowly limited to its involvement ‘in crafting paragraphs, sentences, and their relationships, 
as well as in monitoring the overall structure of the text’ (p. 204). 
 Not surprisingly, this study serves as yet another example of an investigation that 
purports to be exploring the full writing process but is, in fact, only mapping DAN processing, 
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as reflected in the description of their methodology which is littered with DAN markers. 
Participants are given a writing task in which instructions are explicitly specified, among them the 
instruction that the participants are to follow specific writing strategies. These strategies are 
announced by the regular appearance of a pop-up window that requires participants to click on a 
button to read the instructions for that phase and then continue writing in accordance with these 
instructions. At the end of each phase, the number of characters typed in each text area is counted, 
‘to verify that participants used their text area in accordance with their experimental instruction’ 
(p. 207). [Once again, italics have been inserted to indicate the presence of DAN markers]. 
 The researchers, not unexpectedly, conclude that the ‘incessant instructions popping up 
from the computer, could have generated a climate detrimental for creativity’, and that one of 
the key limitations of the study lay in ‘the imposed nature of the task’. They also concede that 
their sample population may have been an additional limitation. The 174 participants were all 
undergraduate psychology students. The researchers therefore speculate that ‘the results would 
have been different in a more specific population – especially people interested in creative 
writing’ (p. 212). These limitations, notwithstanding,  the researchers confidently conclude that 
‘this study provides a unique contribution to the literature on creativity’ because it is the first to 
implement ‘a manipulation of the overall creative process for a complete task’, using a unique 
‘experimental design’ (p. 213). 
 The acute dissonance between what this study claims to measure and what it actually 
does measure vividly illustrates the way in which ‘theoretical models, even as they stimulate new 
insights, blind us to some aspects of the phenomena we are studying’ – that while the cognitive 
process model of writing ‘describes something of what writers do’, it also ‘obscures many 
aspects of writing’ (Cooper, 1986, p. 365). The proposed model makes this plain. Its framework 
not only clearly contextualises cognitive process writing models as examples of DAN-
dominated writing; it also provides a way of ‘seeing’ what has been overlooked – that there may 
be a different kind of writing that is driven by the DMN with its spontaneous, random and free-
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floating processes and its fragmented but emotionally tagged content. It is this vital element of 
the artistic creative process that is embraced in the term creative writing, i.e. the term used to 
describe the kind of writing used in the production of imaginative literary texts. 
THE MISSING DIMENSION 
Non-Cognitive Aspects of the Writing Process  
As argued above, one of the key limitations in the Flower-Hayes model is that it ignores affective 
processes in favour of purely rational thinking. This emphasis on rational thinking also 
minimises the role of pre-writing, the phase Murray (1972) describes as being so important to 
the writing process that it takes up 85% of the writer’s time because it is the phase in which 
ideas are generated. In the Flower-Hayes model, pre-writing is replaced by Planning, and idea 
generation is reduced to a significantly  smaller component in that initial phase, which it is over-
shadowed by other purely cognitive tasks such as goal-setting, organising and outlining.  
The loss of this particular aspect of the writing process is keenly felt by writing teachers, 
like Marilyn Cooper (1986), who quickly respond with alternative views. Cooper asserts that 
writing teachers, are becoming ‘increasingly disenchanted’ with ‘reading alienated and alienating 
essays written from a list of topic sentences or in the five-paragraph format’. They have 
therefore decided to focus on idea generation rather than form in the classroom and so send 
their students off ‘to do various kinds of free writing’ (p. 364). In other words, these teachers 
are reinstating Murray’s all-important pre-writing stage and making this necessary change in 
writing pedagogy because the  dominant model, which views the function of writing in solely 
cognitive terms, has ‘become too confining’ (p. 366). Instead, they turn to  ‘intuitively developed 
methods’ which ‘call for a new model of writing’ that will illuminate those aspects of writing 
only dimly perceived ‘through the gaps in the cognitive process model (p. 367). Ideally, she 
argues, such a new model would reflect an intricately interwoven process ‘in which anything 
that affects one strand of the web vibrates throughout the whole’ (p. 370). Pre-writing is one 
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such strand and there is a growing awareness that it plays an important role in the writing 
process. Researchers are thus revisiting the question of what happens before the writing begins.  
Carol Clark (1991) uses the term pre-text rather than pre-writing to explore the point at 
which the writer crosses the ‘writing threshold’ to move from mental composition to putting 
words on paper. Citing earlier studies of the writing process, she avers that this threshold is 
crossed when the writer begins writing but is also crossed ‘over and over again each time he or 
she pauses in the act of writing to reflect, edit, or mentally compose before continuing to write’ 
(p. 2). She draws support for her argument from writers’ accounts in which they speak of 
beginning to write after a ‘dawning awareness that something has clicked’. This click is also 
referred to as ‘felt sense’; that sense of inner tension that arises as the writer pays careful 
attention to his/her ‘inner reflections’ (p. 4); those ‘intuitive connections’ that form the patterns 
of the emerging ideas that will comprise the content of the text. Some writers describe this 
aspect of the process as listening to their ‘internal voices’ (p. 7). 
 Similar views are found in a collection of essays entitled, Presence of Mind: Writing and the 
Domain Beyond the Cognitive (Brand and Graves, 1994).  Collectively, these essays argue that 
stripping the writing process down to ‘focus on the cognitive’ means that the process ‘loses its 
grounding in emotions and the senses, in private and social experience, in the body and the 
unconscious, in silence and intuition’. It also leads to ‘chronically disappointing results’ (p. xi). 
They therefore assert that explorations of the writing process must ‘recognise the complex and 
unique qualities of the inner experience that do not fit readily into the prevailing structures’. The 
focus on purely cognitive processes, i.e. the ‘conscious, verbal, rational mental processes 
involved in acquiring and transforming knowledge’ effectively obscures ‘other ways of 
knowing’, specifically, internal mental events such as intuition, insight, inspiration and felt sense 
(p. 3, original italics). This non-cognitive knowing is characterised by the way it reveals itself. It 
lies ‘below our level of awareness’ and is ‘verbally inept at the outset’ until it surfaces in cognitive 
consciousness when it can be ‘conceptualized, articulated, enacted’ (p. 4).  
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The writing process they then describe is quite different to the one portrayed in the 
cognitive process models. This process begins instead with silence; a waiting on the wisdom of 
the unconscious, that ‘reservoir of feelings, attitudes, imaginings’ until a word, image or idea 
presents itself ‘unbidden at the threshold of consciousness’ (p. 39). These promptings ‘cannot 
be called up at will but must come of their own accord, on their own schedule’ (p. 40). The 
writer is simply required to maintain ‘the kind of attention which [creates] a gap in time and a 
willingness to wait and see what [will emerge] to fill that gap’. Freewriting (or pre-writing), 
however, can facilitate this part of the process; not only by ‘generating content for further drafting 
and editing’ but also by providing a way of exploring ‘the forms generated by the process’. It 
therefore allows the writer to move easily between ‘between the inner and outer worlds, between 
subject and object, and between imagination and reality (p. 43, original italics). This movement 
is guided by felt sense as the writer constantly checks to see if what is being expressed in words 
matches what has simply been sensed. The writing process is therefore, a halting one, marked 
by frequent pauses as the writer keeps ‘paying attention to what is still vague and unclear’ and 
then  waits for ‘an image, a word, or a phrase to emerge’ that captures the embodied experience 
of felt sense. (p. 115).  This waiting on the wisdom of the unconscious to fill the gap created by 
paying attention to the inner world means the writer needs to remain open to the spontaneously 
generated material which continues to inspire, motivate, sustain, or disrupt the writing act. Yet 
Brand and Graves note that, despite the valuable insights contained in these essays, ‘this line of 
enquiry remains underdeveloped [because] it is impalpable, ephemeral’ (p. 4).  
Contemporary researchers, however, are now actively pursuing this underdeveloped line 
of enquiry, with specific reference to creative writing. Their explorations are being bolstered by 
the rapid technological developments in the field of neuroscience that make investigations of 
this impalpable, ephemeral aspect of the creative writing process possible. This research 
initiative is still very much in its infancy (Woolfe, 2007); investigations delayed partly because it 
was ‘difficult to place states like emotions and moods within the computational frameworks 
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employed by cognitive scientists’. Affect therefore drew very little research attention at a time 
when significant progress was being made in ‘understanding the psychological, computational, 
and neurophysiological basis of various internal cognitive systems, including memory, attention, 
perception, and language’ (Smith and Lane, 2015, p. 2).  
A recent fMRI study does provide a clear demonstration of just how much light a 
neuroscientific investigation can shed on the non-cognitive aspects of the writing process. The 
stated objective of this study is to investigate the neural correlates of creative writing (Shah, et 
al., 2013). Noting that ‘previous neuroscientiﬁc research on creative writing is sparse and thus 
little is known about its neural correlates’, the researchers give their twenty-eight participants an 
open-ended writing task to investigate the ‘real-life creativity of literary writing.’ More 
specifically, they aim to ‘isolate [the] different cerebral networks’ that may be associated with 
this process. (p. 1089).  The findings are revealing. They provide strong evidence that the 
creative writing process is ‘comparable to verbal and episodic production in a free associative 
context’ and that this production process involves memory retrieval. The study also finds a 
close association between creative writing and the DMN. The researchers argue that this is 
because the default network, which ‘has been considered as our inner mental life’, is also 
identifiable as the source of ‘spontaneous cognition’ (p. 1097). This indicates that 
neuroscientific investigations may yet provide even more substantial support for the role played 
by the missing dimension of non-cognitive factors in the creative writing process. 
Additional support for the emerging notion that these non-cognitive factors render the 
creative writing process as being quite different from that depicted in the Flower-Hayes model, 
is coming from a surprising quarter. There are clear indications that some contemporary 
cognitivists are now actively exploring non-cognitive factors in their research. This shift in 
perspective, occasioned by the ‘explosion of research aimed at understanding the functioning 
of the human brain’ (Bhattacharya, 2017, p.R346) arising from neuroscientific research, is 
impacting not only what cognitivists are researching but also how they are researching it, as 
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evidenced in recently published research. For example, in an article entitled Mind the gap: an 
attempt to bridge computational and neuroscientific approaches to study creativity, Geraint Wiggins and 
Joydeep Bhattacharya (2014) propose a computational framework for creativity that is 
specifically designed to include ‘various facets (i.e., unconscious thought theory, mind 
wandering, spontaneous brain states) of un/pre-conscious brain responses’  in support of their 
contention that ‘pre-conscious creativity happens prior to conscious creativity’ (1);  in their 
insightful review, The Role of Intuition in the Generation and Evaluation Stages of Creativity, Judit 
Pétervári, Magda Osman, and Joydeep Bhattacharya (2016) argue that the role played by 
intuition in the creative process ‘should not be neglected as it is often reported to be a core 
component of the idea generation process, which in conjunction with idea evaluation are crucial 
phases of creative cognition’ (p.1); and in Unearthing the Creative Thinking Process: Fresh Insights from 
a Think-Aloud Study of Garden Design, Andrew Pringle and Paul Sowden (2017) not only make 
specific reference to the DMN in their discussion, but they specifically include affective factors 
in the analysis of the creative process investigated in their research study.  
  Cognitivists are not just including aspects of the creative process previously excluded 
from the creativity research terrain following Guilford’s address; they are also embracing 
different research methodologies. Expressing his reservations about the ‘artificiality of the 
experimental approach routinely adopted by most cognitive neuroscientists’ Bhattacharya 
(2017) argues that the traditional research approach is an ‘essentially reductionist practice’; one 
that, while offering ‘a well-controlled experimental design’ and the expectation of ‘cleaner data 
and interpretable research findings’; nevertheless ‘also raises serious doubts, because the tasks 
studied in the laboratory are not always good representatives of real-life situations’ (p. R346). A 
study, in which he was one of the researchers, demonstrates that he is not alone in this 
conviction. This research team departs from the traditional cognitive research approach to 
adopt instead, ‘a phenomenological approach based on the ﬁrst person experience’ in their 
investigation of spontaneous visual imagery (Luft, C. et. al.,  2019, n.p.). Studies like these show 
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that cognitivists are beginning to extend their enquiries into the non-cognitive aspects of the 
creative process, and this raises the possibility that the cognitive process models of the writing 
process will come to reflect this new perspective. Studies such as these not only enrich the 
neuroscientific understandings of the creative process; they also lend support for yet another 
emerging conversation that is arising from another unexpected quarter, namely, the modern 
academic discourse on the creative writing process.  
Modern Creative Writing academics have begun a conversation about the creative 
writing process that indicates marked differences between the purely cognitive view of the 
process and that mooted by those who hold that the process is significantly shaped by the 
DMN. Four of these differences are of particular relevance to this dissertation, namely, that the 
creative writing process is one that features two distinct thinking processes; is significantly 
driven and shaped by the unconscious; involves a range of ongoing internal conversations or 
inner dialogues, and is centred on the imagination.   
CREATIVE WRITING PROCESS IS DIFFERENT  
Before commencing this discussion,  it is necessary to define what is meant here by the phrase 
the “modern academic” discourse on the creative writing process. For the purposes of this 
discussion “modern” refers to scholarship dating from the early 1990s i.e. scholarship arising 
from the paradigm shift attributed to the rise in phenomenological-based research.  As argued 
in Chapter 4, phenomenological research offers an approach whereby models and theories can 
be developed from investigations into phenomena, rather than the fitting of phenomena into 
theoretical frameworks, an approach favoured in the pure  sciences.  This shift in research 
paradigm has opened avenues to new streams of discourse in many disciplines. One example 
of these new streams of discourse is an emerging conversation on the creative writing process, 
where creative writing researchers – teachers, practitioners and scholars alike – are contributing 
to the discussion, often bringing first-hand experience to their research enquiry.  
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The discourse is designated ‘academic’ because what these researchers all have in 
common is that, in addition to being writers themselves, they are also part of the academic 
community.  As such, they offer research-based perspectives on the writing process that draws 
on recognised scholarship in other disciplines to ground their investigations, interpretations and 
arguments.  This discourse is thus one in which researchers are engaging with each other in a 
conversation that must, of necessity, conform to the rigours of academic discourse within the 
wider research landscape. It therefore provides the basis for the following discussion on the 
four differences between the creative writing process and that depicted in the Flower-Hayes 
model.  
Two Modes of Thinking 
As demonstrated in the first part of this chapter, the Flower-Hayes model depicts a uniform 
writing process that purports to account for all kinds of writing, from scientific essays to lyrical 
poetry. This process is described in purely cognitive terms so the thinking mode underpinning 
it is primarily deemed rational, logical and sequential. The discussion above has demonstrated 
why the writing process captured in the Flower-Hayes model can be categorised as a DAN-
dominated one. A very different view is reflected in the emerging discourse on the creative 
writing process. This view posits that creative writing comprises not one, but two distinctive 
modes of thinking, with each mode playing an equally significant role in the process of 
producing literary text.  
While contributors to the discourse use various terms to designate these modes, for 
example, Effort and Effortless Cognition (Doyle, 2016); Right Brain and Left Brain thinking 
(Sonik, 2006a) or Loose and Tight Construing (Woolfe, 2007), there is nevertheless a 
consistency in their descriptions of these two modes that mirrors the consensual view held by 
both cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists. These researchers strongly support the 
notion of a two thinking modes, variously termed primary / secondary thinking (Suler, 1980), 
Type 1 / Type 2 thinking (Allen and Thomas, 2011; Sowden, Pringle and Gabora, 2015), fast / 
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slow thinking (Kahneman, 2011), or Top brain / Bottom brain processing (Kosslyn and Miller, 
2013).  According to this framework, one mode of thinking is described as being fast, automatic, 
intuitive, holistic, subjective, and emotion-laden. This mode uses parallel rather than sequential 
processing to arrive at synthesis and is the one termed primary, Type 1 or Bottom brain 
processing by the cognitive researchers and Effortless Cognition, Right Brain thinking, Loose 
Construing in the discourse.  The other thinking mode is described as slow, logical, sequential, 
and characterised by objective thinking. This mode is primarily used for analytical thinking and 
is designated as secondary/ Type 2 /and top-down thinking, or, within the Creative Writing 
discourse, as Effort Cognition, Left Brain thinking and Tight Construing. Despite the variation 
in terminology, there is a  clear consistency in these descriptions of the two thinking modes.  
 This consistency is also found in those contributions to the creative writing discourse 
that prefer to distinguish between these modes along the lines of  unconscious and conscious 
thinking (Fu, 2001; Mellor, 2004; Morgan, 2006; Shoup and Denman, 2009; Brace and Johns-
Putra, 2010a; Fontana, 2016). The first mode of thinking, unconscious thinking,  is 
conceptualised as being non-cognitive (Verbruggen, 2017); passive, unreflective (Brace and 
Johns Putra, 2010a); pre-verbal, (Peary, 2016); inchoate and voiceless (Sonik, 2006a), and as 
intuitive and imaginal (Stewart, 1994). Conscious thinking, on the other hand, is deemed to be 
cognitive (Freiman 2015a); active, reflective, (Brace and Johns Putra, 2010a), critical, analytical 
(Morgan, 2006), deliberate (Smith, 2015) and very considered (Fu, 2001). These modes, while 
termed differently in the discourse, are in total alignment with the two thinking mode 
framework. Since the contributors show a preference for this distinction, this one will be used 
in the rest of the discussion for ease of reference.   
 It is this view that the creative writing process comprises not one but two distinct 
thinking modes that marks the first significant departure in the discourse from the Flower-
Hayes model that only depicts one mode of thinking. However, an even more significant 
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difference lies in the emphasis Creative Writing academics place on the non-cognitive or 
unconscious aspects of the creative writing process. 
The Role played by Unconscious Thinking 
There is an equally clear consensus in the discourse that the creative writing process is rooted 
in the unconscious (Fu, 2001; Mellor, 2004; Sonik, 2006a; Tomlinson, 2008; Freiman 2015b, 
Fontana, 2016; Peary, 2016). Few elaborate on what they mean by the term “unconscious” so 
that Abi Curtis (2009) is partly correct in his assertion that the term is often presented as an 
unproblematic, ‘unquestioned concept’ (p. 107).  However, contributors tend to favour the 
Jungian perspective when they broadly define unconscious content and processing as that which 
is ‘not yet ripe for consciousness’ (Tomlinson, 2008, p.120). Unconscious content is thus 
described as comprising lost memories, repressed ideas and subliminal perceptions 
(Tomlinson); as well as the ‘wisps of dialogue’ and ‘columns of narrative’ generated by life 
experience (Peary, 2016, p.10) that lie below the level of conscious awareness. Unconscious 
processing is conceptualised as being one of ‘continual synthesis’ (Curtis, p. 108), which, 
through this synthesis, gives rise to those pre-verbal, ‘noncognitive but deeply known, 
inexplicable yet deeply felt’ aspects of the writing process  (Verbruggen, 2016, p. 27) – aspects 
such as intuition, inspiration, incubation and felt sense (Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010b; 
Verbruggen, 2017). The unconscious ‘with all its preverbal knowing’ is regarded as being ‘central 
to the invention phase of creative writing’ (Peary, p. 9), serving not only as the source of the 
ideas that birth the text, but also as an active agent in their further unfolding (Fu, 2001; Sonik, 
2006b), through the impetus of its own inherent processing mode of continual synthesis  
(Horne, 1990; Mellor, 2004; Robertson, 2016).   
 Those contributions that trace the specific role played by the unconscious in the creative 
writing process, provide valuable insights  (Fu, 2001; Ruddy, 2005; Tomlinson, 2008; Fontana, 
2016). These consistencies are very neatly captured by Kai-Ni Fu (2001) in an extended treatise 
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on the creative processes of Virginia Woolf.  Vividly illustrated by many detailed references to 
Woolf’s diaries, this dissertation convincingly argues that,   
• the writer’s unconscious serves as a ‘major source’ for writing ideas (p. 44), by reflecting 
the extent to which Woolf ‘initiated her writings by drawing on her unconscious where 
her feelings were not words yet’ (p. 87), and then allowed the ideas to germinate in her 
unconscious until they surfaced, ripe for the ‘conscious effort’ of writing (p. 12); 
• the writer’s experience of felt sense, intuition, inspiration and incubation are firmly 
linked to the workings of the unconscious. Pertinent quotations from the diaries reflect 
how Woolf first senses an idea or image arising from the ‘psychic contents’ of her 
unconscious, and then nurtures that unfolding image or idea until it is fully conscious 
and ‘becomes written words’ (p. 44); 
• the writer’s engagement with the unconscious and its psychic contents takes the form 
of internal dialogue, and that it is this active, lively dialogue leads to the writing of the 
text. Fu uses the Bakhtinian notion of inner dialoguing in his discussion of the way 
Woolf used her notebooks to ‘go further down into “the heart of the country of the 
unconscious” to have an inner dialogue with what she finds there’ (p. 222); 
• the writing process involves a dynamic ‘interplay between the conscious and the 
unconscious’ that continues until the written product is complete (p. 44). Fu contends 
that this interplay is a ‘crucial element’ in the ‘whole creative process’ (p.7), a contention 
that is substantiated by his close reading of Woolf’s diaries.  
Fu’s contribution offers an insightful view of the extensive role played by the unconscious in 
the process of literary text production, a view that is echoed in all the other treatises that 
examine this role more closely. However, his contribution is particularly valuable because of its 
insights into the internal conversations that he suggests are part of Woolf’s process. While not 
expressed in such clear unambiguous terms, other contributions also describe the writer’s 
interaction with the two thinking modes as taking the form of inner dialogues. Some go a step 
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further and posit that the two modes are also in dialogue with each other throughout the writing 
process. This is the third key difference between the cognitive process models and the 
conceptualisation of the creative writing process emerging from the academic discourse. 
Internal Conversations / Inner Dialogues 
The notion that the creative  writing process involves a constant and dynamic interaction with 
and between the two thinking modes has only emerged fairly recently and so, in some cases,  
the conversation reflects fairly tentative explorations.  
Some contributors adopt a cautious approach and simply suggest that the writing 
process entails a shifting between the two thinking modes. Doyle, for example, observes that a 
‘typical feature of the creation of fiction in all of its stages’ is a continual alternation between 
‘reflective thought in the writingrealm and nonreflective improvisation in the fictionworld’ (p. 
32). Woolfe, similarly, describes the writing process as a cycle that involves ‘alternating skilfully 
between these two modes’ (p. 91). In both these contributions, it is the writer who interacts 
with the thinking modes, alternating between the two in the course of producing the written 
text.  Others, however, extend this notion to embrace the idea that there is a dynamic interaction 
taking place between the thinking modes themselves. Wendy Morgan (2006) argues that the 
writing process involves more than just a moving between ‘the intuitive and the deliberative, 
between inner world and social world’ (p. 26); that there is, in addition, an interplay ‘between 
deliberative, evaluative, critical intellect and intuition, conscious and unconscious [thinking]’ (p. 
32). This interplay, she conjectures, arises from the two thinking modes working ‘in partnership’ 
(p. 18), each bringing its own unique qualities to the interaction. She posits therefore that  
[the undermind] offers material that’s exuberant, richly associative, 
far-fetched, nonrational, even excessive; that’s precisely its function 
and value. … the outer world provides my undermind with materials 
(my sensory experiences of my world’s objects, with all their 
particularity and their encoded meanings). And the undermind 
performs its alchemy with these … the conscious mind evaluates 
and crafts what intuition offers (p. 26). 
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Sonik (2006b) shares this view. She speaks of the conscious and unconscious as being engaged 
in ‘a productive dialogue with the unconscious’, and urges that creative writing pedagogy should 
include the building of ‘useful tools and strategies for facilitating a good creative relationship 
between the two’ ( p. 2). Sonik’s notion of ‘productive dialogue’ is amplified by Peary (2016) 
who posits that ‘all creative writing begins as intrapersonal dialogue’: 
it’s in the terrain of the preverbal that a writer hears his or her 
intrapersonal voice, that dialectic of call and response, the internal 
inquiry characteristic of imaginative rhetoric which lets a piece of 
writing begin … When a person contemplates the preverbal, it’s 
intrapersonal voice that steps onto the scene, bearing wording, 
phrasing, imagery—the beginning of content (p. 11). 
As already mentioned, it is Fu who is most articulate on this issue of the interaction between 
the two thinking modes, arguing that the writer’s engagement with this dynamic interaction 
takes the form of  inner dialogues. He avers that ‘the crucial element’ in the creative writing 
process is ‘the interplay of a writer’s unconscious and conscious’ (p. 7) which continues ‘until 
they complete a written product’ (p. 44). According to Fu, once content generated in the 
unconscious is ‘pushed upward toward the shore’ and ‘consciously felt’, the writer begins to 
transform this sensed content into words by engaging in ‘an act of a carnivalesque discourse’. 
This carnivalesque discourse, he describes as ‘a lively dialogue’ between the writer and his/her 
private vision that encourages the ‘excavation of more images or visions’, which, in turn, 
become part of this conversation. Fu, however, goes on to identify a second inner dialogue. He 
avers that even as the writer is engaging in a dialogue with his/her private vision, there is a 
‘countervailing force’ at work, namely, the ‘process of a deliberate effort’ that is required to 
materialise the sensed images/vision into ‘the ones that can be described in words’. The writer 
thus engages in a second dialogue, i.e. a dialogue between writer and language with the push 
and pull of these two dialogues creating an inner tension that can only be resolved by putting 
pen to paper (p. 249). In the conclusion to his discussion, Fu acknowledges that his ‘theory of 
a writer’s interior voyage toward writing is still a broad view of how a writer proceeds in his/her 
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interior creative process’ because much of ‘a writer’s interior creative process still remains 
unknown to us’. He can therefore not  propose ‘more specific details about how the interplay 
proceeds’ as ‘the language for the procedures is yet to be discovered, or those procedures 
happen too fast for us to capture’ (pp. 261-262). 
Other contributors address this very issue, finding a meaningful way of accounting for 
this phenomenon in the Jungian construct of Active Imagination (Sonik, 2006b; Tomlinson, 
2008; Ruddy, 2015; Fontana, 2016).  These contributions provide compelling evidence to 
support the view that Active Imagination is an effective way of engaging with ‘the interplay of 
conscious and unconscious material’; a strategy deliberately invoked through the ‘inward 
contemplation’ of ‘inwardly observed phenomena’, in which ‘conversations with inner figures 
play an especially prominent role’ (Ruddy, 2015, pp. 6, 13). They also reflect the extent to which 
this engaging with the interplay between ‘a conscious desire to create, and the ‘creative 
unconscious’ (Fontana, p. 7), by ‘intuitively or spontaneously engaging in imaginal dialogues’ 
(p. 50), serves a wider purpose in that it helps the writer ‘understand and navigate the creative 
process’ itself (p. 311).  
These explorations of the writing process within the framework of Active Imagination 
do more than offer unique perspectives on the creative writing process. They also point to the 
fourth key difference between the Flower-Hayes model and the emerging discourse, namely, 
the role played by the imagination. The contributors all make explicit references to the 
imagination as the site of the inner dialogues, averring that it is in their imagination that they 
speak with ‘the person or being in my imagination’ (Tomlinson, p. 86) and “watch” these 
characters play out the plot of their stories (Fontana, 2016;  Freiman 2015a; Smith, 2015). The 
frequent references made to the imagination by these contributors, and many others in the 
discourse, strongly suggest that imagination plays a central role in the creative writing process.  
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The Centrality of the Imagination 
As demonstrated in the discussion on the unconscious above, the imagination is also largely 
presented as an unquestioned, unproblematic concept. This is reflected in the variations in 
terminology. Many contributors simply speak of the imagination as if everyone already has a 
clear understanding of what is meant by the term and thus see no need to define it (Woolfe, 
2007; Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010b; Wandor, 2012; Bradley, 2013). Others, however, offer a 
qualified terminology, speaking instead of ‘creative imagination’ (Horne, 1990, p. 119) or 
equating it with the ‘creative unconscious’ (Fontana, 2016, p.7). Yet, despite these differences 
in terminology, the discourse does seem to suggest that the imagination is being reinstated as 
one of the key components in the creative writing process.  
 Contributors speak of creative thought springing ‘from the imagination’; of pre-writing 
serving to facilitate ‘the process of imagining’ that ultimately leads to ‘the creative release of 
passion and imagination necessary to begin [the] work’ (Brace and Johns-Putra (2010b, p. 407) 
and writers being surprised by ‘jubilant leaps of the imagination’ during a writing process that 
is often filled ‘chaos and uncertainty’ and ‘unexpected contingencies’ (Woolfe, 2007, p. 36). 
Some regard the entire writing process to be so infused with  the imagination that it is seen as 
playing the ‘greater part’ in informing and shaping the final text (Horne 1990, p. 39).  Those 
who share this view include Sue Woolfe (2007) who describes the writing of novels as ‘vast, 
sustained jobs for the imagination’, (p. 128), and  Michelle Wandor (2012) who argues that the 
writing process itself is better conceived as ‘an imaginative process [that] must necessarily be 
directed into a speciﬁc convention/genre’ (p. 58).  She is so convinced of this, that she speaks 
of ‘imaginative writing, instead of ‘creative writing’ when referring to the writing of prose 
ﬁction, poetry and drama (p. 52), asserting that the ‘the crucial process’ in literary text 
production ‘happens between the writer’s imagination and the page’, (p. 56). She thus argues 
that it is not only critical therefore to understand ‘what goes on in the mind, in the imagination 
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itself’ (p. 58),  but also necessary to consider the possibility that ‘each of the core ﬁctional genres 
– prose, poetry and drama – engages the imagination in different ways’ (p. 62). 
In the main, explanations as to how the imagination fulfils its role in the creative writing 
process range from the purely poetic to the highly speculative. The imagination is described as 
being ‘the meeting place’ of the conscious and unconscious aspects of the writing process, i.e. 
the site where the interplay between the two takes place (Fu, p. 43). It is in this space that the 
inchoate, sensed material arising from the unconscious is clothed in language and the 
paradoxical dualities of vision/reality, imaginary thinking/literary convention, spontaneity/craft 
are reconciled ‘into complementary parts’ (Horne, p. 132). It is here that the writer is able to 
‘embrace both inner and outer, subject and object’ to arrive at ‘a unity [of] realized duality’ 
(Woolfe, p. 36); a unity that transcends the apparent paradoxes and antitheses so that it becomes 
possible to see ‘the blues and violets, in a painting of an orange’ (Sonik, 2006a, p. 24). For this 
reason, the imagination is viewed as an ‘alchemical vessel’ in which conscious and unconscious 
elements are ‘transposed and restructured into the creative piece’ (Fontana, pg. 2) that 
comprises an imagined world, peopled by characters crafted from the imagination (Hansen, 
1996).  
As appealing as this description is, it is very reminiscent of Romantic view of the 
imagination as  a ‘living power’ that ‘dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate’ (Woolfe, 
2007, pp. 25-26). This, however, does not mean it can be discounted for, as the next chapter 
will demonstrate, it is increasingly being validated by neuroscientific research, that enables its 
reframing it within a contemporary context, as Romanticists, to their delight, are now 
discovering (Bruhn, 2009 & 2013; Richardson, 2012 & 2013). This reframing further supports 
the reinstating of the imagination as central to the creative writing process in that, according to 
the discourse, it embraces all the differences identified here – the two thinking modes, the 
unconscious and the dynamic interplay between the thinking modes and the writer’s 
engagement with that interplay through Active Imagination.  
211 
 
For this reason the imagination can be rightfully regarded as the most definitive 
difference between a purely cognitive writing process and one that includes both cognitive and 
non-cognitive aspects. Furthermore, its significant presence in the contributions to the 
emerging discourse, and its total absence in the cognitive process models, strongly indicates the 
need for a different model for the creative writing process; one that will provide a more 
satisfactory account of both its cognitive and non-cognitive elements.  
DOYLE’S ‘TENTATIVE’ MODEL   
It is clear from the preceding discussion that any model of the creative writing process must 
embrace both the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of this process. There is an evident 
consensus in the discourse the process comprises ‘a mixture of conscious and unconscious 
decisions’ (Mellor, 2004, p. 44) and so any model of the creative writing process must allow for 
the juxtaposition of the ‘ostensibly immaterial and unconscious with the material and conscious 
elements’ within its framework (Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010a p. 42) in a way that reflects ‘the 
importance of acknowledging and valuing both’ (Sonik, 2006a, p. 2). A meaningful attempt to 
develop a systemic model that meets this criteria is that proposed by Christine Doyle (1998) in 
her seminal work, ‘The Writer Tells: The Creative Process in the Writing of Literary Fiction’. 
Based on the commonalities she finds in the in-depth interview she conducts with five 
contemporary fiction writers, she proposes a ‘tentative’ model of the fiction writing process that 
is enriched by ‘theoretical concepts from psychology, phenomenology, and literary theory’ (p. 
29). According to this model, the writer alternates between two spheres during the writing 
process – the writingrealm and the  fictionworld. The writingrealm is defined as the sphere in 
which the writer withdraws from the from everyday life with the intention to write a specific 
work, and later, to reflect on what has been written. While in this sphere, the writer is ‘highly 
self-conscious’ and the thinking is ‘intentioned, purposeful, reflective’ (p. 31). It is a sphere 
characterised by solitude, clear intent and ‘active judgement’ (p. 34) and one that draws on 
‘ordinary’ cognitive thinking processes such as ‘recognizing, comparing, analogizing, and 
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evaluating’ (p. 36). However, when the writer is in the sphere of the fictionworld, ‘the self-
conscious, intentioned, purposeful mode of being’ gives way ‘to another mode of experience’. 
In this fictionworld, the purposeful writer becomes rather the passive observer of ‘the unfolding 
world of characters and events’; an unfolding narrative in which imaginary characters, ‘take on 
a reality of their own’ (pp. 31, 33).  Doyle thus posits that the thinking processes of the 
fictionworld are ‘fundamentally different from thinking in the writingrealm’ (p. 36), because ‘the 
experience of the fictionworld’ contrasts so sharply with that of the writingrealm: 
Rather than being solitary, it is peopled with characters conjured up 
by narrative improvisation. Rather than feeling self-conscious and 
purposeful in the fictionworld, authors feel as though characters act 
and events unfold independently of their conscious control, 
sometimes in ways that surprise [them] (pp. 33-34). 
The writing process described in this model is thus ‘more fine-grained, less linear’ than the 
neatly sequential stages suggested by the cognitivists. Instead, ‘writers find themselves 
navigating among several different spheres of experience, revisiting spheres such as the 
writingrealm and fictionworld repeatedly’ (p. 36).  Doyle’s later treatise on the two thinking 
modes, which she terms Effort and Effortless Cognition (2016) aligns these modes with the 
spheres of writingrealm and the fictionworld respectively. Her model thus embraces both 
cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of the fiction writing process she is investigating.  
Defining fiction as ‘an artistic form in which the imaginary world’  unfolds through the 
writing of it (p. 32), Doyle outlines a writing process that closely mirrors that described by the 
visual and performing artists discussed in Chapter 4. She, too, speaks of the process beginning 
with ‘seed incidents’ that are so ‘intriguing, puzzling, mysterious, haunting, or overwhelming’, 
that they compel the writer to engage in further ‘exploration and discovery’ (pp. 29-30). Like 
the cited artists, fiction writers then actively engage with spontaneously emerging material, i.e. 
the imaginary characters, by taking time to ‘experience’ them; ‘getting to know them’ intimately, 
and being ‘deeply affected’ by them (p. 33). Once the writing begins, however, the writers are 
confronted with the unpredictability of the unfolding narrative because ‘although characters 
213 
 
and events may begin with seed incidents … they typically change as events in the fictionworld 
unfold’ (p. 34). It is this ‘nonreflective narrative improvisation in a fictionworld’, Doyle argues, 
that is so very different to the ‘typical cognitive processes’ used in the writingrealm,  and it is 
this that gives the writing of literary fiction its distinctive character.  
She, however, does take pains to point out that this ‘schematized description’ of the 
process is a ‘tentative’ one. It is tentative, and justifiably so because model is based on just five 
interviews. Doyle can thus do little more at this stage than reflect the commonalities in these 
interviews and suggest ways in which they connect with each other. Her model,  therefore, is  
largely a descriptive one. It does not go as far as explaining how and why the process unfolds 
as it does in the same way that the neurophenomenological model does. To be fair to Doyle, 
she did not have the benefit of the wealth of neuroscience that underpins this model at her 
disposal. The value of her model, however, lies in its suggestion that the creative writing process 
comprise two distinctive thinking modes, one cognitive, the other non-cognitive. The proposed 
model is based on the same premise and Doyle’s contribution thus strongly supports the 
hypothesis explored in the next chapter, namely, that the proposed model can serve as a more 
satisfactory model of the creative writing process.  
This chapter has argued that the cognitive process models of the writing process, such 
as the Flower-Hayes model, are unable to account for all kinds of writing from scientific essays 
to lyrical poetry. It has demonstrated that, sound as these models may be, they can only account 
for writing that is predominately DAN-dominated. A brief overview of the emerging 
conversation in the modern academic discourse on the creative writing process has highlighted 
four key aspects of this process that are not accounted for by cognitivists, namely, the way 
creative writing process involves two modes of thinking; the role played by the unconscious in 
this process; how the creative writer experiences the interplay between these two modes in the 
form of inner dialogues, and the centrality of the imagination. Contributors to the discourse 
thus argue that any model of the creative writing process has to accommodate both cognitive 
214 
 
and non-cognitive processing in a way that acknowledges and values the contribution made by 
each. Doyle’s model attempts to do this but while it succeeds in describing some of the process, 
it does not provide an explanation of how and why the process unfolds as it does.  However, 
the close correlations between the discourse and the artistic creative process captured in the  
neurophenomenological model proposed in Chapter 5 strongly suggests that this model can 
provide a more satisfactory account of this process.  This possibility is explored in the next 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MODEL AND FICTION WRITING  
Here I sit before a yellow legal pad … a jumble of crossed-out lines, false starts, confused 
order. A mess. The mess of my mind trying to find out what it wants to say. This is a writer’s 
frantic, grabby mind.  (Patricia Hampl, 1996 quoted in Freiman, 2015a, p. 63) 
 
The previous chapter illustrated the extent to which the research-based discourse on the writing 
process has been dominated by cognitivists, often unaware that they are addressing 
predominantly DAN-dominated writing. However, it also showed how threads in the modern 
academic discourse on the creative writing process indicate that this process is one significantly 
shaped by non-cognitive aspects. These non-cognitive aspects play such a significant role in the 
process that contributors strongly advocate that any model of the creative writing process has 
to include the non-cognitive aspects, alongside the cognitive.  A brief discussion of Doyle’s 
model demonstrated that an attempt has been made to do this, but this model has rightly been 
described as a tentative one – it offers some description of the process, but does not provide 
an explanation of why the process unfolds the way it does. However, the close correlations 
between the discourse and the artistic creative process captured in the  neurophenomenological 
model proposed in Chapter 5 strongly suggest that this model can provide a more satisfactory 
account of this process 
  This chapter pursues the possibility that the proposed model, which effectively depicts 
the complex, multi-layered process of artistic creativity – embracing both its cognitive and non-
cognitive aspects – is able to  provide a more meaningful description of and explanation for the 
creative writing process, specifically the process that underlies the writing of fiction, i.e. 
imaginative prose.   The explorations of this possibility follows a similar approach to that used 
to arrive at the neurophenomenological conceptualisation of the artistic creative process. In 
other words, it begins by examining the first-hand accounts given by fiction writers themselves 
as they reflect on their own process of producing a text of imaginative prose. The discussion of 
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these accounts is framed by the proposed model to reflect the high levels of correlation between 
the two. The chapter thus argues that the proposed model is a good fit and this particular 
creative writing process is better conceptualised as a neurophenomenological process. The 
implications of arising from this are discussed in the concluding section.  
SETTING THE SCENE 
The detailed analysis of the artistic creative process presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated that 
this process involves two distinct modes of thought. The mode of thinking termed Idea 
Generation is the mode that gives rise to the content of the artwork.  It is a mode characterised 
by spontaneously arising images, moments of inspiration, times of incubation and an intuitive 
engagement with this emerging material through felt sense. The mode of thinking termed Idea 
expression is the mode required to giving physical expression to the generated ideas in an 
appropriate form, i.e. the mode used for the material production of the artwork. This mode 
draws on craft knowledge acquired through the mastery of skills and techniques, and developed 
into expertise through much practice. Neurobiological evidence indicates that the mode of 
thinking primarily involved in Idea Generation is closely associated with DMN activation, while 
that of Idea Expression is closely associated with DAN activation. This artistic creative process 
was then captured in a neurophenomenological model that allowed the first-hand subjective 
accounts of the artists and the third-hand object knowledge arising from neurobiological 
research to sit comfortably side by side in a mutually illuminating and enriching relationship. 
Attention now turns to the writing process involved in the production of imaginative 
prose, a topic that is so significantly under-researched that ‘much more is known about the 
processes of the visual artist than about those of the fiction writer’ (Woolfe, 2007, p. 72). As 
the previous chapter demonstrated, this paucity of research can largely be attributed to the 
dominance of cognitive process models. This chapter, however, aims to redress that imbalance 
by examining the first-hand subjective accounts given by fiction writers themselves. To this end, 
the chapter will focus on the creative writing process as reflected in four anthologies, namely, 
217 
 
Novelists on the Novel (Allott, 1959); Novel Ideas: Contemporary Authors Share the Creative Process 
(Shoup and Denman, 2009);  Writers and Their Notebooks  (Raab, 2010), and  Inside Creative Writing: 
Interviews with Contemporary Writers (Harper, 2012). The accounts contained in these anthologies 
are augmented by the findings of two formally conducted surveys into the fiction writing 
process, namely, ‘When the Book Takes Over’: Creativity, the Writing Process and Flow in 
Australian Fiction Writing’ (Paton, 2012) and ‘Rethinking the Writing Process: What Best-
Selling and Award-Winning Authors Have to Say’  (Sampson, Ortlieb, and Leung, 2016). 
This selection is strongly biased towards contemporary novel writing and this is a 
deliberate decision. Of all the genres in fiction, the novel is relatively new to the stable of literary 
fiction (Boyd, 2009; James, 2015; Bohman, 2016). As a ‘mixed genre’ whose ‘origins lie in a 
dozen different forms’ (Bohman, p. 2), the novel has a looseness, a formlessness that offers 
such ‘tremendous variety’ (p. 86) that its form can be shaped by content rather than convention. 
Yet this very loose formlessness, this dispensing with rigid convention, creates a new, perhaps 
even more demanding criterion, namely, that the novel should conform strictly to its own 
inherent ‘unity of design’ (Allott, 1959, p. 14) where every small facet contributes to the 
coherent whole. Coherence, rather than convention, thus becomes the ‘invisible default’ as all 
the threads of the fictious narrative in the novel are woven together to create an ‘an intuitive 
unity’ (Colomb and Griffin, 2004, p. 293).  
This weaving together of the threads of a fictious narrative is a long, onerous task that 
demands an ‘ongoing commitment’ and a readiness to embrace ‘a longer term dwelling’ within 
the fictious world (Bacon, 2017, p. 248); a long immersion in this fictious world as the writer 
undertakes such a vast and sustained work of the imagination (Woolfe, 2007).  For these 
reasons, the discussion will concentrate on writers’ accounts of the novel writing process.  It 
should be noted that while Miriam Allott’s anthology does not fit the criteria of contemporary 
novel writing, it has been included to reflect the level of historical consistency in these accounts. 
As will be demonstrated in the discussion that follows, Allott’s anthology shows that the 
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consistencies reflected in contemporary accounts have historical precedence and cross socio-
cultural boundaries.  
Three factors have influenced the decision to use existing accounts rather than conduct 
an empirical study: In the first instance, as will be demonstrated, the existing accounts all offer 
such a high level of consistency that it is unlikely another empirical study of the phenomenology 
of the fiction writing process would result in a picture significantly different from that arising 
from existing accounts. The second reason behind the decision to use existing accounts is that 
the selected texts reflect the views of approximately 175 creative writers. Not only would it be 
difficult to replicate this sample size in an empirical study in the time frame of this dissertation, 
but a database of that many contributions is able to provide a significant enough sample size to 
enable consistencies to be traced with a measure of confidence. The third reason an empirical 
study does not form part of the dissertation’s argument is that an independent study of the 
neurobiology of the proposed model would require the kind of cross-disciplinary research that 
requires a lengthy time period, significant levels of specialised expertise and substantial funding 
to undertake meaningful exploration of this component of the model. For these reasons the 
discussion that follows is based on the four selected anthologies and two research studies  that 
all explore the process of writing imaginative prose.  
WHAT FICTION WRITERS SAY 
Even a cursory reading of this selected material reveals the most telling departure from the 
cognitive process model – the unmistakably significant role played by the unconscious in the 
process described in these accounts and the research studies. Elizabeth Paton, for example, 
reports that of the 41 published Australian fiction writers she interviewed, nearly 70% made 
specific mention of the key role played by the unconscious in their writing process. While few 
writers in the other anthologies use the term ‘unconscious’, almost all mention markers 
associated with DMN processing, such as  
• a clear indication of attentional shifting to an inward focus, 
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• an active engagement with spontaneously generated but emotionally compelling images, 
• these images being intuited or apprehended through intuition or felt sense,  
• the need to wait upon a random and unpredictable process that follows its own rhythms 
and patterns in a spontaneous, diffused way, 
• evaluating this emerging, sensed or intuited material according to the criteria of whether 
or not it ‘feels right’, 
• descriptions of these non-cognitive as aspect of the process being characterised by 
terms such as intuition, inspiration, incubation and  imagination. 
Frequent references to these markers are found in 19 of the 20 responses given to Barbara 
Shoup and Margaret-Love Denman; in 20 of the 26 contributions made to Diana Raab’s 
publication, and in 12 of the 14 interviews conducted by Graeme Harper.  
Allott’s anthology, however, shows that this is not a phenomenon unique to 
contemporary fiction writing or to a particular socio-cultural context. Her anthology comprises 
a collection of extracts drawn from the original writings by an array of historical, canonical 
novelists, ranging from Samuel Richardson (1748) to early twentieth century writers such as 
Virginia Woolf, D.H. Lawrence, Anthony Trollope, and Aldous Huxley. The extracts are 
thematically arranged and 35 of these novelists are represented in the section specifically 
devoted to the fiction writing  process. While these accounts of the writing process predate the 
use of the term ‘the unconscious’, they contain an equally high incidence of DMN markers and 
unmistakeably clear references to  DMN processing. The inclusion of writers such Gide, 
Flaubert, de Maupassant, Stendhal, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky indicates that this phenomenon is 
consistent for writers across historical periods or socio-cultural settings. The consistencies in all 
these anthologies will now be discussed in greater detail, following the framework suggested by 
the proposed model.  
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Idea Generation 
Writers themselves are aware that, broadly speaking, creative writing is different from other 
kinds of writing. The difference lies in the fact that creative writing is ‘a way of exploring 
subjective experience [that] … involves a use of the imagination, liminal and subliminal’ 
(Harper, 2012,  p. 58). For example, Maggie Butt, a professional journalist and an established 
fiction writer, says that in her experience,    
writing as a journalist, or writing a letter or a diary, is a different sort of 
act from writing a poem or a story … With poetry and stories, you 
have to conceive the idea … With journalism, diaries, letters, the idea 
is usually there already … [there is] an essential conceptual and 
imaginative difference (Harper, pp. 56-57).  
 
Whether intentionally or not, Butt’s reply pinpoints the most marked distinction between DAN-
dominated writing and creative writing, namely, the conception, generation and development 
of the ideas that form the content of the text. This aspect of the writing process receives the 
least amount of attention in the cognitive process models, possibly, because, as Butt suggests, 
‘the idea is already there’. However, the anthologies consistently reflect the dominant role played 
by idea generation and development throughout the fiction writing process. Writers repeatedly 
locate their impulse to write in the rise of a spontaneous, internally generated image that is so 
compelling it captures and engages the writer’s attention. The descriptions of the writing 
process that follow reflect the extent to which the fiction writing  process is shaped by the 
unfolding and subsequent development of this initial image.  
Spontaneous images and Seed Thoughts 
 
Fifteen of Shoup and Denman’s interviewees (75%) explicitly speak of their writing as a 
response to a spontaneously generated image that is so emotionally charged that they are 
compelled to write to relieve the rising inner tension. They trace the beginning of their novels 
to ‘something [that] comes in my head and won’t leave’ (p. 89), to spontaneously arising images 
and/or voices that ‘become so pushy and demanding that I really have to write it. Initially, it’s 
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intense: I sometimes feel like I’ve got a gun trained on my head until I get it down, first draft or 
outline at least’ (p. 300). They speak of voices so compelling  that ‘I just had the impulse to jot 
it down, I don’t understand why’ (pp. 215-216); of images so engaging that even if ‘it comes in 
the middle of the night, I get up. I don’t take notes. I write the thing itself until I drop’ (p. 252). 
Valerie Martin is prompted to take up her pen by the  image of a weeping maid:  ‘When I started 
the book, my original intention was to find out why that maid was weeping. I thought, “What 
is she crying about? She must know something.” It was where the idea for Mary came from’ (p. 
224). In similar vein, Sena Jeter Naslund describes how ‘the idea for Ahab’s Wife came to me 
out of the blue. I wasn’t expecting it at all … I had a vision and I heard a voice. The vision was 
of a woman on a roof walk, or a widow’s walk … I just suddenly saw her up there’ (p. 246). 
Alongside these descriptions of the fiction writing  process beginning with images that 
emerge ‘suddenly’ or spontaneously in blinding flashes of  insight, are those that describe idea 
generation occurring in a more diffuse, gradual process. But even these writers, whose ideas 
‘accumulate over time’ (p. 103), find they are impelled to write as a cluster of ideas becomes so 
imbued with a sense of ‘weight and dramatic power’, (p. 171) that there is no rest until the 
writing begins. They write to release the book ‘swimming around in my head’ (p. 282). That 
Shoup and Denman are not reflecting a unique perspective on how the fiction writing  process 
begins is evidenced in the historical accounts found in Allott’s anthology.  
Allott observes that novelists consistently speak of their writing beginning with figures 
that ‘offered themselves spontaneously to the imagination’ and  then ‘haunted [the writer] until 
he evolved on their behalf the situations and circumstances in which they could fully come alive’ 
(p. 119). Flaubert, for example, says he writes because ‘my imaginary characters pursue me’ (p. 
155), while Conrad is so ‘haunted by the fate of Nina’ and the ‘companions of my imagination’ 
that it becomes his practice directly after breakfast ‘to hold animated receptions of Malays, 
Arabs and half-castes’ as he pens his first novel, Almayer’s Folly (p. 286). Some of Allott’s 
novelists go a step further in their accounts, tracing the source of these initial ideas back to an 
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object or event that they frequently describe as being the seed that, over time, germinated and 
birthed these imaginary but compelling characters: Nathaniel Hawthorne comes across a rag of 
scarlet cloth bearing the letter A that ‘strangely interested me’ (p. 136); Anthony Trollope is 
captivated by the shadowy figure of a church warden on a visit to Salisbury cathedral, and Marcel 
Proust is prompted by an evocative memory vividly recalled as he wiped his mouth with a 
napkin. Henry James professes that ‘most of the stories straining to shape under my hand have 
sprung from a single small seed, a seed as minute and wind-blown’ as a ‘floating particle in the 
stream of talk’ that nevertheless has a ‘needle-like quality, the power to penetrate’ (p. 138). He 
habitually records these penetrating particles, these small seeds, in the notebook he always 
carries with him (Poirer, 1986). 
Like James, the writers interviewed by Raab (2010), also use notebooks or journals to 
record seed ideas; so much so that she terms these notebooks and journals the ‘seeding ground 
for future works’ (p. 185). Writers consistently speak of jotting down whatever catches their 
attention because ‘these are the kernels for my writing’ (p. 18). These fragmentary notes are 
then stored in notebooks ‘so that the seed can grow’ (p. 25). Rebecca McClanahan likens this 
writing down of seed thoughts to ‘addressing a postcard to myself and dropping it into the 
mailbox of my unconscious’ (p. 130). Neuroscientists would identify this act as the priming of 
the DMN whereby the random, free-floating activity of the DMN is activated by the smallest 
fragment of an idea or the tiniest sliver of an experience that has engaged its attention (see Chap. 
5, pp. 143-145). Not all writers, however, are as acutely aware of the seeding of their text. Most 
of the writers in the anthologies rather attribute the beginning of their writing process to a 
spontaneously arising, but highly compelling image or voice.  
Robb Forman Dew speculates on the possible connection between seed thought and 
compelling image, suggesting that ‘one little detail is like a magnet. It pulls together all the little 
bits and pieces that eventually make up the whole person’. She is adamant, however,  that ‘the 
creation [of the image] on my part isn’t conscious’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 149). Michael 
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Chabon concurs, stating that for him: ‘It’s such an intuitive process that for the most part I’m 
not even aware that it’s happening’ (p. 122). Neuroscience affirms these observations. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the DMN does, in fact, randomly combine disintegrated 
fragments of memory to form emotionally charged composites that bear little resemblance to 
their component parts (Chap. 5, p. 142). More importantly, both the content of these 
composites and the process by which they are formed,  lie below conscious awareness. It is only 
when the composite carries a sufficiently high emotional valence that the unconsciously formed 
composite crosses the threshold into conscious awareness. Which explains why writers 
consistently describe these images as coming ‘out of the blue’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 246) and 
being so compelling that the writer feels pursued or haunted by them.  
Moreover, whether the writing process begins with a seed thought or a compelling 
image, writers readily identify the unconscious as the source of their ideas. E.M Forster  speaks 
of letting down a bucket ‘into his subconscious’ to ‘draw up something normally beyond his 
reach’. It is this ‘stuff’ in the bucket,  he says,  that comprises ‘the substance of the work’ (Allott, 
p. 158). Like Forster, others also tell of reaching into ‘the deep primordial bog’ that is ‘fed by 
the trash and treasure of our days’ which is then ‘slowly changed into something else [so that] 
we writers never quite know what we’re going to get when we dip our ladles in’ (Paton, p. 67). 
Reginald Gibbons describes the notes in his journal as ‘hints of what was already moving in my 
memory and unconscious’. These notes then serve as ‘floating markers of my unconscious … 
that level of my inner life where the thoughts and feelings first arrive’, acting as reminders to 
‘go back and search the depths beneath’ (Raab, pp. 121-124). Wally Lamb is particularly 
articulate in this regard when he explains the symbology that enriches his work: 
I’m writing symbol on an unconscious level and when it sort of bubbles 
up to the surface and becomes conscious to me, then I can use it … I 
had no memory of even writing about whales, but when it became 
conscious to me, I could begin to work with it, sculpt it almost like 
clay, and use it to help me understand the ‘whys’ of Dolores’ story 
(Shoup and Denman, p. 203). 
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It seems from all these illustrative examples that, like Proust, fiction writers are very aware that 
‘creating the work of art I now felt ready to undertake’ will be a difficult undertaking because 
it does not exist ‘consciously in my mind’; that each of its constituents parts will need to be 
constructed ‘out of a different sort of material’ (Allott, p. 141). The different sort of material 
Proust is alluding to is clearly the unconscious content derived from the unconscious 
processing of the DMN, content not yet available to his conscious mind.  
Incubation 
However, whether this content initially arrives in the form of a spontaneous, but compelling 
image, begins as a small seed, or gradually accumulates weight and dramatic power in a more 
gradual, diffused process, writers consistently describe the writing of the text as being both 
preceded by and subsequently interspersed with pronounced periods of incubation.  They find 
that, before the writing begins, it is necessary to let this internally generated material ‘float 
around in my mind for months, swirl around and collide and spark off other ideas’ (Paton, p. 
67). Chapter 5 offers a neurobiological explanation for this. It asserts that just as the DMN 
generates its material through random combinations, its free-floating, unconstrained processing 
is equally arbitrary, unpredictable and beyond conscious control. Incubation thus refers to the 
time the DMN takes to generate new ideas that carry sufficient emotional valence for them to 
cross the threshold into consciousness. In this regard, writers describing their writing as 
beginning with a seed thought is especially appropriate because it includes in its embrace the 
time the seed takes to germinate and ripen. More importantly, it highlights the fact that this is 
not a mechanical process that can be carefully managed. DMN processing, like seed 
germination, is inherently organic, and unfolds in its own distinctively dynamic way. Ha Jin, for 
example, describes his writing process as beginning with ‘the seed of a story’ that stays ‘a long 
time in me until I begin to work on it’ until it gradually sprouts ‘into the shape of a story’ 
(Harper, 2012, p. 176).  
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Contributors to Raab’s anthology (2010) similarly describe their writing as beginning 
with something ‘small and incomplete’, and then living with this unformed  idea for some time 
until ‘solutions present themselves, characters thicken into existence, the plot stretches out a 
slim new tendril, and you follow it’. During this time of incubation, the initial idea is cradled in 
the mind ‘like a ripe peach in the hand’ (pp. 183-184) or, like compost, is left  to ‘breed a while, 
rot a while’ (p. 127) until the idea mutates into ‘something much larger’ (p. 67). For Katherine 
Towler her writing  process ‘always begins with character, with the shadowy images of imagined 
people who live in my mind’. She then spends time ‘listening to them, waiting for them to reveal 
themselves’ in an incubation process that ‘takes patience and takes place over time, not days or 
weeks but months and years’ (p. 40). That this is not a process that can be controlled or hurried 
is frequently reflected in the writer’s accounts which tell of these initial incubation periods 
lasting anywhere from 6 months to 6 years or more.   
The work of incubation, however, can be facilitated, either by priming the DMN and/or 
engaging in free, unconstrained writing. The anthology accounts reflect writers doing both, 
pointing to the important part played by notebooks and journals in this part of the writing 
process. Writers frequently describe recording whatever catches their attention in journals or 
notebooks. They find that the act of noting topics and questions amounts to giving the mind 
an assignment, and ‘once the assignment is given, my mind starts looking for ways to complete 
it’ (Raab, p. 130). The ideas that arise from this priming are often explored in free writing; a 
form of writing described as ‘feathering about with various ideas’ (Allott, 1959, p. 153) or 
‘thinking aloud on paper’ (Harper, p. 164). It is playful, unconstrained writing in which ‘the 
journal functions as a playground for the mind, a haven where the imagination can cavort at 
will’ (Raab, p. 11); freely hopping ‘from one image to another, one idea to another, surprising 
us with connections we had not known were there’ (p. 130). Others use freewriting in a more 
focussed way, using pre-writing to explore their characters ‘until these people are literally 
walking around in my head, impatient for the novel to begin’ (Shoup and Deman, p. 304), or to 
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write ‘several pages of content in my note book … fast and furiously’ (Raab, p. 32) in what 
Henry James calls a ‘preliminary private outpouring’ (Allott, p. 151). Kate Grenville is ‘a great 
believer in free writing’, in these preliminary private outpourings, because they often lead a 
writer to finding out what ‘you really want to think about – the thing that really matters to you’ 
(Harper, p. 165); to finding what Sheri Reynolds terms is ‘the kernel of the book’ (Shoup and 
Denman, p. 269). 
Writers, however, also consistently refer to periods of  incubation occurring during the 
writing of text. William Tremblay speaks of needing to sleep on the evolving work ‘for several 
nights before the next mage that will drive the process further gets unpacked on the page’ 
(Harper, p. 73). Similarly, Michel Cunningham describes going through ‘two or three very dark 
months’ before he finds the thread that lets him continue  ‘writing the book that seems to be 
presenting itself’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 138). Patricia Henley frames her experience of the 
fiction writing process as a continuous cycle of incubation, giving a vivid portrayal of how her 
ideas unfold: ‘I knew Kate, I knew she was going to be a midwife, and I knew that she had had 
a troubled love life. That’s all I knew at the beginning’. However, as she begins writing, she says, 
she is very aware that ‘something’s cooking in me. I’ll get glimmers of it once in a while as I’m 
going about my day. But it’s not ready to spring forth on the page yet … I wait it out, and 
usually when I least expect it the first sentence of that next section will come to me’ (pp. 187, 
189).  Even then, she finds that some of the characters only emerge or are only fully integrated 
in successive drafts. 
It is this ongoing cycle of seeding, incubating and  writing – what E.M Forster terms 
the ‘waxing and waning rhythm’ of the writing process (Allott, p. 247) – that leads Dorothy 
Allison to describe the fiction writing  process as ‘the long work of living in the novel’ (Shoup 
and Denman, p. 74).  Writers thus find that this continual waiting upon the emergence of 
internally generated material means that the writing process is very slow work indeed; on 
average, the writers in the anthologies take anywhere between 6-10 years to write their novels 
227 
 
(Allott; Shoup and Denman; Harper), reflecting the extent to which the processes of the DMN 
cannot be hurried. However, writers need to stay attuned to this internal processing throughout 
the writing process, alert to the emergence of any new material. This sustained and intense 
inward focus strongly indicates the activation of the DMN. 
This waiting upon DMN-generated content is coupled with another clear DMN 
indicator, namely, the unpredictability of the random, free-floating processes that characterises 
its activity. Unlike the writers engaging in DAN-dominated writing who can carefully plan the 
text before writing it, creative writers find themselves caught up in a cloud of uncertainty, 
occasioned by ‘the unpredictability of the course followed by the novelist’s imagination’ (Allott, 
p. 120). 
Unpredictable Unfolding  
Fewer than five writers across all the anthologies explicitly state that they plan the work 
thoroughly before beginning to write it, and then keep to that plan. Allott mentions Dickens 
who had to plan those novels which were initially published as serials, as well as the writers of 
detective fiction who have to work out schemes ‘with the skill of a good chess-player’(p. 179).  
Harper is told by Iain Banks that ‘I discovered that what works for me is to plan thoroughly 
before I start to write and then stick to the plan’ (p. 67), while Jane Smiley, a writer of murder 
mysteries, uses charts and index cards to ensure her plot is developing according to plan (Shoup 
and Denman).  
None of the other writers begin their writing in this rational, logical way. In fact, some 
express quite vehement views on the idea of planning a work before they begin writing. Samuel 
Richardson states that unlike those who ‘forming an agreeable plan, write within its circle’, he 
is a very ‘irregular writer’ who ‘can form no plan; nor write after what I have 
preconceived’  (Allott, p. 144). Similarly, Stendhal finds that ‘drawing up plans freezes me stiff’ 
(p.146), as does Sheri Reynolds, who says that when she does write a novel according to a 
predetermined plan, it doesn’t quite get off the ground; ‘it lacks magic. It lacks soul’ (Shoup and 
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Denman, p. 268). Andy Brown simply dismisses pre-planning out of hand, stating that if he 
knows what it is ‘going to be about before I’ve really begun writing it, then I don’t see much 
point in writing it’ (Harper, p. 68). This is not to say that these writers don’t make use of 
planning aids such as charts, maps, diagrams and spreadsheets – they do, but, like Xu Xi,  they 
use them simply to stay ‘on track’ ( p. 75), especially when writing long, complex novels with 
multi-layered characters, plots and timelines.  
Yet, even when writers do draw up rough outlines, they find it difficult to keep the 
characters ‘inside their outline’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 304). Like Walter Scott, they find 
themselves led astray from their purpose as ‘characters expand under my hand; incidents are 
multiplied, the story lingers, while the materials increase … and the work is closed long before 
the point I proposed’  (Allott, p. 145). Most describe a process of simply following where the 
characters and or plot leads, beginning with ‘only the vaguest idea what a project will be when 
I start’ (Harper, p. 155), and of not being sure ‘where the plot was taking me’ (Raab, p. 32). 
Larry Brown’s description of  his experience of this following of unfolding ideas is particularly 
articulate:   
I get motivated enough to put down a few words and see where it goes. 
That’s how I begin. I don’t really have any kind of a theme and usually 
not much of a story … People just pop up .. That’s why I never use an 
outline. I usually don’t even have any notes. I usually just begin, and 
then the whole writing of the story of the novel is a process of 
discovery for me […] It’s such a messy process, writing a novel. You 
don’t know where you’re going. You don’t know how long it’s going 
to take you to get there (Shoup and Denman, pp. 90, 97). 
In similar vein, Kate Grenville says she begins with ‘a shapeless thing and just keep prodding 
and adding and re-arranging and exploring. Eventually it more or less lets you know what kind 
of a thing it might be’ (Harper, p. 71). That these writers are not describing an idiosyncratic 
writing practice is reflected in the findings of Paton’s survey. Of the 41 Australian fiction writers 
who participated in the survey, over half ‘elaborate early ideas in notes, character sketches, rough 
plot outlines’. Yet, even when they have a rough synopsis in place, they still adopt a fluid 
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approach in their writing process, letting new ideas arise and shape the flow.  Writers thus 
frequently speak of being surprised by the ‘stuff [that] just wove itself in and out spontaneously’ 
(Shoup and Denman, p. 250), the way ideas  ‘open out to me more and more’ as the writers let 
the initial idea ‘flow where it will’ (Allott, pp. 156, 251). Wally Lamb, for instance, says: 
Probably the biggest sign of just how much I didn’t know or how the 
story was sort of revealing itself step by step was that on the floor in 
front of me there was this three-pronged trail of index cards. Almost 
like dominoes. I don’t do a lot of thinking or planning ahead. I don’t 
have an ending in sight. I don’t know who the characters are … Along 
the way I’m surprised on a daily basis (Shoup and Denman, pp. 211- 
212). 
This is a far cry from the neatly planned approach advocated by the cognitive process models 
where the writer carefully organises the content of the text before beginning to write. For these 
novelists, the writing process is very different: ‘each piece of writing is in some way a step into 
the dark; [so] you have to be prepared for surprises’ (Harper, 2012, p. 72). This notion that 
fiction writing is like stepping into the dark is undergirded by how often writers like Nadine 
Gordimer, speak of writing as ‘exploration’ (p. 117).  They tell how they ‘only discovered what 
it was about’ during the writing of the text; and of making ‘all kinds of surprising discoveries 
and decisions along the way that I never could have foreseen’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 121).    
First drafts are generally undertaken ‘to see what I’m writing … to see what the book is 
and how it’s going to be best told’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 131). Writers describe the writing 
of this first draft as the text revealing itself ‘page by page, day by day’; of finding ‘I only know 
what to write when I get there’ (p. 260). For this reason, says, Patricia Henley, ‘you have to be 
very patient … there are so many things you don’t know, that you can only find out by writing 
the book’ (p. 190). This writing in order to discover the story is not unique to these writers. A 
survey of the writing process of 39 published authors conducted by Michael Sampson, Evan 
Ortlieb and Cynthia Leung (2016) finds that, for most writers ‘the story, content, or voice of 
each character reveals itself during the process of writing as opposed to before the drafting 
process’ (p. 268).  
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This finding affirms the fiction writer’s experience of ‘the unpredictability of the course 
followed by the novelist’s imagination’(Allott, p. 120) because ‘you have to let the computer of 
your subconscious lead the way’ (Harper, p. 72) – and this subconscious ‘has its own way of 
going about its business’ (Raab, p. 14). It is this unpredictability that leads Harper to describe 
the act of creative writing as ‘mobile and fluid’; as an exploration of ‘possibilities with, and 
through, words’ (pp. 5-6), and James Brown to liken fiction writing to treading an unknown 
path, in which 
you discover what it is you want to say during the writing process. In 
fact, what you originally thought you wanted to say, and what you 
actually end up writing, aren’t always the same thing … the work is 
malleable – an evolving, living thing in a constant state of flux (Raab, 
p. 3)  
 
However, the malleability of the work is not restricted to the generation of ideas and their 
unfolding during periods of incubation. As will be demonstrated,  the DMN also exerts a strong 
influence on that part of the writing process concerned with the production of the text itself.  
Idea Expression 
 
The anthologies and studies selected for this discussion are heavily weighted in favour of Idea 
Generation as this is regarded as the most mysterious, inexplicable part of the fiction writing 
process (Le Guin, 1989). Where writers do speak of the process of writing the physical text, 
they consistently make mention of the sheer effort required to undertake the extensive 
rewriting, the multiple drafts, and numerous revisions that is necessary to produce the finished 
text. This is accompanied by an intense focus on detail (Allott; Shoup and Denman). It’s no 
wonder then that Flaubert writes, somewhat despairingly, ‘I’ve written 25 clear pages (25 in six 
weeks) … I’ve so much worked them over, recopied them, altered the, handled them, that for 
the moment I can make neither head nor tail of them’ (Allott, p. 149). Many writers share 
Flaubert’s experience. ‘Oh God, it took a long time to get Bone’s voice right. How did you go 
about doing that? I kept writing it over and over … I did, like, thirty-eight drafts’ says Dorothy 
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Allison (Shoup and Denman, p. 77); ‘I wrote that novel five times. Completely,’ recalls Larry 
Brown (p. 92); and Charles Johnson tells how in the six years it took him to write Middle Passage, 
‘I threw out 3,000 pages to arrive at the final 250 of the final manuscript’ (p. 195). The hard 
work of revision is painstaking work that involves ‘ruthless objectivity’  and requires the novelist 
to ‘work at the sentence level, considering syntax, punctuation, and vocabulary until each 
sentence in the novel says exactly what she means for it to say and connects smoothly and 
logically to the sentence before and after it’ (p. 58). These brief comments give little insight into 
the sheer effort involved in this writing of the text. For a deeper understanding of what writers 
describe as the hard work, the agony of crafting the text (Dueben, 2013), one needs to return 
to the modern academic discourse on creative writing.  
Insights from the Modern Discourse  
Chapter 4 argued that artistic creativity involves both the generation of novel ideas and then 
the embodiment of those ideas in some physical form. For the fiction writer, this embodied 
form comprises the wording and shaping of the material text (Tomlinson, 2008). As Carol Clark 
(1991) points out, ‘ideas aren't writing until they become written words. All the intricate plots 
waking writers in the middle of the night don't become short stories unless they are written 
down’ (p. 2). The process of giving form to the ideas generated by the DMN is thus described 
as a process in which the text moves from ‘formlessness to ever-increasing form, from multiple 
possibilities to a stabilized structure’ (Peary, 2016, p. 5). This is what is encompassed by the 
term Idea Expression which refers to the physical act of creating the text. 
This simple term, however, belies the challenging process underlying this act of writing, 
which is unpredictable, uncertain and haphazard. In similar vein, the following discussion that 
travels neatly through the stages of Pre-writing, Drafting and Revision, reflects a neatly ordered 
linear progression from first words to finished manuscript which is far from the reality of lived 
experience. The unpredictability of the ideas emerging randomly from the DMN means that 
writers sometimes find themselves returning to pre-writing in the middle of their writing 
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process, revising sections as they go or deleting large portions of text already written in a far 
more recursive process than the ensuing discussion might suggest. Rather than being a smooth 
progression through the various draft, the act of writing the text follows a pattern of rise and 
fall similar to that encountered in a game of snakes and ladders. 
Pre-writing: While some writers do engage in a form of pre-text writing, this generally 
takes place at the stage when ideas are being generated and is therefore usually confined to 
notebooks and journals. As stated in the previous chapter, the purpose of this writing is 
essentially to capture fleeting thoughts, ephemeral images and sensed intimations arising from 
the unconscious (Fu, 2001; Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010a; Raab, 2010; Peary, 2016; Sampson, 
Ortlieb and Leung, 2016). At this stage the writer is still playing with possibilities, exploring 
options, toying with potential avenues. It is only when the writer crosses the writing threshold 
(Clark, 1991) and makes the conscious, intentioned and purposeful decision to begin drafting 
the text that the writing begins (Doyle, 1998). It is then that the writer attends to the shaping of 
the content, giving these ideas coherent, material expression through the writing of the text 
itself (Clark, 1991). 
Drafting: The drafting of the text is described as that phase of the process when the 
freedom and spontaneity associated with idea generation not only gives way to the ‘discipline 
and craft’ to develop these ideas, but simultaneously requires that the writer ‘achieves a 
synthesis’ by balancing the two – combining the heady excitement of idea generation with the 
cooler, considered thinking needed for idea expression (Horne, 1990, pp. 35-36). The challenge 
of maintaining this balance is intensified by the deeper, underlying challenge of finding words 
for the (often) inchoate images and sensations that have only been intimated through felt sense. 
For writers, whose medium is language, drafting the text is experienced as hard work, an agony, 
in which finding ‘every word is a struggle and every sentence is like the pangs of birth’ (Boyd, 
2009, p. 352). Marcelle Freiman (2015a) explores this aspect of the process in some detail, 
arguing that the agony of drafting lies in the hard work of making visible, ‘the vivid inner, 
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shifting and imaging, perhaps film-like or dream-like, perceptions of memory and imagination’ 
(p. 53). During this embodied process, the writer is seeking to bridge the gap between that 
which has been ‘sensed in a blurred or incomplete way’ and the cognitive articulation of that 
pre-verbal material through appropriate, fitting language (p. 54). Heidi Smith (2015) echoes and 
elaborates this view. She argues that creative writing is essentially a visually-led process that 
begins in a figural space populated with ‘fleeting free-floating ephemeral imaginings and 
sensations’ that are difficult to discuss because they are ‘other-than-verbal’ (p. 102). Drafting 
the text is thus an onerous task that requires the writer to give expression to this visual, felt 
material that arises ‘before even words emerge’ (p. 42), and for which ‘words are incom-
mensurate’ (p. 88).   
Writers adopt different approaches to overcoming this challenge. There are those who, 
like Virginia Woolf, choose to write a rapid first draft (Fu, 2001) before beginning the work of 
revision to polish this rough, unfinished writing in a series of redrafts. They do so because it is 
in the writing of this first draft writing that they ‘find out what they want to say’ (Freiman, p. 
56). Others, like Elizabeth Smart and Nadine Gordimer, prefer to compose their first draft 
mentally before they put pen to paper (Horne, 1990; Harper, 2012), and there are those who 
prefer to revise as they write (Harper, 2012).  However, no matter the writer’s preferred practice, 
the challenges of the drafting process remain the same – of giving worded expression to that 
which is ‘essentially seen and sensed (felt) in the body’ (Smith, p. 103, original italics). This is the 
challenge of the first drafting, no matter if this is the drafting of a compete text or the drafting 
of a sentence or a paragraph. 
Revision: As already stated, the neat distinctions between pre-writing, drafting and 
revision are artificial, being more useful as ways of conceptualising the fiction writing process 
than delineations of the process itself.  Writers rarely experience the process in these tidily 
ordered stages. Siri  Hansen (1996), for example, says: ‘It’s hard for me to talk about writing as 
distinct from revision, since they are intrinsically part of the same process. Whilst I left major 
234 
 
revising until the end, I was engaged, as any writer is, in the moment to moment revision that 
is an inevitable part of the act of writing’. She does, however, assert that revision ‘is possibly the 
most important feature of writing, that willingness to go back and review, to let previous 
judgements go and allow the text to evolve’ (pp. 30, 32). 
Shoup and Denman (2009) describe revision as the process of ‘bringing the written 
novel closer to your vision’ (p. 58). The challenge of this task is similar to that of the first 
drafting of the text in which ‘the novel you see in your mind’s eye, the shape you sense inside 
yourself must be translated to words; but words are a second language to the heart. Ultimately, 
they fail us’  (p. 69). During revision, the writer aims to make the gap ‘between the novel inside 
you and the one in the world as small as it can be’ (p. 70). By way of illustrating the enormity of 
this task, Freiman references Flaubert who ‘notoriously struggled, managing through numerous 
paper-based drafts to retain certain sentences, images and words, to develop others and reject 
many paragraphs, honing the story to its bare bones and maximum effect’ (p. 62). Theodor 
Geisel reportedly drafted and redrafted over 1 000 pages to produce a 60-page book (Boyd, 
2009). These writers are not unusual. A study of writing practices finds that writers generally 
make four to ten revisions per piece of writing (Sampson, Ortlieb and Leung,  2016) thereby 
supporting the view that the ‘creative formulation’ which dominates this phase of the writing 
process is the revision process whereby ‘the material is worked and reworked to fit the 
individual’s aesthetic or artistic sense’ (Ruddy, 2015, p. 13). 
 The discourse, however, does not just reflect the process. It also identifies the mode of 
thinking that underlies it. Contributors uniformly equate text production with the ‘critical 
evaluative thinking’ that is ‘a necessary, complementary, productive partner’ in the creative 
writing process (Morgan, 2006, p. 32); speak of the ‘conscious self’ as the agency that is involved 
in the drafting and revising of the text (Salibrici, 2008), and demonstrate how the writer’s 
‘cognitive decisions and choices’ can be traced through successive drafts and revisions of such 
a text (Freiman 2015a, p. 48). Furthermore, there is a wide consensus that the writing process 
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is a conscious one because it is an embodied one (Mildenberg, 2004; Woolfe, 2007; Brace and 
Johns-Putra, 2010a; Freiman, 2015a; Bohman, 2016; Peary, 2016).  Contributors argue that the 
consciousness ‘usually represents the conclusion of nonconscious processing’ (Woolfe, 2007, 
p. 47) and first ‘comes to birth in the body’ (Mildenberg, 2004, p. xiii), in the  embodied subject 
(the writer). It is then ‘realised in part through a set of embodied practices in space and 
structured around the things writers need to proceed; the assemblage of spaces, objects, 
materials, technologies, skills and institutional structures that enable the work’ in which the text 
is viewed as ‘the material object around which the creative energy circulates’ (Brace and Johns-
Putra, 2010b, p. 409). This discourse is so populated with DAN markers that it is easy to believe 
the entire process is DAN-dominated in the same way as depicted in the cognitive process 
models. The writers’ accounts, however, reflect a slightly difference reality. In their experience, 
the shaping and structuring of the literary text, i.e. Idea Expression, is significantly influenced 
by the DMN. 
Finding Form through Felt Sense 
Aside from those writers working in a genre that demands considered planning, meticulous 
plotting and careful sequencing, such as murder mysteries, fiction writers generally describe the 
shaping of the form of their text in the same organic, dynamic way that they describe the 
conceiving of the text.  This strongly suggests that the DMN continues to exert a robust 
influence on the physical  expression of the conceived ideas; that its role is not limited to idea 
generation but extends to idea expression, and the shaping of the final text. This is evidenced 
in the high incidence of DMN markers in the writers’ accounts of how they shape and give 
form to their ideas.  
The writers describe the architecture or structure of the text as being  ‘dictated by the 
evolution of the story’ (Shoup and Denman, p.  282). They happily confess that ‘I really never 
thought about the structure of a book, or how I would go about building it’ (Shoup and 
Denman, p. 159) because ‘I’m never sure if a character is leading me into a story or a novel’ (p. 
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231). This is a  starkly  different approach from that depicted in  the cognitive process models 
which emphasises the need for careful planning and clear structuring before writing 
commences.  As highlighted earlier, fiction writers generally eschew this approach. So much so 
that there are those who, like Kate Grenville,  readily admit that they have ‘only the vaguest idea 
what a project will be when I start’ so they ‘never start a book at the beginning … [I] always 
just plunge into the bit I’m looking forward to writing and build out from [there]’ (Harper, p. 
155). Most novelists, however, describe how they first let the characters ‘tell me about 
themselves’ and then, once they have a clear understanding of who these characters are, they 
turn their attention to structure because ‘structure is an empty house. Once you know who lives 
in the house, you can design it around them’ (Harper, p. 164).  
Yet, even as writers describe writing ‘out of sequence’, or writing ‘organically’  (Raab, p. 
14), one has to ask, how do fiction writers then go about finding the appropriate form for their 
text? As Henry James argues, while he ‘cannot imagine composition existing in a series of blocks 
[because] … a novel is a living thing’, it is form alone that ‘takes, and holds and preserves, 
substance – saves it from the welter of helpless verbiage that we swim in’  (Allott, p. 235). How 
then do writers achieve the ‘skilfully unified structure’; that ‘interdependence of story, plot, 
character, dialogue and setting’ which creates the organic coherence that allows the work to 
exist as ‘an organised and unified whole’ (Allott, p. 163)? The responses given by the fiction 
writers clearly indicate the significant role played by the DMN in the finding of this ‘organised 
and unified whole’, in the developing of this ‘skilfully unified structure’.   
They assert, quite simply, that the writing itself ‘will dictate the form, if you listen to 
what it’s saying’ (Harper, p. 72). Yet what they describe in such deceptively straightforward 
terms is in fact, a long, hard process – much of this listening for form only happens as they 
relentlessly revise, redraft, rework the initial writing. It is as Patricia Henley says: ‘you can only 
find out by writing the book. And then you have to rewrite it, sometimes many, many, many 
times’ (Shoup and Denman, p. 190). It is in this rewriting many, many, many times that writers 
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find what they call the rhythm of the book; a rhythm that then determines ‘what fits and what 
doesn’t – what feels right and what doesn’t’ (p. 282). They find this rhythm by listening carefully 
with an ‘inner ear’ and ‘attending to the feeling in my gut’ (p. 125); by ‘intuitively [feeling] the 
drive and the heartbeat of the book’ (p. 178). Lewis Nordan provides a clear illustration of how 
he experiences this. As with so many other writers, he, too, never knows the shape of the novel 
when he begins, but says he finds it developing intuitively. He explains how this happens for 
him: 
it’s almost impossible to speak logically about the sources of intuition. 
If pressed to say when intuition guides me, or by what name, I guess 
I’d say it’s a feel for the rhythm of the story. When the action in Red’s 
store stops and the point of view slides up to the rafters where the 
pigeons are discussing what they’ve been watching, I was responding 
intuitively to something in the rhythm of the story’s telling (p. 261). 
 
These consistent references to form being shaped by intuition, instinct, or what Allott calls the 
‘internal logic of the imagination’ (p. 173), clearly indicate that this is not an entirely conscious 
process – these are all unequivocally DMN markers. Further evidence that the DMN influences 
this shaping of the writing is reflected in how often writers describe attuning themselves to an 
inner, felt sense as they make stylistic decisions and structural choices. Paton suggests a rational 
explanation for this felt sense, describing it as little more than a form of evaluation based on a 
feeling of resonance. She attributes it to an internalised sense of what works and doesn’t work 
that is acquired through extensive reading.  She may be proved right, but the fact remains that, 
as demonstrated in the previous chapter, both inward attentional shifting and felt sense are 
unmistakably DMN indicators.  
This brief exploration of the writers accounts given in the selected anthologies and 
supporting has provided significant evidence to demonstrate just how very different the creative 
writing process is from that depicted in cognitive process models. In the words of Dorothy 
Allison: ‘there’s nothing reasonable about the [creative writing] process. It’s a completely 
unreasonable process’ (Shoup and Denman, 2009, p. 74). The frequent references in the writers’ 
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accounts to spontaneous idea generation, incubation, intuition and felt sense; as well as 
references to the uncertainty, unpredictability and surprise experienced as both the content and 
form of the text unfolds, clearly indicate the strong presence DMN activity in the creative 
writing process. Moreover, the consistency of these references throughout the writers’ accounts 
strongly indicates that there is an underlying pattern to this process. Some may find this 
surprising – Dallas Baker (2013), for example, in his review of Harper’s anthology, finds himself 
surprised by the significant coherence in the writers’ responses and the high levels of agreement 
in their accounts. He would probably be even more surprised at the high level of consistency in 
the writers’ accounts discussed here – accounts which span more than two centuries – as well 
as that found in the wealth of additional scholarship on a writer’s experience of the fiction 
writing process not specifically cited here, but consulted while researching this dissertation (see 
for example, Woolf, 1953; Le Guin, 1989;  Dillard, 1990; Faqir, 1990; Doyno, 1991; Lamott, 
1995; Hansen, 1996; Atwood, 2002; Bradbury, 2015; King, 2012; Bradley, 2013; Dueben, 2013; 
Monk, 2016). These additional accounts reflect the same patterns identified in the selected 
anthologies.  
 The significance of this pattern of consistency points to the possibility of a coherent 
narrative about the fiction writing process which has always been there, just not visible, so that  
the process has come to  be regarded as essentially ineffable and shrouded in mystery (Le Guin, 
1989; Elliot, 1994; Ellwood et.al., 2009; Berg, 2010; Harper, 2012; Mayers, 2015). However, the 
many close correlations between the writer’s accounts discussed above and the artistic creative 
process as depicted in the proposed model strongly suggest that the neurophenomenological 
model can be applied to the process of producing a text of imaginative prose. This in turn 
suggests that it would, in fact, be possible to arrive at a coherent narrative of the fiction writing 
process that is describable, comprehensible and communicable.  
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BRINGING MODEL AND PROCESS TOGETHER 
It could be argued that the hypothesis that the proposed model can also be applied to any form 
of creative writing arises from the decision to discuss the fiction writers’ accounts within the 
model’s framework. This is a justifiable criticism for, as already mentioned, reflection always 
includes the danger that ‘you see what you want to see’ (Chap. 2, p. 47). However, the hypothesis 
is not only supported by the compelling evidence presented in the discussion of the writer’s 
accounts above. Additional support lies in a broader conceptualisation of creative writing as an 
artform because it shares so many characteristics with the creative process found in other 
artforms, and in the research findings from studies investigating the non-cognitive aspects of 
the creative writing process. 
Creative Writing as Artform 
The notion that it could be more helpful to conceptualise creative writing as an artform is not 
unique to this dissertation. Many contributions define creative writing in this way, either 
implicitly or explicitly (Fuller, 1998; Doyle, 1998; Boyd, 2009; Donnelly and Harper, 2013; 
Chemi, Jensen, and  Hersted, 2015; Smith, 2015; Lunke and Meier, 2016; Neale, 2018). This 
dissertation contributes to the conversation by drawing together four threads that provide 
strong support for this speculative position. The first thread comes from scholarship that clearly 
associates creative writing with the other artistic disciplines; the second thread is found in the 
many close correlations between the writer’s accounts given above and those of the artists 
discussed in Chapter 4; the third thread is based on the argument that creative writing, like the 
other arts, is concerned with meaning-making, while the fourth thread focusses on the central 
role played by the imagination in the artistic creative process.  
Creative writing scholars find that creative writing can be closely associated with 
disciplines of art, design, dance, musical composition and performance because of the shared 
experiences of the creative process (Doyle, 1998; Donnelly and Harper, 2013; Chemi, Jensen, 
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and  Hersted, 2015; Neale, 2018). Doyle intimates that a conversation with practitioners of other 
artforms could be rewarding because ‘fiction is an artistic form’ (p.34) and that ‘it would be 
interesting to see whether this kind of construct could be useful in exploring the creative process 
in the other arts as well’; Donnelly and Harper (2013) argue that ‘interaction between creative 
writing and other art forms’ could be a productive line of enquiry for creative writing researchers 
(p. 178), and Smith (2015) posits that identifying the commonality in art practices will allow 
creative writing researchers the freedom ‘to systematically use certain words or concepts 
“borrowed” from other artistic domains’ (p. 36). Derek Neale (2018) is strongly supportive of 
this view. In his phenomenologically-based exploration of the creative writing process, he 
argues that in many ways ‘creative writing bears greater similarity to the disciplines of art, design, 
dance, musical composition and performance than either English literature or language, in that 
experience of the creative process is the central focus’ (para 1). Conceptualising the creative 
writing process as an ‘artistic activity, (para 2), will thus allow its phenomenology to be informed 
by the ‘various theoretical contexts concerning the epistemology of artistic activity’ (para 6).  
Evidence that this is not totally idle speculation lies in the second thread: the many 
points of intersection between the writers’ accounts discussed above and the descriptions of 
the artistic creative process outlined in Chapter 4. Whether provided by visual artist, performing 
artist or fiction writer, these accounts all describe a process in which the parallels are so close 
that the descriptions are almost interchangeable; the only difference being that each of these 
artists works in a specific medium. They thus reflect a process beginning with spontaneously 
arising material that compels them to engage in the creative process; of periods of incubation 
and a slow unpredictable unfolding of both content and form; of playful interaction with 
emerging ideas and the hard work of giving material expression to fleetingly sensed impressions; 
of being surprised by the developing artwork, and of being guided by in internal dialogues 
through felt sense, active imagination and intuition. The close correlations in the descriptions 
of all these accounts strongly suggests that, whether the medium of expression is pen and ink, 
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music, clay, dance or language, the underlying process is very much the same across all artistic 
endeavours.  
 In addition to these clear parallels in the creative process as experienced by artist and 
writer, there is the third thread, namely, that both regard their artistic endeavours as being 
concerned with meaning-making. Fogelberg and  Maxwell are very clear on this point (see Chap. 
4, pp. 162-164), while Creative Writing scholars posit that creative writing can be defined as an 
art form because ‘art is intrinsically about meaning-making’ involving a holistic process the 
embraces ‘senses, bodies, perception, feelings and emotions’, as well as technical prowess. 
Furthermore, they define creative writing as an artform because it is concerned with 
constructing ‘narratives that are meaningful to others’ (Chemi, Jensen, and  Hersted, 2015, pp. 
68, 34). Creating these narratives – shaping stories ‘out of the chaos of continuous sensory 
information’ to make meaning out of this chaos – is viewed as an ‘artistic process’. Fictional 
narratives are thus able to offer ‘a coherence, a meaningful perspective on the world’ (Fuller, 
1998, pp. 1, 12).  
Chapter 3 argued that this meaning-making aspect of the artistic creative process can be 
attributed to the work of the imagination which functions as the agent tasked with producing 
this meaning, primarily in the form of metaphor (see Chap. 3, pp. 94-98). The chapter thus 
asserted that the imagination is integral to the art-making process (see p. 99); a proposition that 
forms the fourth, and perhaps most significant, thread in support of  the contention that  
creative writing is an artform.  Chapter 4 clearly demonstrated the extent to which artists, 
inadvertently or deliberately, use active imagination and inner dialoguing in their creative 
processes. This was found to be so integral to the artistic creative process that the imaginal 
space in which this occurs was placed at the centre of the proposed model. The writers’ accounts 
discussed above reflect a similar view of the imagination as lying at the heart of this process, a 
view strongly supported by research scholarship that argues that the imagination is integral, 
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even critical, to the creative writing process (Glück, Ernst and Unger, 2002; Collins, 2003; 
Barbot et al., 2012; Boyd, 2009; Freiman, 2015b; Smith, 2015; Fontana, 2016).  
According to this view, the imagination ranks as a ‘critical factor’ on the list of essential 
skills for creative writing (Barbot et al., 2012 p. 218). This is because the imagination, which is 
deeply embedded in the unconscious (Fontana 2016), so encompasses the “unreflected”, 
emotional aspects of the writing process (Glück, Ernst and Unger, 2002) that the entire process 
is dependent on the writer’s ability ‘to focus attention on an inner sensory experience’ and 
explore ‘the vast range of imagery available through the memory’ and the imagination (Smith, 
p. 42). For this reason, ‘the mind’s capacity for figurative thought, creative leaps, and fictional 
representation is becoming an increasingly important focus both for cognitive scientists and for 
scholars of literature’  (Freiman, 2015b, p. 130). In her insightful overview of brain research 
studies investigation the neurobiology of the imagination, Freiman posits that this research can 
provide a ‘convincing cognitive framework for the aspectual, visual and spatial aspects of 
imagination, and for their function in imaginative and narrative writing’ (p.153).  
However, she also asserts that ‘this capacity for the writing of the creative or literary 
text occurs, perhaps, even more vividly “as experience”’(p. 135) thereby lending additional and 
highly significant support for the hypothesis that a neurophenomenological model could offer 
a more satisfying account of the creative writing process.  
The Neurophenomenology of the Fiction Writing Process 
The conceptualisation of creative writing as an artform strongly suggests that the 
neurophenomenological model of the artistic creative process can be adapted to provide a 
meaningful and satisfying account of the complex, multi-layered process underlying the 
production of imaginative prose. The figure overleaf demonstrates how easily this adaptation is 
accomplished.  It only requires two minor changes namely, specifying that the artist concerned 
is a fiction writer and refining the criteria under Idea Expression, so that the generic constraint 
of medium and material is replaced by the domain specific constraints of medium, language, 
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style and genre. That the model can be adapted with such ease is only one indication that it can 
be applied to the fiction writing process. Far more compelling evidence is provided by the 
narrative of this process as depicted in the adapted model. 
Figure 2: A Neurophenomenological Model of the Creative Writing Process 
 
According to this model, the neurobiology of the fiction writing process is rooted in the two 
key neural networks of the DMN and the DAN which, respectively, give rise to two distinct 
modes of thinking. The process begins when the writer becomes aware of spontaneously 
generated material arising from the unconscious, i.e. content surfacing from the activation of 
the DMN. The writer’s active engagement with this emotionally charged material, encourages 
the generation of yet more DMN material, and this ongoing dynamic gives rise to the content 
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of the text. The DMN is thus the neural network most closely associated with Idea Generation. 
However, when the writer’s attention shifts to focus on Idea Expression, the mode of thinking 
activated is that of the task-related DAN. This shift in mode is occasioned by the writer’s 
attention shifting from the inward focus of the DMN to an external focus on the production 
of the material artefact, i.e. the production of the physical text and its subsequent revisions.  
These attentional shifts between the DMN and the DAN take place throughout the process as 
the writer engages in the hard work of giving the emerging DMN content coherent form and 
structure through the activation of the DAN. Thus, while each neural network is responsible 
for a specific mode of thinking, the two networks are in constant dynamic interaction with each 
other throughout the process. In this way, content and form both shape and are shaped by each 
other.  
The model thus depicts a writing process that is initiated by the emergence of 
spontaneously generated, compelling images arising from his/her unconscious, that are 
discerned through intuition and felt sense. These images are affectively sensed because they are 
formed from the emotionally tagged components that make up the spontaneously generated 
images produced by the DMN in its random processing. The images are thus charged with an 
emotional valence and the higher the valence, the more intense the writer’s experience of the 
emergence of this material, i.e. the more heightened the moment of inspiration. The writer’s 
playful engagement with this emerging material encourages the further generation of ideas that 
increases the level of inner tension until the writer begins the deliberate act of drafting the 
physical text. The shift to the external materiality of the text activates the DAN, the network 
that enables the considered, conscious thinking that characterises the work of further refining 
the initial writing through the extensive and detail revision. However, the writer will continue 
to experience periods of incubation occasioned by the rather haphazard nature of DMN 
processing. This haphazard and unpredictable processing also gives rise to the writer’s 
experience of writing into uncertainty, the unknown where the act of writing continues to be 
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impacted by the dynamic interaction of the DMN and DAN.  The writer experiences this 
interaction in the form of inner dialogues that take place in imaginal space in which he/she 
engages in imagined conversations with the imaginary characters and the developing text. The 
writer is thus consciously aware of the way the generated ideas and the unfolding artwork both 
shape and are shaped by the other. This explanation closely mirrors the descriptions of the 
writing process as described by the fiction writers in their accounts. It is therefore possible to 
posit that the narrative of the fiction writing process suggested by the model therefore not only 
describes the process in a coherent and systemic way but also demonstrates a clear causal link 
between the unfolding of the phenomenology of the process and its underlying neurobiology.  
Furthermore, it intimates that the writer’s experience of the fiction writing process unfolding 
the way it does, is embedded in the very brain activity that gives rise to the production of 
imaginative text and that this brain activity is further activated and stimulated as the writer 
actively engages in the lived experience of writing creatively. There are research findings that 
offer persuasive support for this notion.  
Fuller’s research study, cited in the previous chapter, found that ‘students writing 
imaginative narratives used a greater number and richer array of cognitive operations than when 
writing narratives to report and explore’ (see Chap. 6,  p. 188). Like Fuller, contemporary 
researchers are curious to discover ‘how writers think when they write narratives’ (Fuller, p. 32).  
Their concern is particularly focused on the non-cognitive aspects of the writing process, i.e. 
the connection between the DMN and literary text production.  Their studies are yielding 
persuasive evidence that supports the neurophenomenological model of the creative writing 
process proposed here.  
Story generation has attracted much interest and studies are consistently finding that 
story generation is closely associated with DMN activity (Howard-Jones et al., 2005; Andrews-
Hanna, et.al., 2010; Shah, et.al., 2013). An fMRI mapping of neural correlates shows increased 
levels of bilateral activity across ‘a number of left and right prefrontal regions’; the kind of brain 
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activity that facilitates the integration of ‘semantically unrelated material’ (Howard-Jones et al., 
2005, p. 249) in a range of ‘spontaneous cognitive processes’ (Andrews-Hanna, et.al., 2010, p. 
322) that enables ‘free associative and spontaneous’ text production (Shah, et.al., 2013, p. 1100). 
These findings are consistent with neuroscientific research that associates the spontaneous 
processing of the DMN with the brain activity termed ‘spreading activation’, thereby accounting 
for aspects of the creative process such as inspiration,  intuition and incubation (see for example, 
Dietrich, 2004; Blair, 2009; Berlin, 2011; Gilhooly, Georgiou and Devery, 2013; Thagard, 2014; 
Pinho et al., 2016). 
However, researchers are not just finding correlations between DMN and creative 
writing  as regards processing. Others are exploring possible links between DMN content and 
imaginative literary text production. Nathan Spreng and Cheryl Grady (2009), for example, find 
that autobiographical remembering, prospection, and theory-of-mind reasoning all engage ‘a 
common set of brain regions largely overlapping with the DMN’ (p.1121), a finding validated 
in more recent research study conducted by Jung, Flores and Hunter, 2016. Both studies 
conclude that it is the DMN that makes it possible for us to project ourselves into the past, into 
the future and into the minds of others, which, as Erik Bohman (2016) points out is exactly 
what a fiction writer is doing when he/she is creates a fictional world peopled with imaginary 
but very believable characters. Findings such as these lend substance to the clearly expressed, 
research-based argument presented by Mario Garcia (2015) that literary narrative is a reflection 
of the way the brain works. He defines literary narrative very broadly as ‘a complex sequence 
of words that describes imaginary events’ before presenting his argument that ‘literary narrative 
is the result of an unconscious computation in the brain, a computation that arises from the 
dynamical interaction of specific innate … neuronal circuits and mappings’ and that these 
‘specific circuits constitute the fundamental building blocks of literary narrative’ (p. 22). His 
demonstration includes research to show that the ‘unconscious retrieval of episodic memory’ 
occurs ‘during the production of literary narrative’ and  that ‘memory simulations’ stored in 
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long term memory have the ability ‘to interact with other circuits, and can thus be subsumed 
into the larger activation pattern of literary narrative’, in other words, ‘these neuronal circuits 
interact in some (unconscious) fashion’ to create  this narrative. His thus asserts that literary 
narrative is the outflow of  ‘an unconscious, metastable pattern of activity in the brain which 
eventually becomes conscious’ (p. 31). However, because this unconscious metastable activity 
draws so heavily on episodic memory and memory simulations, literary narrative always has ‘an 
individual human point of view’; for it ‘is infused with and coloured by’ the author’s ‘complex 
spectrum of human emotions, thought, and experience’. Garcia therefore argues that, because 
literary narrative draws upon individual experience to tell a unique human story, 
two similar brains, with similar capacities to build neuronal 
representational circuits, living at the same time, in the same culture, 
with similar human universals and so on, will create unique literary 
narratives because they draw upon the aggregate experiences of the 
individual brains which create them (p.30) 
 
While he makes no specific mention of the DMN, his argument aligns closely with the research 
into DMN content and processing cited in Chapter 5 (see p. 140-141).  
 These contributions reflect the growing attention being paid to the non-cognitive 
aspects of the creative writing process, in particular the connection between the DMN and 
literary text production. While they are early explorations of this connection, they nevertheless 
provide persuasive evidence to supports the hypothesis that the fiction writing process is 
meaningfully reflected in the neurophenomenological model proposed above. This support, 
however, is significantly augmented by all the research that informs the model of the artistic 
creative process. By contextualising the fiction writing process within the broader framework 
of the neurophenomenology of the artistic creative process, the research that informs this 
framework, can, by implication, also enrich this model of the fiction writing process, thereby 
providing rich potential for further research.  
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A SIGNIFICANT OUTCOME AND TWO KEY INSIGHTS 
The most significant outcome of this neurophenomenological model of the fiction writing 
process is that it provides clear answers to the four research questions posed at the beginning 
of this dissertation, namely,  
1. How does one explore a process widely regarded as inherently unknowable, 
immeasurable, and thus, largely unquantifiable?   
2. How best can one investigate a process that is fundamentally artistic, emotional 
and solitary?   
3. How can one describe a process closely associated with the Romantic notions 
of ‘inspiration’, ‘intuition’ and ‘imagination’ so that these terms are used in a 
critically specific way?  
4. Is it, ultimately, possible to develop a model that embraces both the critical 
thinking necessary for text production, as well as the creative thinking necessary 
for text creation?  
The model and its narrative account of the fiction writing process clearly shows that, by 
adopting a neurophenomenological approach, it is possible to explore a process that has widely 
been regarded as inherently unknowable, immeasurable, and thus, largely unquantifiable. This 
approach not only embraces the consistencies in writers’ accounts, but also provides a 
neurobiological explanation for how the process unfolds and why it unfolds the way it does. 
Moreover, the juxtaposing of the phenomenology of the process with empirical evidence drawn 
from neurobiological research reflects the causal link between the two in a way that allows these 
first-hand subjective accounts to inform and be informed by third hand objective knowledge 
so that each is enriched by the other. The model is thus able to provide a coherent and systemic  
account of a process that is fundamentally artistic, subjective and solitary. More importantly, it 
is able to incorporate the notions of inspiration, intuition, incubation and imagination in a 
critically specific way through its neurobiological underpinning. The model therefore 
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demonstrates that it is possible to arrive at a conceptualisation of the fiction writing process 
that embraces both its cognitive and non-cognitive aspects, i.e. the critical thinking necessary 
for text production, as well as the creative thinking necessary for text creation. 
 In addition to offering clear answers to the four research questions posed at the 
beginning of this dissertation, the model also highlights two key insights that impact 
conceptualisations of the fiction writing process in significant ways. The first is that this process 
can be more meaningfully contextualised as a DMN-driven process, and the second, closely 
aligned with the first, is that creative writing could be better, and more accurately  defined as 
imaginative writing.  
Both the narrative provided by the model and the writers’ accounts demonstrate the 
substantial role played by the DMN in the writing process. Its role is not confined to the initial 
stage of Idea Generation; there is strong evidence to indicate that the DMN exerts a powerful 
influence on the writing process from beginning to end. Once the writer engages with a 
spontaneously generated image that invites further exploration, the DMN continues to play a 
key role in the unpredictable folding of the ideas that comprise the content of the literary text. 
As both the model and the writers’ accounts show, this unfolding can occur even in the final 
drafting of the literary text. Furthermore, the DMN also exerts a strong influence on the 
structuring and shaping of the form of the literary text where its dictates, communicated 
through felt sense, often over-ride the more conscious, deliberate plans of the writer. The 
powerful presence of the DMN throughout the process thus strongly suggests the process is 
more meaningfully contextualised as a DMN-driven one.  
The second insight arising from the neurophenomenological model and its 
accompanying narrative, is that the imagination lies at the heart of the phenomenology of the 
fiction writing process. This will come as no surprise to fiction writers who clearly are quite 
comfortable with idea the imagination plays an integral role in their writing process, as 
evidenced by the frequent references to the imagination in their accounts. Academic 
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scholarship, however, has shown a marked reluctance to embrace this notion, with this  
reluctance being attributed to the imagination’s  fall from grace as scientific enquiry moved into 
ascendancy.  The result of this, as Guilford pointed out, is that the imagination came to be 
regarded as a vague, untestable concept. The model challenges this premise by demonstrating 
that it is now possible to conceptualise the imagination in meaningful way, namely, as the lived 
experience of the dynamic interaction between the DMN and the DAN. Evidence supporting 
this notion lies in the close correlations in the findings emerging from contemporary research 
into the imagination and those arising from research into the DMN. As demonstrated earlier, 
both these research initiatives show a clear overlap in the brain functions associated with the 
imagination and those linked to DMN activity (see pp.160-162). It is thus possible to assert with 
some level of confidence that, broadly speaking, because the imagination is so integral to the 
creative writing process, it would be more accurate to define creative writing as imaginative 
writing.  That said it is important to note that the discussion in this chapter must be tempered 
by three caveats, namely, that the application of the neurophenomenological model of the 
artistic creative process has only been applied to one of the key genres in creative writing (fiction 
writing or the production of imaginative prose); that this genre is largely constraint-free beyond 
those self-imposed by the individual writer; and that the model explains the process only in 
terms of the two key neural networks, i.e. the DAN and the DMN. Contemporary research 
indicates that the model could be enriched, extended or modified by these factors, as will now 
be argued.  
The first caveat is that the specific writing process that has been discussed in terms of 
the proposed model is the process used in the production of imaginative prose, i.e. the process 
involved in the writing of fiction. More particularly, the discussion has focussed on those 
aspects of the process that are essentially solitary, subjective, and private. This not to say that 
the fiction writer does not seek advice, comment or critical feedback from others, or that the 
fiction writer writes in a vacuum, unaffected by his or her socio-cultural environment. These 
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too are part of the broader experience of fiction writing, but they do not fall within the ambit 
of the particular focus of this research project and so have not be addressed in this dissertation. 
This chapter has demonstrated the close correlations between the neuro-
phenomenological model of the artistic creative process and the specific process of producing 
imaginative prose. However, it cannot be simply assumed that this model will hold true for all 
forms of creative writing. Some studies suggest this may well be the case, but other studies 
suggest otherwise. For example, an in-depth study aimed at investigating brain activity during 
poetry composition, yields a neurobiological map that is very similar to the one discussed above 
(Lui, et. al., 2015). Basing their study on the Idea Generation/Idea Evaluation or Revision 
model, the researchers find clear indications that the neurobiological process of poetry 
composition is grounded in two brain systems, namely, ‘the medial prefrontal (MPFC) regions, 
representing anterior elements of the default mode network, and dorsolateral prefrontal regions 
and parietal cortices (DLPFC/DAN) that regulate executive control’ and that the dynamic, 
reciprocal  interactions between them ‘lie at the heart’ of creative behaviour (p. 3368). They also 
find that the generation of novel poems ‘elicited increased activity throughout the MPFC 
[DMN] but decreased activity in the DLPFC [DAN]’ (p. 3364). However, they find that revision 
is strongly associated with increased activity in the DAN which, they say, ‘suggests that self-
monitoring and top-down attentional processes, suspended during the generation phase, are 
robustly reengaged during the revision phase’ (p.3366). This brief summary of some of their 
findings mirrors the findings of the neurobiological research that underpins the proposed 
model. This in turn suggests that the proposed model could be applied to the writing of poetry, 
providing some valuable insights into the neurobiology and phenomenology of that writing 
process. 
However, a study of the writing process of screenwriters describes a process that differs 
from that used in fiction writing in quite marked ways, that highlights the second caveat, namely, 
the way constraints may impact the writing process a demonstrated in a study of the process of 
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screenplay writing (Bourgeois-Bougrine, et.al., 2014). Basing their investigation on the accounts 
of twenty-two French screenplay writers, the researchers propose a three-stage model of this 
process, comprising the stages of Impregnation, Structuring & Planning, and Production. While 
traces of the kind of DMN and DAN activity and interaction outlined in the model can be 
found in the screenplay writers’ accounts, their process is greatly impacted by three factors that 
are absent from the fiction writers’ accounts. For example, only 36% of the screenplay writers 
reported writing a script ‘animated by an intrinsic desire or need to create a film’ (p.389); the 
remaining writers said their screenplays were commissioned by directors or producers to fulfil 
a specific brief i.e. to undertake a specific writing task. Secondly, screenplay writers spoke of 
needing to clarify and hone their understanding of the brief ‘through discussions with the 
director or peers’ (p. 390), with all but one of them, writing in collaboration with others such as 
the director, the producer or other writers.  Thirdly, screenplay writers were also constrained by 
the need to meet sponsor requirements. They report having frequent meetings with such 
sponsors to ‘define the characters, the topic of the film, set the tone, and decide on the genre 
(all within the constraints of the film budget)’ (p. 391). The process thus described by these 
screenplay writers differs from that of fiction writers in that it is far more task-focussed, much 
more collaborative, and significantly shaped by external constraints. Divergences such as these 
point to the need for genre specific research within field of Creative Writing to ascertain the 
extent to which the proposed model can accommodate variances like these. They also highlight 
the strong possibility that the close correlations between the proposed model and the fiction 
writing process only arise because fiction writing is largely free of the kinds of external 
constraints imposed on the screenplay writers. This is not to say that fiction writing is 
completely constraint free, but it is clear from the accounts cited in this chapter that the 
constraints impacting fiction writing are internal constraints imposed by the writers themselves, 
such as the decision to write within a specific sub-genre of imaginative prose, restrict themselves 
to first-person narrative, or structure the narrative in a non-linear fashion. These constraints 
253 
 
may be as exacting as the external constraints faced by the screenplay writers, but they may not 
impact the writing process in the same way. Further research is needed on this particular aspect 
of the writing process.  
The final caveat draws attention to the fact that the model is based on a consideration 
of only the two key neural networks, the DMN and the DAN. This can give rise to the 
misleading impression that the fiction writing process only involves these two neural networks, 
when, in fact, contemporary neuroscientific research shows that the brain ‘is a highly complex 
system composed of functionally interconnected neural networks’ that are in constant 
interaction with one another (Beaty, et. al., 2014, p. 94); an interaction marked by the way both 
the DMN and the DAN will rapidly couple and decouple with smaller networks in specific brain 
regions on an ad hoc basis (Fedorenko, and Thompson-Schill, 2014), depending on what is 
needed in the moment. So, for example, Lui, et. al. (2015) observe that, during the generation 
phase of poetry composition, when the DMN is highly active, there is associated activity in the 
language-related areas of the brain that constitute the language network. They speculate that it 
is through this coupling that the spontaneously degenerated ideas emerging from DMN activity 
are encoded into language. Furthermore, they posit that the second coupling they observed 
during the generation phase, namely a coupling with the regions associated with emotional 
processing ‘could contribute to the spontaneous production of more vivid sensorimotor images 
or more innovative uses of sound during the generation phase, ultimately resulting in poems 
that were judged to be more engaging’ (p. 3368). However, these can still only be speculations 
at this point, for ‘the study of brain networks (functional connectivity) is complex and in its 
infancy’); some of this complexity arising from the fact that ‘networks are not static: they change 
under different task conditions as well as during different stages of a single task’ (Fedorenko 
and Thompson-Schill, 2014, p. 120). Nevertheless, some of these early explorations into this 
complex field are yielding insights that could further enrich the model proposed in this 
dissertation. For instance, the study cited above suggests that the way the DMN couples with 
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the regionally located networks associated with language, visualisation, sound and emotional 
processing could possibly provide an explanation for the compelling images fiction writers 
report as being so haunting they are impelled to begin writing. Other studies that highlight the 
immense fluidity of these networks, including the DMN and the DAN, could explain why the 
writers experience the writing process as so unpredictable, uncertain and beyond their conscious 
control (Fedorenko and Thompson-Schill, 2014); research into the semantic network, that 
network thought to be responsible for assigning meaning and found to be strongly coupled 
during DMN processing (Binder, et. el., 2009; Binder and Desai, 2011), could explain the 
generation of spontaneous images that need “decoding” into language, and the coupling of the 
language region with the DAN during the writing and revision stages (Lui, et. al, 2015) could 
explain why writers find it so hard to put these sensed images into words during the conscious, 
deliberate act of crafting the text.  These are all possibilities that await further research, and it 
for this reason that these more specialised networks have not been included in the proposed 
model. That said, the cited studies offer the strong possibility that this research will only serve 
to refine and enrich the proposed model.  
 This chapter has argued that, because Creative Writing can be regarded as an artform, 
the neurophenomenological model of the artistic creative process proposed in Chapter 5 can 
also provide a coherent and systemic account of the process underlying the production of 
imaginative literary text. It then demonstrated how, with some minor changes, the model can 
be applied to the process of fiction writing, with the neurobiological component of the model 
furnishing a systemic explanation for the phenomenology of this process as reflected in the 
accounts provided by a wide range of fiction writers. Furthermore, this application of the model 
to the fiction writing process has yielded two additional insights, namely, the extent to which  
fiction writing is primarily a DMN-driven process, and the possibility that what fiction writers 
identify as the workings of their imagination could be the explained as their lived experience of 
the dynamic interaction between the DMN and DAN. The chapter thus concludes that this this 
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neurophenomenological model demonstrates that it is possible to explore in a process widely 
regarded as being unknowable because it is essentially a deeply subjective and intensely private 
and internal process. Moreover, the neurobiological component of the model makes it possible 
to discuss the concepts of intuition, inspiration, incubation and imagination in a critical way. 
The model thus provides a coherent and systemic account of the fiction writing process that 
encompasses both the creative and critical aspects of this process. It thus offers clear answers 
to the research questions presented in this dissertation. The concluding chapter that follows 
outlines the implications and limitations of this neurophenomenological conceptualisation of 
the fiction writing process and suggests possible avenues for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
256 
 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
The previous chapter argued that, because creative writing can be conceptualised as an artform, 
the neurophenomenological model of the artistic creative process is able to provide a coherent 
and systemic account of the fiction writing process. It demonstrated how closely writers’ 
accounts paralleled those of the artists’ accounts examined in Chapter 4, and the extent to which 
these accounts are reflected in the neurophenomenological model. The chapter thus concluded 
that the fiction writing process can be effectively represented by this model. Moreover, the 
application of this model to the writing process yielded a significant outcome and two key 
insights. In the first instance, it showed that the model is able to provide clear answers to the 
questions regarding those aspects of the writing process previously thought to be inherently  
unknowable, immeasurable, and unquantifiable. These answers in turn provide an explanation 
for this fundamentally subjective and solitary experience; an explanation  that embraces both 
the critical thinking necessary for text production, as well as the creative thinking necessary for 
text creation. In the second instance, the application drew attention to two key insights absent 
from previous conceptualisations of the fiction writing process, namely, that the process is 
primarily a DMN-driven one and that the pivotal role played by the imagination in the process 
strongly suggests that fiction writing is better conceptualised as imaginative writing.  
 This chapter discusses the implications and impact of this model of the fiction writing  
process, before outlining the limitations of the dissertation’s argument and suggesting 
possibilities for future research. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the dissertation’s 
central argument.  
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DISSERTATION OVERVIEW  
This dissertation has argued that Creative Writing as a field of study is in a state of flux and 
indecision regarding its purpose. It highlighted the many, often contradictory,  perspectives that 
have given rise to the field’s unsettled status, reliance on unquestioned assumptions and 
perpetuation of unexamined practices. One of the reasons for this lack of shared understanding 
is that the field has not yet developed a distinctive epistemology; blame for which has been laid 
squarely at the door of Creative Writing scholars. This is not entirely justified.  The fault line 
can be traced back to the seminal address given by JP Guilford that laid the foundation for the 
wave of creativity research which followed. When early creativity researchers adopted 
Guilford’s research plan as their research paradigm, they overlooked the explicitly stated 
limitations of that plan. Guilford not only specifically excluded artists from his research 
investigation, but also dismissed the very elements integral to their process, such as intuition, 
incubation, inspiration and imagination. Investigations into artistic creativity were therefore 
overshadowed by those concerned with exploring the process underlying scientific discovery 
and technological innovation. The ensuing creativity discourse was thus restricted to 
explorations within a rationalist-positivist framework. As a consequence, the creative process 
came to be regarded as a form of problem-solving, and thus a process adequately described in 
purely rational terms. This perspective in turn led to the widely held view that both artist and 
scientist used the same uniform process to produce vastly divergent creative products, ranging 
from the scientific report to the lyric poem.  
  The dissertation, however, has challenged this view, arguing that the artistic creative 
process can readily be distinguished from the processes used in scientific discovery. It has drawn 
on scholarship within the domain debate to posit that the creative process is domain specific 
and that the two processes are, in fact, distinctly different. Of particular relevance to the 
dissertation’s argument is an easily overlooked observation made by Graham Wallas (1926) 
when he proposed his four-stage model. He asserted that, while the creative process might 
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follow the same broad pattern, the specific constraints imposed by the respective domains give 
rise to distinctive processes. This was particularly evident when one considered the role played 
by the imagination in each of these domains.  Wallas asserted that, while the imagination played 
a minor role in the process of scientific discovery, it was integral to the artistic creative process. 
 In its exploration of this proposition, the dissertation took its cue from the paradigm  
shift in the research landscape that occurred in the 1990s. This shift saw a rise in 
phenomenologically-based research and the advent of practice-led research, both of which 
served to provide a research framework that could accommodate first-hand accounts of the 
creative process. A number of phenomenologically-based studies demonstrated the efficacy of 
this approach, providing a compelling background for an in-depth analysis of four dissertations 
on the phenomenology of the artistic creative process. This analysis showed that artistic 
creativity involves a far more complex, multi-layered process than that of the comparatively 
much simpler problem-solving approach used in the sciences. More specifically, it showed that 
this process is almost totally reliant on the imagination for both the generation of the content 
of the artwork and the shaping of its physical form, thereby providing convincing support for 
Wallas’s intuitive observation. Furthermore, this phenomenological approach also shed light on 
a number of valuable insights overlooked in previous studies, for example, how inspiration 
arises from idea conception, the importance of attentional shifts, the dynamic of inner 
dialogues, the many periods of incubation and the role played by intuition and felt sense 
throughout the process. The dissertation thus argued that the value of adopting a 
phenomenological approach in explorations of the creative process, which embraces first-hand 
accounts of the lived experience of the artistic creative process, allows for explorations of the 
‘inner’ or subconscious aspects of this process. In other words,  this approach facilitates an 
investigation of those non-cognitive aspects that, while largely absent from the process of 
scientific discovery, nevertheless, characterise the artistic creative process.  
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The dissertation then proposed a model for this process and demonstrated the extent 
to which this model provided a systemic account of the process as reported by the artists. 
However, it augmented this demonstration with neurobiological evidence that provided 
compelling support for the model. Of particular relevance, were the findings emerging from 
contemporary research into the key neural networks of the DMN and the DAN. An in-depth 
discussion of these findings not only showed how neurobiology is able to offer a clear 
explanation for how and why the artistic creative process unfolds as it does; it also posited that 
there is a direct, causal link between the neurobiology of the process and its phenomenology as 
reported in first-hand accounts. The proposed model thus embraces both perspectives in its 
depiction of this creative process; a combination made possible by a recent addition to the 
research stable, namely, neurophenomenology. This is an approach that allows subjective first-
hand accounts to sit alongside objective third-hand knowledge in a mutually beneficial and 
enriching relationship.  For this reason, the model is able to reflect the artists’ accounts of their 
lived experience in a way that validates their experience, with its Romantic notions of 
inspiration, incubation, intuition, because of the critical underpinning provided by 
neurobiological research.  
The dissertation then returned to its central concern, the creative writing process. It 
used the context of the model to demonstrate that cognitive process models have not been able 
to provide a meaningful account of the creative writing process because their focus has been 
primarily DAN-dominated writing. By contrast, there are clear indications in a new conversation 
emerging within the modern academic discourse on Creative Writing that the creative writing 
process is primarily, a DMN-driven one.  It is thus a process that could be better explained by 
the proposed neurophenomenological model. The dissertation concluded its argument by 
allowing the artists, silenced by Guilford’s address to have the last word. It examined the 
accounts of a range of fiction writers from Samuel Richardson writing in the 18th century to 
contemporary authors and identified the high levels of consistency in these accounts. The 
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discussion that followed demonstrated how closely and accurately these consistencies are 
reflected in the proposed model. These close correlations provided further evidence that the 
proposed model effectively answered the research questions posed at the beginning of this 
dissertation. The dissertation thus concluded that the model unequivocally demonstrates its 
ability to provide a meaningful framework for explorations of  a process widely regarded as 
inherently unknowable, immeasurable, and largely unquantifiable. It is the neuro-
phenomenological approach, in particular, that enables an investigation of a fundamentally 
subjective and solitary process and provides a coherent and systemic description of the fiction 
writing process that incorporates the notions of ‘inspiration’, ‘intuition’, incubation, and 
‘imagination’ in a critically specific way. The finding of this dissertation is therefore that this 
neurophenomenological model is able to provide a coherent and systemic account of the fiction 
writing process that embraces both the critical thinking necessary for text production, as well 
as the creative thinking necessary for text creation. The implications of this finding are 
significant for Creative Writing as a field of study. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CREATIVE WRITING 
The neurophenomenological model of the fiction writing process, and the coherent, systemic 
account of this process that it offers, holds significant implications for Creative Writing as a 
field of study. Of particular significance is the contribution it makes to the academic discourse 
with regards to the issues raised in Chapter 1, namely, the extent to which the field is 
characterised by undefined terms, unquestioned assumptions and unexamined practices. The 
model addresses these issues by bringing definition to terminology, clarity to conceptualisations, 
and a sound framework that can further enrich the discourse. It does so in a number of ways, 
among them the following: 
1. The model offers a clear answer to the question of what exactly is meant by “creative 
writing”, showing quite plainly how this kind of writing differs from other kinds of 
writing. In essence, the model shows that creative writing is writing that is primarily 
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imaginative writing, i.e. writing that draws extensively on the imagination for its content 
and form. Neurobiologically speaking, creative writing is writing that is predominantly 
DMN-driven in that it draws on contents and processes that lie beneath the writer’s 
awareness. It is thus writing that is largely shaped by the non-cognitive, subjective, 
affective aspects of the creative process. The writer experiences this neural activity 
through imaginative engagement with the spontaneously generated material, i.e. through 
his / her imagination. The model thus suggests that the term “imaginative writing” is a 
more accurate descriptor for the kind of writing that gives rise to the production of 
literary text.  
2. This refined definition addresses the issue of the terms imaginative and creative being 
used interchangeably as though they mean the same thing. The model demonstrates that 
this is not so and, in so doing,  gives substance to Harper’s intuitive observation that 
“imaginative” refers to ‘the projection of mental images, whereas “creative” refers to 
something new’ (Chap. 1, p. 14). As already mentioned, Harper does not pursue this 
line of thought in any great depth, failing to point out that the appellation “creative” 
can only be applied in hindsight, to the finished work which then shows itself to be 
sufficiently so new that it challenges prevailing paradigms.  This is the contention of 
both Briskman (2009) and Sternberg (2006) who posit that the term “creative” is an 
evaluation of a finished work and not a descriptor for the process of producing that 
work. The model’s depiction of the writing process as an imaginative one is thus a more 
accurate reflection of a process that may or may not lead to a literary text that is deemed 
creative in that it redefines boundaries, shifts paradigms and / or opens up new avenues.  
3. The model also offers a coherent, systemic account of the fiction writing process, i.e.  
the process involved in the production of imaginative prose, that embraces both its 
cognitive and non-cognitive aspects through its neurobiological underpinning of the 
dynamic interaction between the DMN and the DAN. The model thus not only 
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describes the process but also explains why it unfolds the way it does. In so doing, the 
model addresses one of the key underlying uncertainties in the Creative Writing 
discourse, namely, can creative writing be taught? The model suggests that the process 
can certainly be understood and explained in a way that embraces both the subjective 
experience of the process and the neural activity that underpins it. Furthermore, it 
shows that while the craft skills can be taught because they fall under the umbrella of 
the DAN, the non-cognitive aspects of the writing process, those that fall under the 
umbrella of the DMN, can nevertheless be stimulated, encouraged and nurtured. This 
is turn suggests that the Creative Writing as a field of study should embrace activities 
that develop both the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of the process.   
4. For this reason, the model offers a sound framework that can inform the pedagogy of 
Creative Writing, particularly with regard to the writing of imaginative prose. In the first 
instance, it can assist writer-teachers to develop a clear understanding of their own 
processes and therefore place them in a better position to communicate that 
understanding to their students. Moreover, sharing this framework with the students 
could help students navigate their own writing process in a more self-aware way in the 
manner of other writers (Sonik, 2006b; Ruddy, 2005; Woolfe, 2007, Fontana, 2016). In 
the second instance, the model enables a re-framing of the writing workshop space. 
Instead of it being a space dominated by the critical reading of the text, and the teaching 
of craft skills, it could also be a space for idea generation in the form of pre-writing, 
collaborations on plot and character development in non-judgemental discussions, and 
the playful exploration of new possibilities. In the third instance, the model can facilitate 
more meaningful feedback by providing both teacher and student with a shared 
understanding of what part of the process needs more attention and how to address 
identified weaknesses with specific strategies.  
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5. In addition to the practical benefits the model can offer Creative Writing pedagogy, it 
holds significant potential to inform, enrich and guide the broader academic discourse. 
Through its clear framework, the model can play an instrumental role in facilitating the 
development of a common language, the building of a shared understanding, and the 
constructing of a distinctive epistemology, all of which have been identified as currently 
unresolved issues.   
6. The model’s inclusion of the phenomenology of the fiction writing process as reflected 
in writers’ accounts not only means that these accounts can serve as a valuable 
pedagogical resource, but that Creative Writing scholars can use these accounts more 
freely in their research. The model thus reinstates the value of the wealth of material 
contained in writers’ accounts, material explicitly excluded from consideration by 
Guilford. In this way the model asserts that Creative Writing is a discipline that already 
enjoys ‘a robust tradition of theory – written by writers, for writers’ (Adsit, 2017, p. 
313); it just hasn’t been acknowledged or scientifically / academically  formulated. The 
model addresses this gap by providing a scientifically based formulation of the writer’s 
experience. It thus demonstrates how this wealth of scholarship could also be used to 
develop a distinctive epistemology for Creative Writing. 
7. The model’s contextualisation within the broader framework of the artistic creative 
process is significant for two reason. First, it means that the substantial body of research 
that underpins the model of the artistic creative process can be mined for keener insights 
into the fiction writing process. Second, it opens up the possibility of a new discourse, 
namely, a mutually enriching conversation between Creative Writing and the other 
artistic disciplines where research, knowledge and insights can be shared and exchanged 
because the model provides a framework that could facilitate such a conversation.  
This list of possible implications is not exhaustive, but it does demonstrate the significant 
contribution this dissertation can make to the Creative Writing discourse by informing a fresh 
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conceptualisation of creative writing and its underlying process. This fresh conceptualisation 
can shape the theories, practices and pedagogy within this field of study,  thereby facilitating the 
development of the distinctive epistemology it so sorely needs as posited by. These theories and 
this epistemology, however, will be need to be balanced with the realities of practice along the 
lines suggested by Suze Adams (2014) who defines the role of theory as  
the imparting of information to the practice (the critical analysis that 
underpins practical investigation); as making the practice aware of 
something, acquainting with knowledge of a subject (the multi-layered 
inﬂuence of theory in practice); as giving form or character to, imbuing 
with a quality (the rigour of the practice); and as being a pervasive 
presence in or animating (the underlying presence of theory in practice 
– implicit or pervasive critical presence) (p. 224) 
 
This dissertation demonstrates how this can be achieved and thus makes a valuable contribution 
to Creative Writing discourse, bringing some much-needed clarity to its definition of terms, 
providing a critical framework for future research enquiries and encouraging a more coherent 
conversation.  
LIMITATIONS 
The dissertation, of necessity, has a very broad scope owing to the nature of its subject. At the 
outset it quickly became apparent that it was virtually impossible to discuss the term “creative 
writing” without reference to the definition of “creative” arising from decades of creativity 
research. A closer examination of this scholarship showed a clear bias towards scientific 
creativity and a strong emphasis on rationalist-positivist explanations of the creative process. It 
then became necessary to revisit Guilford’s address and the Wallas model to build an 
understanding of how the artistic process came to be seen as just another form of problem-
solving. More research was needed to identify exactly what was not being accommodated in 
this cognitive view of the artistic creative process, before the task of mapping this process as 
experienced by the artists themselves. This necessitated research into phenomenology and 
phenomenologically-based research methods. In the course of following these threads, research 
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findings from neurobiological studies became increasingly relevant and this in turn required a 
research journey into a very different terrain. It was thus impossible within the confines of one 
dissertation to address any of these threads in great detail. Furthermore, to narrow the scope of 
the dissertation argument would have left many key elements unaddressed. The decision was 
therefore made to keep the scope broad but the focus very tightly on the creative process and 
more specifically, on its private, interior aspects.   
The decision to keep this broad scope also meant there was little time or space to include 
any kind of empirical testing of the hypotheses proposed in the dissertation’s argument. While 
its argument does provide abundant evidence drawn from other empirical studies in support of 
its contentions, it is essentially a theoretical, and thus untested, argument. 
A further limitation is that while every care was taken to reflect the neuroscientific 
research findings as accurately as possible, the fact remains that these findings have been 
interpreted and applied by a non-neuroscientist. In that respect I share the sentiments of Laura 
Otis (2015), a neuroscientist turned literary scholar who said: ‘I am the worst possible person 
to be writing a book on visually rich mental worlds’ (p.11) because her background lay in the 
sciences. Yet, as her publication shows, sometimes it is the eyes of the uninitiated, the novice, 
that sees possibilities overlooked by the experts. It is in that spirit that I have embarked upon 
these unchartered waters.  
The waters of neurobiology are particularly choppy as this is a very new, but rapidly 
developing field of research, its advances marked by the development of ever-more 
sophisticated technology (Williams and Henson, 2018). For example, Imec (2018), the world-
leading research and innovation hub in nanoelectronics and digital technologies, recently 
announced the launch of a neuropixel probe. This probe, designed to provide  simultaneous 
and long-term recording of hundreds of neurons, enables in vivo neuroscience, i.e. a more 
refined mapping of neural network activity, and its developers believe it will revolutionise the 
way the neuroscience research is performed and ‘propel our understanding of complex brain 
266 
 
processes’ (para. 4). Findings at this level of sophistication may well refine the research on the 
DMN and the DAN cited in the dissertation. However, while neurobiological research may 
reveal yet undiscovered patterns of neural network activity that may impact the scientific 
narrative of the proposed model, the phenomenology of  writing process is unlikely to undergo 
any significant change. This narrative, dating back to Aristotle, is already centuries old and, as 
demonstrated in this dissertation, is a narrative that is only now being scientifically explained by 
neuroscience. The possibility thus exists that advances in neuroscience will only serve to cast 
even more light on the artistic creative process as a whole, and the creative writing process in 
particular.  
POSSIBILTIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The limitations listed above nevertheless point to the rich vein of possibilities for future 
research, especially empirical research studies. Potential research initiatives include:  
• Studies into each of the genres that fall under the Creative Writing umbrella to ascertain 
the extent to which the model also illumines the processes used in each. 
• Studies to explore the suggested link between the imagination and the DMN.  
• Testing the hypothesis that the imagination is the lived experience of the dynamic 
interaction between the DMN and the DAN. 
• An empirical testing of the model with fiction writers.  
• Establishing the efficacy of the model to inform the pedagogy of  the writing workshop. 
• Determining whether the metacognition afforded by the model does in fact help fiction 
writers navigate their writing process.  
• Empirical research into the phenomenon of inner dialogues and the role they play in 
the production on literary text production. 
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• Studies that explore specific aspects of the writing process such as idea generation, 
incubation, intuition, idea expression, the constraints of genre, etc. within the context 
of the systemic account of the process provided by the model. 
• Studies to determine the link between Idea generation and DMN. 
• Studies to determine the link between Idea expression and DAN. 
• Neuroscientific/ neurobiological research that explores the possibilities offered by the 
model and/or aspects of the model  
• Comparative studies across the various artforms to see if the model does provide a 
meaningful account of the artistic creative process. 
• Studies that investigate the possible links between the two thinking modes as proposed 
by cognitive psychologists and the two neural networks 
• Further exploration of the possible differences between DAN-dominated writing and 
DMN-driven writing.  
 
There seems to be no more fitting conclusion to this dissertation than the words of Patrick 
Colm Hogan (2003) that reflect the underlying theme of this contribution to knowledge, 
namely, that 
the arts are not marginal for understanding the human mind. They are 
not even one somewhat signiﬁcant area. They are absolutely central. 
Put differently, if you have a theory of the human mind that does not 
explain the arts, you have a very poor theory of the human mind. 
...cognitive science cannot afford to ignore literature and the arts (p.11). 
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